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Over the last fifteen years, a small group of ecclesiologists has been engaged in 
redefining the object of ecclesiological inquiry and the purpose of ecclesiological 
reflection. These ‘concrete’ ecclesiologies take the historical, sinful, concrete church of 
experience as the object of their theological reflection, and understand ecclesiological 
reflection as practical reasoning in the service of church communities. Concrete 
ecclesiologies borrow methods from qualitative social science in order to attend to the 
concrete church. 
 
This thesis describes concrete ecclesiologies as a distinct field for the first time, defines 
the methodological common sense they share, and traces their roots in twentieth 
century theology and the postmodern cultural context. The theological and 
methodological tensions underlying concrete ecclesiologies are analysed, and cril 
attention is focussed on their use of social science. This critical analysis suggests that 
significant reparative work is needed in order to realise the promise of concrete 
approaches to ecclesiology. Constructive ethnographic and theological work is required 
to develop concrete ecclesiologies’ understandings of (a) the object of ethnographic 
inquiry, (b) the object of ecclesiological inquiry, and (c) the function of ecclesiological 
reflection. 
 
Constructive work commences with a survey of ethnographic understandings of the 
social real. Pragmatic/relational anthropology’s understanding of the social real is used 
as the departure point for a creative theological rethinking of the object of 
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A number of the texts consulted in the writing of this thesis have their own particular 
referencing conventions. 
 
1. Works by Wittgenstein that are organised into separately numbered paragraphs, e.g. 
Zettel, Philosophical Remarks and the first part of the Philosophical Investigations are 
cited by paragraph number (§). The second part of the Investigations and the Blue and 
Brown Books are cited by page number. As the referencing style I use throughout the 
thesis does not employ ‘p.’ or ‘pp.’ to indicate page numbers, a page reference to the 
second part of the Investigations will be indicated by the lack of a preceding paragraph 
marker (§). Thus the reference Investigations §23, 192 is a reference to paragraph 23 
and page 192; the reference §123, §192 denotes paragraphs 123 and 192. In chapter 
four, where references to Wittgenstein are more frequent, I use the customary 
abbreviations for his work, which are listed in footnote 394. 
 
2. The journal Current Anthropology publishes papers together with responses to the 
paper from other authors. I cite these as part of the original article, rather than as 
separate articles, but indicate the name of the commenting author and the inclusive 
pagination of their response. 
 
3. A number of the papers to which I refer are unpublished conference papers. The page 
numbers in these citations refer to pages in the typescript. Some of these papers, given at 
the Ecclesiology and Ethnography Research Network conferences, are forthcoming in 
two volumes in the ‘Ecclesiology and Ethnography’ series from William B. Eerdmans, 
with projected publication dates of Spring and Autumn 2012. 
 
4. Papal encyclicals are referred to by paragraph number (§).  
 





















1. What’s ecclesiology about? 
‘Quite often, at dinner parties and so on, people ask you, ‘Well, what’s 
jurisprudence about?’, to which the answer is, ‘It’s the law, stupid!’ or, 
perhaps more politely, ‘Just law’.’ 1 
 
What’s ecclesiology about?  The legal philosopher Neil MacCormick was often asked a 
similar question at dinner parties about his own field: ‘Well, what’s jurisprudence 
about?’  He suggested the answer, ‘It’s the law, stupid!’, and perhaps we could answer 
the question ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’ in the same way: ‘It’s the church, stupid!’  
Yet, with jurisprudence as with ecclesiology, the answer is not as simple as the 
question.   
 
What is ecclesiology about, then?  Part of the difficulty here is working out what the 
question is asking.  On one hand, it could be a question about the nature of 
ecclesiology’s object of inquiry; on the other, it could be a question about the purpose 
and function of ecclesiological reflection.  If we hear the question as ‘What’s 
ecclesiology about?’ then answering it will mean giving an account of the nature of 
the church.  If we hear the question as ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’ then answering it 
will mean giving an account of the purpose of theological reflection on the church.   
 
This thesis is concerned with the simple question, ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’, and 
with the answers it requires.  Christian theological reflection over the centuries has 
produced a range of different answers about the nature of the church and the purpose 
of theological reflection on it; my particular interest in this thesis is in the new and 
                                                
1 Neil MacCormick, ‘Valedictory Lecture: ‘Just Law’,’ (2008) Podcast available from http://law-
srv0.law.ed.ac.uk/media/42_professorneilmcormacksvalidictorylecture.mp3 (Accessed July 12th 2011).  
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different understandings that have begun to emerge in Europe and North America 
over the last thirty years.  During this period, theologians have returned to the 
question ‘What is ecclesiology about?’, and begun to answer it in new and interesting 
ways.  First, they have begun to rethink the object of ecclesiological inquiry, arguing 
that ecclesiology should be principally concerned not with the ideal, abstract, invisible 
church of faith, but with the real, historical, sinful, concrete church of experience.2  
Second, they have also begun to reshape the purpose of ecclesiology around the 
concrete church, suggesting that ecclesiology should be primarily a form of practical 
reasoning, whose purpose is to help churches become more faithful to their Lord.3  
These theologians come from a variety of different theological and confessional 
backgrounds.  They are united not by substantive theological agreement, nor by a 
clear sense of themselves as a movement, but by what I will describe as a 
methodological common sense: a shared sense of what ecclesiology should attend to 
and how it should be undertaken.4  They are united by the twofold conviction that the 
ordinary, messy, sinful church of our experience is also the place of our graced 
encounter with God and hence worthy of theological attention, and that engaging 
with the methods of social science can help ecclesiologists attend to that concrete 
church.   
 
                                                
2 ‘The primary object of ecclesiology is the historical organization that has a historical life; to 
understand it, one must attend to it.’ Roger Haight, Christian Community in History Vol. 1: Historical 
Ecclesiology (London: Continuum, 2004) 4.  For Healy’s definition of the concrete church see Nicholas 
M Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 4–5.  For Jinkins’ articulation of the need to attend to the concrete 
church, see Michael Jinkins, The Church Faces Death: Ecclesiology in a Postmodern Context (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 73. 
3 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 46. 
4 Jonas Ideström writes, ‘The reflections [of this book] do not start from agreement on a common 
ecclesiology but from a common interest in doing ecclesiology based on concrete manifestations of the 
church’.  See Ideström, ed. For the Sake of the World: Swedish Ecclesiology in Dialogue With William 
T. Cavanaugh (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2009) 1.  The sense of a movement is beginning to develop with 
the formation of the Ecclesiology and Ethnography Research Network in 2007; this will doubtless 
continue with the publication of the first two volumes of the Studies in Ecclesiology and Ethnography 
series, forthcoming from Eerdmans in 2012. 
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a) The tasks of the thesis 
 
I will refer to these concretely oriented, practically minded and empirically informed 
ecclesiologies as concrete ecclesiologies.5  Although it is possible to trace the roots of 
such concrete approaches back some thirty years or more, the field has only begun to 
develop rapidly in the last ten to fifteen years.6  Working with such a young and 
dynamic theological field presents three major challenges, which give us the three 
principal tasks of the thesis.     
 
The rapid growth of concrete ecclesiologies over the past ten to fifteen years has been 
remarkable.  From the turn of the millennium onwards, an increasing number of 
theologians have been engaging the question, ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’, redefining 
the object of ecclesiological inquiry and working out the purpose of ecclesiological 
reflection.7  Despite this enthusiastic industry – in fact, perhaps because of it – 
concrete ecclesiologies have yet to be properly defined and described as a distinct 
theological genre.8  The first task of the thesis is to define concrete ecclesiologies as a 
genre for the first time, by describing their shared characteristics and arguing that 
                                                
5 I will use the plural, concrete ecclesiologies, throughout the thesis.  This reflects the fact that concrete 
ecclesiologies are unified by a loose methodological common sense rather than by a single, consciously 
shared theological programme. 
6 Healy notes a general turn to the concrete across the last three to four decades in his ‘Ecclesiology and 
Practical Theology’ in Keeping Faith in Practice: Catholic Perspectives on Practical and Pastoral 
Theology, ed. James Sweeney et al (London: SCM, 2010) 117–30 (117).  I will suggest in chapter one 
that the general turn to the concrete church becomes well established only following the rise of 
postliberal theology in the 1970s-80s.    
7 Michael Jinkins and Nicholas Healy are probably the first to articulate the concrete ecclesiological 
project in its current form.  While Jinkins’ earlier book has gone relatively unrecognised, Healy’s has 
been at the centre of ongoing conversations on ‘ecclesiological ethnography’, which he proposes in 
Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 168–74. 
8 Healy comes closest to defining concrete ecclesiologies in his very brief characterisation of what he 
calls ‘the new ecclesiology’ in Nicholas M Healy, ‘Misplaced Concreteness? Practices and the New 
Ecclesiology,’ International Journal of Systematic Theology 5:3 (2003): 287–308 (287–8).  He also 
briefly describes what he calls ‘practical ecclesiology’ in his ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 117–
30 (120).  Douglas Gay uses Healy’s term ‘new ecclesiology’ in Gay, ‘A Practical Theology of Church 
and World: Ecclesiology and Social Vision in 20th Century Scotland,’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 2006) 2.  I will distinguish my ‘concrete ecclesiologies’ from Healy’s ‘new ecclesiology’ in 
Chapter One, see 24–5. 
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these amount to a distinctive methodological common sense.  Defining concrete 
ecclesiologies will also mean looking at their provenance for the first time, both in 
terms of their roots in twentieth century theology, and in terms of their roots in 
broader cultural changes.9   
 
Writing about twentieth century ecclesiologies’ penchant for models and theory, 
Healy comments, ‘The impression is given – in many cases no doubt a false one – that 
theologians believe that it is necessary to get our thinking about the church right first, 
after which we can go on to put our theories into practice.’10  Concrete ecclesiologies, 
by contrast, are a thoroughly practical form of reasoning: so practical, in fact, that 
they have yet to look backwards over their shoulders to consider where they have 
come from, in either theological or cultural terms.11  Exploring concrete 
ecclesiologies’ provenance will show us that the sheer number of theological and 
cultural influences that converge to form their methodological common sense produce 
significant theological and methodological tensions within this nascent genre.  These 
tensions are intensified when ecclesiologists seek to borrow methods from social 
science.  The second task of this thesis is to critically engage with concrete 
ecclesiologies, in order to describe the tensions at work in their methodological 
project.  I will focus my critical attention particularly on concrete ecclesiologies’ use of 
                                                
9 Concrete ecclesiologies’ connections with postliberalism (especially the Hauerwasian school of ethics) 
are very briefly discussed in Healy, ‘Misplaced Concreteness?’  287–8, and their connections with 
practical theology briefly indicated in Healy’s ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 117.  These by no 
means amount to a comprehensive account of concrete ecclesiologies theological and cultural 
influences.  I anticipate that a fuller account will be forthcoming in Elizabeth Phillips’ chapter ‘Charting 
the 'Ethnographic Turn': Theologians and the Study of Christian Congregations’ in the forthcoming 
Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 2012), the first 
volume in a ‘Studies in Ecclesiology and Ethnography’ series.  
10 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 36. 
11 Healy argues that ‘theological reflection upon the church is in fact from the very outset a matter of 
practical rather than theoretical reasoning.’ Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 46 
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social science and the development of what has been called ‘ecclesiological 
ethnography’.12 
 
Quite often, new and improved approaches to problems tend to articulate their 
approach in terms of what they are not doing.  Concrete ecclesiologies are no 
exception, and tend to express their project contrastively with twentieth century 
approaches to ecclesiology.13  While I will uphold concrete ecclesiologies’ basic 
convictions throughout the thesis – that the concrete church is worthy of attention, 
and that social science can help us to attend to it – I will suggest that they are currently 
constrained by the terms of their own self-definition.  Constructive work is needed to 
help concrete ecclesiologies develop greater theological maturity and greater social-
scientific sophistication.14  The third task of the thesis is to engage in theological 
reflection on the object of ecclesiological inquiry and the function of ecclesiological 
reflection, in order to help concrete ecclesiologies address the tensions of their 
theological inheritance, face the challenges of their current context and engage 
fruitfully with social science.    
 
In what follows, then, I will be engaging the question ‘What is ecclesiology about?’, 
and concrete ecclesiologies’ answers to it, in a way that is descriptive, critical and 
constructive.  The three aims of the thesis are as follows: 
(i) to define concrete ecclesiologies as a distinct genre and describe their 
theological and cultural provenance; 
                                                
12 See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 168–74 and Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 101. 
13 Roger Haight’s work is a good example: ‘Against the background of an ecclesiology that is abstract, 
idealist, and a-historical, an ecclesiology from below is concrete, realist and historically conscious.’  See 
Haight, Christian Community Vol.1 5.  
14 The idea that thinking in opposites or dichotomies undermines the development of theological 
maturity is Clare Watkins’: see her ‘Text and Practices: An Ecclesiology of Traditio For Pastoral 
Theology,’ in ed. Sweeney et al, Keeping Faith in Practice 163–78 (163). 
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(ii) to analyse the difficulties facing concrete ecclesiologies, paying particular 
critical attention to their use of social science; 
(iii) to provide constructive suggestions for how to think about the object of 
ecclesiological inquiry and the purpose of ecclesiological reflection. 
 
Before we begin, it will be helpful to summarise and characterise the argument that 
follows.  I will offer a short chapter-by-chapter summary of the argument of the 
thesis, and then move on to make some points about analysis, writing and approach 




The three aims of the thesis outlined above correspond roughly to the progression of 
the argument.   
 
 a) The progression of the argument 
 
The principal aim of chapter one is to define concrete ecclesiologies as a distinct and 
recognisable genre, and suggest where they have come from.  This will involve four 
steps.  First, we need to situate the development of concrete ecclesiologies within the 
context of the widespread turn to the concrete church in twentieth century theology.  
Second, having described concrete ecclesiologies as a distinctive methodological 
common sense, we need to explore their key identifying characteristics.  Defining 
concrete ecclesiologies and setting them in context will lead us to the third task of 
chapter one: tracing the roots of concrete ecclesiologies back into twentieth century 
theology, showing how they emerge on one hand from Barth and postliberal 
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theology, and on the other from changes to Roman Catholic theology following 
Vatican II.  With their theological provenance described, I will then show how 
concrete ecclesiologies can also be seen as arising in response to cultural changes 
associated with postmodernity. 
 
Chapter two picks up one element of concrete ecclesiologies’ common sense, their use 
of social science, and looks at the development of what has been called ‘ecclesiological 
ethnography’.  The purpose of the chapter is to take a close and critical look at 
concrete ecclesiologies’ use of anthropology.  We will look at five ways in which 
concrete ecclesiologists consciously use social science, and then at a further two ways 
in which social science seems to be used unconsciously.  From here, the chapter takes 
a more critical turn, as we look at the ways in which concrete ecclesiologies are 
implicated in a number of difficulties, both theological and ethnographic.  I will 
suggest that concrete ecclesiologies’ tendency to think of their task as bringing two 
perspectives (theology and ethnography) to bear upon a single object (the church) 
results in caricatured understandings of the nature of both disciplines, and a 
problematic way of understanding the relationship between the two.  I will argue that 
the key to solving this problem will be to examine separately in greater depth how 
ethnographers understand their own object of inquiry, the social real.  A more 
developed understanding of the kind of ‘real church’ ethnography can give 
ecclesiology will set us on a better footing for further theological conversation. 
 
In chapter three, I will explore four ways in which ethnographers have understood 
their object of inquiry, the social real, and the nature of ethnographic knowledge, and 
argue for the superiority of one view – what I will call pragmatic/relational 
ethnography.  The discussion has three aims: (a) to provide a richer understanding of 
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ethnography than concrete ecclesiologies currently work with, (b) to establish what 
kind of ‘real church’ ethnography can offer ecclesiology and (c) to head off certain 
uses of ethnography by ecclesiologists.  Exploring pragmatic/relational ethnography 
in greater depth will show that illuminating comparisons can be drawn between the 
ways in which theology and ethnography relate to their objects of inquiry.  I will 
argue that pragmatic/relational ethnography can help us to develop a richer 
theological account of the object of ecclesiological inquiry and the purpose of 
ecclesiological reflection, by encouraging us to make the connection between how we 
know and what we know. Pragmatic/relational ethnography is successful because its 
account of what anthropologists know (the social real) is governed by how that reality 
is known in the field.  Placing the fieldwork experience at the heart of its explanations 
of the social real allows pragmatic/relational ethnography to give a good account of 
the unique value and limitations of anthropological knowledge.  I will argue that 
paying attention to how we know the church will be the key to developing a richer 
theological account of the concrete church, and a renewed understanding of the 
purpose of ecclesiological reflection. 
 
In chapter four, the thesis moves into more constructive mode.  Concrete 
ecclesiologies’ answers to the question ‘What is ecclesiology about?’ have, thus far, 
largely taken methodological shape.  The aim in this chapter is to advance the 
theological conversation a little further, by making some constructive suggestions for 
how we might think about the object of ecclesiological inquiry and the purpose of 
ecclesiological reflection.  I will argue that the key to this task will be to follow the cue 
of pragmatic/relational anthropology, and make the connection between how we 
know and what we know.  I will draw on Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and 
understanding to draw attention to the ordinary ways in which we talk about, 
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experience and recognise the church.  Focussing theological attention on the rough 
ground of actual practice will yield two constructive suggestions for how we 
understand the object of ecclesiological inquiry, the concrete church.  I will argue that 
‘church’ can be helpfully thought of as an analogical, or family resemblance, concept.  
I will also suggest that reflecting theologically on the culturally embedded and Spirit-
guided ways that we recognise churches can give us a useful way of talking about 
discerning the church.  From these suggestions about the object of ecclesiological 
inquiry will emerge a different understanding of the purpose of ecclesiological 
reflection: I will suggest that the purpose of ecclesiology is best thought of, not as 
defining the church, but as searching for it. 
      
b) The key terms 
 
Before moving on to characterise the approach of the argument in this thesis, it will 
be useful to clarify the meaning of some of the terms already used.  Many of the terms 
I have used above – including ‘church’ and ‘ecclesiology’ – will be explored, critiqued 
and reworked during the course of the argument that follows.  As their meaning will 
change (and be clearly explained) as we go along, it will not be helpful at this point to 
specify a single consistent meaning for each.  Two points regarding the term ‘church’, 
however, should be noted.  First, concrete ecclesiologies do not make the classic 
distinction between small c ‘church’, usually denoting a church, an individual 
community or parish, and big C Church, meaning the church universal and catholic.  
Church is almost invariably referred to with a small c – a stylistic decision which, as 
we shall see, reflects concrete ecclesiologies’ desire not to distinguish too sharply 
between the universal and ideal church of creedal faith, and the local and concrete 
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church of experience.15  I follow concrete ecclesiologies in using a lower case c for the 
church throughout, although upper case Cs used by quoted authors obviously remain 
unchanged.  I also follow concrete ecclesiologies in referring to ‘church’ with the 
pronoun ‘it’ and never ‘she’.  Second, one of the challenges we will note in the early 
chapters of the thesis is concrete ecclesiologies’ reluctance to define crisply what they 
mean by ‘church' – a decision which, we will see, reflects their desire not to get 
sidetracked by defining ‘essential Churchness’.16  In the hands of concrete 
ecclesiologists, ‘church’ usually denotes ‘the Christian community’.17  Where I am 
referring to concrete ecclesiologists’ views, I use church in the same way, and I will 
use ‘church’ and ‘the Christian community’ interchangeably.  
 
The other note about terms concerns ‘anthropology’ and ‘ethnography’, and their 
relation to one another.  The generic term ‘anthropology’ covers a variety of 
disciplines, from linguistic anthropology to physical and forensic anthropology.  It is 
used here to refer solely to cultural anthropology.18  A distinction is sometimes made 
between anthropology and ethnography, on the basis that ethnography is the 
distinctive method of the anthropological discipline – ethnography deals with 
fieldwork and raw data, and anthropology with analysis, or ethnography with the 
                                                
15 For Healy, giving the church a small ‘c’ is a means of acknowledging the church’s sin. See his 
comments in Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 6, n.13. 
16 A nice phrase of Michael Jinkins’, for which see Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 80. 
17 Mudge says ecclesiology begins with the ‘gritty, situated “community called church”’.  See Lewis 
Mudge, Rethinking the Beloved Community: Ecclesiology, Hermeneutics and Social Theory (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2001) 2.  Healy objects to the use of the phrase ‘Christian community’ in 
his 'A (Somewhat) Chastened Ecclesiology,' (Paper presented at the Being Surprised by God: Embodied 
Ecclesiology in Local Contexts Conference, Utrecht, 2010), on the grounds that the church does not 
have 'a common life and language that is empirically describable' (7).  He does, nevertheless, use the 
word church as a collective way of referring to followers of Christ. 
18 This, of course, only begs the question ‘What is cultural anthropology?’ and, as Geertz remarks, 
‘Everyone knows what cultural anthropology is about: it’s about culture.  The trouble is that no one is 
quite sure what culture is.’  (See Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on 
Philosophical Topics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 11.  For now, I will simply define 
cultural anthropology as the study of human social life – as distinguished from physical anthropology 
(human physiology and racial variation) or linguistic anthropology (human language).  Chapter three 
considers a range of possible definitions of the object of anthropological inquiry, and so I will not press 
the definition any further here. 
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nitty-gritty of particular field situations, and anthropology with larger questions about 
epistemology, ethics and so on.  Such distinctions run into difficulties: to make too 
strong a distinction between the gathering of raw data in the field and the subsequent 
process of analysis is to hang one’s coat on a shaky nail, and to suggest that the work 
of epistemology and ethics is carried out in a manner and place distant from the 
pressing concerns of the field is simply inaccurate.  It is on this basis that I follow 
Clifford Geertz in using the two terms, ‘anthropology’ and ‘ethnography’ 
interchangeably.19  Where I am referring to ethnographic fieldwork in particular, this 




Having briefly summarised the progression of the argument and defined some of its 
key terms, it will now be helpful to explore some of the characteristics of my 
approach to the topic.  A quick look at the bibliography at the end of reading the 
thesis shows that it contains a fair number of books that do not feature much in the 
footnotes.  Among them are two important resources for the thesis, which affect the 
style of analysis and writing that follows: Foucault, and feminist theory.  
 
 a) Foucault  
 
Concrete ecclesiologies, as we have already seen, are not persuaded of the necessity of 
getting theory about the church right before putting it into practice.  This somewhat 
gung-ho approach to ecclesiology means that concrete ecclesiologists do not 
                                                
19 For Geertz’ use of the terms interchangeably, see the first chapter of his Clifford Geertz, Works and 
Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 1–24. 
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frequently reflect on or reference their theological influences.  Concrete ecclesiologies’ 
lack of reflexivity in this regard makes the first task of this thesis – defining concrete 
ecclesiologies and describing their emergence – a challenging one, and it is here that 
Foucault can be a useful analytical resource for the thesis.  Two of Foucault’s interests 
make him particularly helpful for the analysis that follows: his attention to the 
conditions for the possibility of discourse, and his concern with the unconscious of 
discourse.   
 
Exploring where concrete ecclesiologies have come from will involve a fair amount of 
history-of-ideas sort of analysis, in order to trace concrete ecclesiologies’ theological, 
philosophical and anthropological influences.  But, as Marilyn Strathern puts it, ‘There 
is a puzzle in the history of ideas.  Ideas seem to have the capacity to appear at all sorts 
of times and places, to such a degree that we can consider them as being before their 
time or out of date.’20  The task of analysing concrete ecclesiologies’ emergence is not 
just one of finding the first mention of the phrase ‘concrete church’, or fixing the 
dates of influential books and conferences.  It is also, as Foucault has it, the task of 
analysing concrete ecclesiologies’ conditions of possibility.21  It means asking what it 
is about the cultural context of academic theology in twenty-first century Europe and 
North America that has allowed concrete ecclesiologies to emerge as a methodological 
common sense.22  It is a question of asking how and why concrete ecclesiologies’ 
assumptions and questions find such resonance now.  One of the things we will note 
in this connection is that concrete ecclesiologies do not just arise in response to 
                                                
20 Marilyn Strathern, ‘Out of Context: The Persuasive Fictions of Anthropology,’ Current Anthropology 
28:3 (1987): 251–81 (251). 
21 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock, 
1991) xxii. 
22 With respect to scientific discourse, Foucault argues that the question is not one of asking what 
conditions people had to fulfil in order to make their discourse coherent or true in general, but to ask 
what conditions had to be fulfilled ‘…to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value 
and practical application as scientific discourse…’  See Foucault, The Order of Things xiv. 
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ecclesiological issues, and are not simply trying to resolve ecclesiological problems.  
Beneath the surface moves of concrete ecclesiologies lie attempts to deal with a range 
of major problems, from the relationship between theology and social science to 
theological epistemology and the role of the specialist theologian.  This brings us to 
the second useful tool Foucault gives us: talking about the unconscious of discourse. 
 
‘I do not wish to deny the validity of intellectual biographies, or the possibility of a 
history of theories, concepts and themes.  It is simply that I wonder whether such 
descriptions are themselves enough, whether they do justice to the immense density 
of scientific discourse, whether there do not exist, outside their customary 
boundaries, systems of regularities that have a decisive role in the history of the 
sciences.’23  It is this concern for whether the history of ideas approach is enough that 
leads Foucault to inquire after the ‘unconscious’ of science.  By this, he does not mean 
just that which disturbs, resists and deflects the course of scientific inquiry, but ‘a 
positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the 
scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and 
seeking to diminish its scientific nature.’24  In the same way, the analysis of this thesis 
is also concerned with the positive unconscious of concrete ecclesiologies.  As with 
asking about the conditions for the possibility of concrete ecclesiological discourse, 
this means trying to discern the broader issues to which concrete ecclesiologies are 
unconsciously or implicitly responding.  Again, this means analysing concrete 
ecclesiologies in their cultural context.  It also means maintaining analytical focus not 
just on what concrete ecclesiologists say about their use of social science, but on what 
theological work social science is doing, and what function it serves in concrete 
                                                
23 Foucault, The Order of Things xiii. 
24 Foucault, The Order of Things xi. 
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ecclesiological discourse.  This means that the thesis will need to draw attention to 
relevant non-ecclesiological questions at stake and, if not resolve them, then at least 
lay some theological groundwork towards doing so. 
 
 b) Feminist Theory 
 
The thesis is also resourced at a deep level by feminist theory which, though it appears 
infrequently in the footnotes, has been a consistent thread in my reading and thinking.  
The influence of feminist theory can be felt in both the content and style of the thesis.  
First of all, in both the critical and constructive work that follows, there is a 
commitment to reflexivity and experience, that is, a commitment to conscientious 
reflection on how others’ particular cultural and ecclesial experience forms their 
theology in general, and their ecclesiology in particular, and how my own experience 
forms my critical and constructive response.  In my constructive work on the church, 
this commitment to reflexivity takes the form of a concern for those whose particular 
experience (and its accompanying theological and ecclesiological perspectives) has 
been historically marginalised or excluded by academic and ecclesiastical authorities.  
 
Feminist theory also informs, to an extent, the written style of the thesis.  Research in 
gender and communication studies suggests that men and women typically 
communicate in different ways.25  In general, male communication tends to value 
arguments that are critical, rhetorical, assertive, linear, logical and argumentative.  
Female communication tends to value arguments that are reflexive, intuitive, spatial, 
lateral, demonstrative and experiential.  Male communication typically prioritises 
                                                
25 Major interest and research in this area was sparked by Robin Lakoff’s influential study, Language and 
Woman’s Place (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).  For an overview of subsequent challenges and 
qualifications to Lakoff’s study, see Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet, Language and Gender 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 157–91. 
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problem solving, and adopts a ‘reporting’ style that sees itself as representing a reality 
believed to be stable; this tends to efface the writer, and treat the audience as 
essentially passive listeners.26  Female communication typically prioritises rapport 
building with listeners, processing information, reflecting on topics, and typically 
shows concern for things like character, relationships and biography.27  Good 
academic argument and good academic style are usually defined with principal 
reference to the characteristics of male communication.28  Whether these typical 
differences in preferred communicative and argumentative style are biologically ‘hard’ 
or culturally ‘soft’ is open to debate and (at least here) not relevant.29  Nor is it 
relevant that academic style is learned, and may or may not come naturally to anyone, 
regardless of gender.  What is relevant is that the definition of ‘good’ academic 
writing and argument is shaped around the experience and typical preferences of the 
people who have historically formed – and indeed still form – the overwhelming 
majority of the academic field: men.  
 
What does this mean for the style of what follows? It does not mean that I will 
deliberately try to write in a way that reflects the list of female characteristics I listed 
above.  Rather, it means that I will not try to edit out the accent of my communicative 
mother tongue.  Contrary to academic convention, which tends to efface the writer, I 
will use the first person pronouns ‘I’ (meaning the author) and ‘we’ (meaning the 
reader and author) throughout.  The style of the writing will also be slightly more 
conversational, more engaging of the reader, than the conventional reporting style, 
                                                
26 See Deborah Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (London: 
Virago, 1992); for problem solving, see 64–8; for treating the audience as passive, see 123–6.   
27 See Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand; for symmetry and rapport building, 58–9 and 89–93; for 
use of experience see 91–2.   
28 For interesting comment on gender and assessing academic standards, see Carole Blair, et al., 
‘Disciplining the Feminine,’ Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994): 383–409.   
29 Julia T Wood has an accessible discussion of the cultural factors here in her Gendered Lives: Gender, 
Communication and Culture, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1997). 
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which tends to treat the reader as passive.  Where I engage in critical work, this does 
have a demonstrative feel to it: I am trying to show how concrete ecclesiologies make 
certain moves, or encounter certain problems.  Any or all of these stylistic 
characteristics may well jar with readers accustomed to conventional stylistic language, 
and it could be argued that a doctoral thesis is not the place to push the boundaries of 
academic convention.  Yet to insist that women need to graduate through androcentric 
stylistic conventions before being allowed to challenge them is to accept and reinforce 
academia’s structural discrimination against women.  
 
c) Watching language 
 
We have been created by God, placed before Him, destined for Him, called 
to the immediate participation in His glory.  But now we are still in the 
world – we are not yet there where we will be for all eternity.  This demands 
humility of us (recognition of the fact that we are still “on the way”) and 
courage (striving for the future community with God).30 
 
One of the features Foucault and feminism hold in common is the way in which they 
watch language intently, acutely conscious of its power to shape and reshape our 
worlds of thought and experience.  The same trait also defines theologians: Nicholas 
Lash suggests that we define theologians as people who watch their language in the 
presence of God.31  The theological approach of this thesis is characterised by 
watching language about the church.  In the early chapters of the thesis, this 
‘watching’ simply means observing how language about the church has changed over 
the past thirty years, and suggesting why it has done so.  In the last chapter, however, 
‘watching’ our language about the church becomes a constructive theological agenda 
                                                
30 Karl Rahner, Spiritual Exercises, trans. Kenneth Baker (London: Sheed & Ward, 1967) 17. 
31 The definition originates with Gerald O’Collins: see Nicholas Lash, ‘All Good Reasoning Proceeds 
From Prior Commitments and Beliefs,’ The Guardian Main Section Sat July 2nd 2011: 43. 
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– it is about being careful with our language about the church, conscious that it is 
language in the presence of God.   
 
Being careful means recognising that our language about the church, as well as the 
church itself, is in via: in our discipleship and in our theology, we are only ever ‘on 
the way to church’.  This demands humility in our speech about the church, and an 
honest recognition that our language and our lives fall short.  Yet that the church is 
‘on the way’ should be a hopeful as well as a humble admission, for the church is on 
the way somewhere: on the way to the God whom it confesses as the source, sustainer 
and consummation of all that is.  This means that our church talk should also 
characterised by courage and by confidence, too – confidence enough to engage 
deeply with other disciplines, and courage enough to allow those disciplines to 
challenge our language and categories. Only by constantly re-asking and re-answering 
simple questions like ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’, and by constantly breaking and 
reshaping our language about the church, can we keep ecclesiology a discipline in 










Chapter One: Concrete Ecclesiologies 
 
Introduction 
Kxoma and Tuma, two !Kung men travelling with us, suggested we make our 
camp at this site where Richard Lee and Nancy Howell, other 
anthropologists, had set their camp four years earlier.  Living where someone 
has lived before was right, they said; it connected you to the past.  The 
slender stick shell of Richard and Nancy’s hut was still there.  It stood out in 
the moonlight, a bizarre skeleton set apart from the surrounding bush.32 
 
In this chapter, we arrive in the field.  The purpose of the chapter is to survey and 
describe the theological landscape with which we will be concerned in the thesis, and 
to define it as a field for the first time.  Our first task on arriving in the field will be to 
describe the stick shell, by looking at what ‘the concrete church’ is, and explaining 
what I mean by ‘concrete ecclesiologies’.  We can then ask about the campsite, 
detailing who the inhabitants of this theological landscape are, and how they came to 
be here.  This exploration of the field will set us up for the work of the following 
chapters, in which we will gather resources to repair and strengthen concrete 
ecclesiologies. 
 
I have chosen to start this chapter with an arrival narrative because, before we begin 
the work of description and repair, I want to suggest that theologians have much to 
learn from ethnographers about arriving in the field.  Ethnographic writing is being 
increasingly shaped by the recognition that ethnographers are part of the social fact 
under investigation.  Put simply, anthropologists are humans alongside their subjects 
of investigation, social beings investigating other social beings.  The ethnographer’s 
subjectivity cannot be bracketed out in the field, nor relegated to the foreword of 
ethnographic texts: it runs through both field and text, shaping encounter and 
                                                
32 Marjorie Shostak, Nisa: The Life and Words of a !Kung Woman (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981) 20–1. 
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narrative equally.  Systematic theology, with its analogous sense of ‘field’ as similar 
writings, shared influences and research associations, lacks ethnography’s reflexivity.  
Our sense of our presence in the field is directed towards what needs saying, how we 
can be original, and how other people are subtly or not-so-subtly wrong: we are in 
the business of repairing the skeletons of other researchers’ huts.  The task of this 
thesis is, of course, descriptive, critical and constructive – I am also in the business of 
hut repair.  But my claim at the start of this thesis is that theologians need to 
acknowledge that we too are deeply bound up in the matters of which we speak.  We 
work in an inhabited landscape, and we arrive in a field of persons as well as a field of 
ideas. 
 
What we need, I suggest, is a theological arrival narrative.  All theology starts from a 
particular academic and pastoral setting and has a particular audience or problem in 
mind.  Yet these differences are perhaps less important than what we share with other 
scholars in our field: an instinct that theological work needs doing in the area, that 
these issues are important, or that some problem needs addressing.33  This means that 
any inquiries about the historical, theological or cultural factors driving other 
theologians to ask particular questions are also an examination of our own conscience, 
motives and influences.  If we diagnose certain theological influences behind a 
theological trend or field of interest, it is likely that these theological influences lie 
behind our own work.  If we perceive others as responding to a cultural or ecclesial 
need, it is probable that we, too, are responding to a similar situation.  Exploring the 
origins of the field of study will therefore shed light on our own reasons for engaging 
with it.  Our arrival in the field must start with the question ‘Why are we here?’ and 
                                                
33 Mary McClintock Fulkerson describes this inchoate sense that something needs to be addressed as a 
response to a wound.  See Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly 
Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 13–18. 
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then, following Robert Jenson, ‘…In that we have heard and seen such-and-such 
discourse as gospel, what shall we now say and do that gospel may again be spoken?’34     
 
This arrival narrative, describing the rise in theological interest in the concrete church 
and exploring its roots, will therefore serve a number of purposes.  First, it will begin 
to map the field, showing the confluence of historical, theological and cultural factors 
that are its raison d’être.  Second, this survey will allow me to draw out the purpose 
and value of this study, as I begin to demonstrate tensions in the way theological 
approaches to the concrete church are currently conceived and practiced.  Third, in 
delineating the theological, historical and cultural factors driving the field in which 
my intervention is placed, I will begin to develop what Roger Haight calls ‘historical 
consciousness’: a sense of the limitedness of my own work by time and place, and a 
keener sense of the origin of my own theological instinct that work is needed in the 
field.35  
 
The chapter will proceed in four sections.  In the first, I will trace the rise of concrete 
approaches to ecclesiology, and begin to describe the characteristics of concrete 
ecclesiologies.  This will give us an idea of the fluidity of the field we are dealing with 
in the thesis, and some of the challenges involved in contributing to the debate.  In 
the second section, we will trace the two main roots of concrete ecclesiologies in the 
twentieth century: postliberal theology, and changes to Roman Catholic theology 
following Vatican II.  Then, in the third section, we will fill out this theological 
history by situating concrete ecclesiologies within their cultural context, and 
suggesting ways in which they may be responding to the challenges of doing 
                                                
34 Robert W Jenson, Systematic Theology Vol.1: The Triune God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) 14. 
35 Haight, Christian Community Vol. 1 27. 
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ecclesiology in postmodernity.  In the fourth section, we will ask where the 
investigation needs to go from here: what needs repairing, and how we will go about 
the task. 
 
1. The rise of concrete ecclesiologies 
 
 a) The turn to the concrete 
 
In order to define the field of interest, concrete ecclesiologies, I will draw a series of 
concentric circles.  This will help us to situate the emergence of concrete ecclesiologies 
both within the context of a general theological shift, and a general shift across a 
range of academic disciplines. 
 
The development of an increased and widespread interest in the concrete church has 
been evident for some time in theology.36  In works ranging from ethics to biblical 
studies, there is a renewed sense of the importance of the living church for academic 
theology.  Among other things, the church is indicated as the source for theology’s 
reflection, the norm for its usefulness, and the justification for its existence.  Alongside 
this general rise in rhetorical appeals to the church, it is now quite common to come 
across descriptive accounts of living communities, both of a more formally 
ethnographic kind and a more anecdotal tenor, in a wide range of theological 
writings.  Both appeal to the concrete church as an historical, cultural entity, as a 
living community rather than as an ahistorical ideal type.  The focus is on the church 
                                                
36 Nicholas Healy notes this general turn to the concrete in his essay ‘Ecclesiology and Practical 
Theology’ 117–8.  He suggests that the turn comes about as theologians begin to articulate that 
Christianity is not first and foremost a system of doctrine or a religious theory, but a concrete way of 
life (117). 
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as a marked and marking social body: there is much talk of church practices, social 
distinctiveness and the church as God’s story. 
 
This interest in particular embodied communities is not unique to theology.  It comes 
as part of what Clifford Geertz calls the ‘moral and epistemological vertigo’ that affects 
disciplines across the academic spectrum as they shift and change under the influence 
of postmodernity.37  The symptoms of this postmodern shift are familiar: as well as a 
general suspicion of metanarratives and a genealogical approach to history of 
institutions, there is also a preoccupation with narrative, practices and discourse, a 
chastening of Enlightenment optimism about knowledge and progress, and a shift of 
epistemology away from Enlightenment presuppositions about objectivity and reason.  
These themes are easily recognisable in contemporary theology, from Hans Frei’s 
work on biblical narrative and intratextual hermeneutics, through Hauerwas’ 
preoccupation with virtues and the church as a social ethic, all the way to Mark D. 
Jordan’s genealogical work on the invention of sodomy in Christian theology.38  The 
widespread turn to communities and practices means that there is also a shift across 
the academic spectrum towards using language and modes of analysis borrowed from 
cultural studies.39  At the same time, cultural studies itself has undergone a significant 
post-colonial and postmodern transformation.  
                                                
37 Clifford Geertz, After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995) 128. ‘Postmodernity’ is shorthand for a complex and interrelated set of 
cultural phenomena.  For a good summary, see the first chapter of Paul Lakeland, Postmodernity: 
Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997). 
38 See Hans W Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A 
Primer in Christian Ethics, 2nd ed. (London: SCM, 2003); Mark D Jordan, The Invention of Sodomy in 
Christian Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
39 Linell E Cady describes this move as a ‘paradigm shift’ in her ‘Loosening the Category That Binds: 
Modern “Religion” and the Promise of Cultural Studies,’ in Converging on Culture: Theologians in 
Dialogue With Cultural Analysis and Criticism, ed. Delwin Brown et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 17–40 (17–18).  Healy notes that the turn to the concrete has resulted in theology using 
critical disciplines like history and social science.  Practical theology in particular has drawn on many 
different disciplines, including social science and social psychology, ‘in order to develop rich, critically 
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The reason I have briefly set concrete ecclesiologies within theology’s broader turn to 
the concrete church, and that turn within the broader postmodern academic shift, is to 
draw attention to the fact that these complicate the task of defining ‘ecclesiology’.  
Ecclesiology used to be a recognisable and discrete area of theology, concerned with 
church order, sacraments and the nature, origin, purpose and end of the church.  
Now, with the increased interest generally in communities and practices, ecclesiology 
has become like a rock pool around which the tide has risen: the discipline is either 
invisible or ubiquitous.40  Ecclesiology has become the new fundamental theology.41  
This ‘rock pool’ effect makes it tricky to distinguish between those theologians whose 
work involves a general turn to the concrete church, and those I will call concrete 
ecclesiologists.  For now, we can explain the difference by saying that whereas 
concrete ecclesiologies are ecclesiologies (or theological reflection) that take the 
concrete church as their object (e.g. they focus on and talk about the concrete 
church), the general turn to the concrete uses the church to do other work, or talk 
about other things: biblical interpretation, ethics, and so on.42  The distinction is 
fuzzy, not definite, and some scholars are easier to place than others.  Alasdair 
                                                                                                                                     
informed descriptions of church life that point to areas for improvement…’.  See Healy, ‘Ecclesiology 
and Practical Theology’ 117. 
40 Mary McClintock Fulkerson describes the same change in a different way in her Mary McClintock 
Fulkerson, ‘Theology and the Lure of the Practical: An Overview,’ Religion Compass 1:2 (2007): 294–
304. 
41 For remarks in this vein, see Harald Hegstad, 'From Congregational Studies to Congregational 
Development: On the Different Modes of Ecclesiology,' (Paper presented at the Being Surprised by God: 
Embodied Ecclesiology and Local Contexts Conference, Utrecht, 2010) 2, and Lewis Mudge and Gerard 
Mannion’s introduction to The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church (London: Routledge, 
2008): ‘Seen as “fundamental theology,” ecclesiology concerns the nature of the social space which 
makes language about God, and therefore faith itself, possible.’ 3. 
42 Healy names George Lindbeck, Robert Jenson, Stanley Hauerwas, Kathryn Tanner, Greg Jones and 
Bruce Marshall ‘and many others’ as fellow travelers in ‘the new ecclesiology’ in ‘Misplaced 
Concreteness?' 287.  To these, Doug Gay adds John Howard Yoder, James McLendon, John Milbank, 
Miroslav Volf and Reinhard Hütter, who he says are ‘re-focussing theological attention on the practices 
of the ‘concrete church’ and on the ‘public’ character of ecclesiology.’  See Gay, 'Church and World' 2.  
While many of these are engaged in a turn to the concrete church, I would hesitate to call some of their 
work ecclesiology, which is why I have not taken up the term ‘new ecclesiology’ used by Gay and 
Healy.  
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MacIntyre’s work, for example, exhibits a turn to the concrete church, but he is not an 
ecclesiologist.  The work of someone like Stanley Hauerwas, however, is somewhat 
harder to place – it is sometimes ethics with a turn to the concrete, but sometimes the 
church becomes the focus of discussion and we could call it concrete ecclesiology.43  
Not all those whose thought on the church I will address are recognisably 
‘ecclesiologists’ at all, insofar as they may not directly address the subject of the 
church in the classic sense of ecclesiology, nor discuss the church in a particularly 
systematic or doctrinal way.44  More differences between the general turn to the 
concrete and what I am defining as concrete ecclesiologies will become evident as we 
trace their theological and cultural provenance, but with these cautions in mind, we 
can move on to define ‘the concrete church’ and ‘concrete ecclesiologies’. 
 
b) Concrete ecclesiologies  
 
  i) The concrete church 
 
What is the concrete church, and what is a concrete approach to ecclesiology?  As 
concrete approaches to ecclesiology have developed, particularly over the past twenty 
years, ecclesiologists have begun to define more clearly what has hitherto been an 
assumed object of study, appealed to, but not defined.  The concrete church is the 
                                                
43 In his In Good Company, Hauerwas writes, ‘These essays fall into that area of theology called 
ecclesiology, but I do not pretend to deal adequately with the scriptural, historical, and systematic 
issues usually thought necessary to “do” ecclesiology.’  Nevertheless, it would be hard to find a 
theologian more consistently preoccupied with the church than Stanley Hauerwas.  See Stanley 
Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995) 10. 
44 For example, Amy Plantinga Pauw discusses Kathryn Tanner’s ‘incipient ecclesiology’ in her article 
review, 'Ecclesiological Reflections on Kathryn Tanner’s Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity,’ Scottish 
Journal of Theology 57:2 (2004): 221–27.   
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church in its historical, sinful, cultural and embodied theological reality.45  It is not 
just the empirical church, nor simply the church as an institution: concrete 
ecclesiologies tend to reject the dichotomy between the church’s theological and 
empirical identity, or visible and invisible aspects.46 Concrete ecclesiologies often 
define the concrete church in terms of what it is not (abstract, idealised and essential) 
and we will explore later the degree to which this negative definition causes 
difficulties.  For a positive definition, we can turn to Nicholas M. Healy, one of the 
first theologians to articulate the turn to the concrete church in an ecclesiological 
context.  He writes, 
it [the concrete church] can be summarily described as a distinctive way of 
life, made possible by the gracious action of the Holy Spirit, which orients its 
adherents to the Father through Jesus Christ…The Christian way of life is 
distinctive because its Lord is a particular person and its God is triune.  Its life 
takes concrete form in the web of social practices accepted and promoted by 
the community as well as in the activities of its individual members.47  
 
  ii) Concrete ecclesiologies 
 
Although Healy’s definition sounds quite Hauerwasian – the emphasis on the church’s 
distinctiveness and social practices comes through quite strongly – concrete 
ecclesiologies are not principally discussion of whether and how the church is a social 
                                                
45 Healy distinguishes between the empirical church and the concrete church in his Church, World and 
the Christian Life 4.  For a distinction between the institutional church and the concrete church, see 
Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 42 and Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 4.  For arguments 
against distinguishing between the visible and invisible church, see Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 48, 
Mudge, Beloved Community 9. 
46 See Stanley Hauerwas, ‘The Servant Community: Christian Social Ethics’ in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. 
John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001) 371–91: ‘The people of 
God are no less an empirical reality than the crucifixion of Christ.  The church is as real as his cross.  
There is no ‘ideal church,’ no ‘invisible church,’ no ‘mystically existing universal church’ more real 
than the concrete church with parking lots and pot luck dinners.’ (382–3).  This refusal to separate 
visible and invisible sometimes results in talk of the church as sacrament, for which see Clare Watkins, 
‘The Church as ‘Special’ Case: Comments From Ecclesiology Concerning the Management of the 
Church,’ Modern Theology 9:4 (1993): 369–84. 
47 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 4–5.   
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ethic.48  Rather, concrete ecclesiologies attempt to make sense of the concrete church.  
As Harald Hegstad puts it, ecclesiology’s basic question is whether the church of faith 
is also available to experience.49  Concrete ecclesiologies’ fundamental conviction is 
that the concrete church should be the starting point for theological reflection – the 
church as it is, as we know it, rather than what the church should ideally be like.50  So 
Stanley Hauerwas, for example, appeals to the theological significance of the church of 
‘parking lots and potluck dinners’.51  Roger Haight argues that ‘[t]he principal object 
of ecclesiology consists in the empirical organization or collectivity or community 
called church’.52  One of the fullest articulations of the concrete approach to 
ecclesiology, which is also representative of the tone of many such articulations, 
comes from Michael Jinkins’ The Church Faces Death.  It is worth quoting at length:   
I would argue that the church we know in actuality, the church we 
experience in ordinary time, the church that worships in assorted settings 
under a variety of names in a diversity of ways on Sunday mornings 
throughout the world, the church that argues and mourns and rejoices and 
heals, the church that endures the pressures to provide services for religious 
consumers, the church of endless committee meetings and dirty linen 
washed in public, this church is the church of which we speak and to which 
the Word of God is addressed, and through which the Word of God makes 
Godself known in and through and as human speech.  This is the church God 
intends and loves and redeems.  And so when we speak of church we cannot 
afford to lapse into ecclesiological essentialism.  We must pay attention to 
this church and the speech of this church.53 
 
                                                
48 The phrase comes from Hauerwas: ‘The church does not have a social ethic but is a social ethic, then, 
insofar as it is a community that can be clearly distinguished from the world…Put bluntly, the church 
is in the world to mark us.’ Stanley Hauerwas ‘The Gesture of a Truthful Story,’ in Stanley Hauerwas, 
Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World and Living in Between (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 
1988) 101–110 (101, 103). 
49 See Harald Hegstad, 'Ecclesiology and Empirical Research on the Church,' (Paper presented at the 
Ecclesiology and Ethnography Research Network Conference, Oxford, 2008) 3. 
50 See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 3.  In another essay, Healy writes, ‘While it may 
well be useful on occasion to present ideal accounts of the Church, these should be complemented by 
sufficient theological attention to what the Church can do and become, here and now, in this particular 
situation, given these empirical factors.’  See his ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 119.   
51 ‘It is the church of parking lots and potluck dinners that comprises the sanctified ones formed by and 
forming the continuing story of Jesus Christ in the world.’  See Stanley Hauerwas, ‘The Servant 
Community’ 383. 
52 He adds ‘although it is also more than that as the history of ecclesiology plainly shows.  The “more” 
lies in the fact that this church is experienced religiously or theologically, because in it and through it 
people recognize the presence and activity of God.’  See Haight, Christian Community Vol.1 5. 
53 Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 73. 
 32 
For Jinkins, the challenge of ecclesiology is having the imagination to see what is 
really there.  What we require is ‘the imagination to speak clearly about what it means 
when we speak of the church ordinary.’54  One of the reasons I quote Jinkins at such 
length is because I want to draw attention to the impassioned and rhetorical way in 
which the commitment to the concrete church is expressed, and the way (quite 
Barthian) language about the Word of God mixes with resolutely quotidian references 
to dirty linen and meetings.  What is argued for is also assumed as common sense: 
that our thought about the church should begin with the church of our experience.      
 
As well as with passionate appeals to the sacredness of the ordinary, concrete 
approaches to ecclesiology also tend to be defined in opposition to modern 
ecclesiologies.  Healy begins his Church, World and the Christian Life by stating that 
his study arises out of the sense that twentieth century ecclesiology’s preoccupation 
with models and the church’s essential nature had been less helpful to the church than 
it could have been, and so his articulation of concrete ecclesiology proceeds in 
contrast to such ecclesiologies.55  Likewise, Jinkins uses a critique of taxonomic 
                                                
54 Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 87. 
55 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 3. Healy describes five characteristics of modern 
ecclesiology as follows: ‘One is the attempt to encapsulate in a single word or phrase the most essential 
characteristic of the church; another is to construe the church as having a bipartite structure.  These two 
elements are often combined, third, into a systematic and theoretical form of normative ecclesiology.  A 
fourth element is a tendency to reflect upon the church in abstraction from its concrete identity.  And 
one consequence of this is, fifth, a tendency to present idealized accounts of the church.’  Church, 
World and the Christian Life 26.  Healy contrasts such highly systematised modern accounts of church 
with pre-modern accounts of church from Augustine (55–6), Aquinas (56–8) and Calvin (58–9), 
arguing that premodern ecclesiologies are more practically minded: ‘Doctrines about the church are 
formulated to serve the tasks of the church rather than for theoretical purposes.’ (59).  I wonder if, in 
articulating his project in contrast to modern/twentieth-century ecclesiologies, Healy underplays some 
of the ways in which these ecclesiologies are also responding to practical concerns.  Haight argues that 
‘twentieth-century ecclesiology betrays a growing consciousness, appreciation, and organization of 
pluralism’ and a sense that ‘the ecumene, or whole world, both in geographical terms of the five 
continents and human terms of the secular sphere of human activity, progressively becomes the horizon 
for understanding the church’.  It could be argued that, in trying to systematise and organise this 
pluralism, twentieth-century ecclesiology is responding to a practical concern.  See Haight, Christian 
Community in History Vol.2 Comparative Ecclesiology (London: Continuum 2005) 368.  Haight’s 
discussion of the ecumenical movement and the formation of the World Council of Churches is 
interesting in this context: see ibid. 369–82.     
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approaches to ecclesiology in order to articulate his own, more concrete approach.56  
Perhaps the best example of such contrastive definition is Roger Haight’s articulation 
of the difference between ecclesiologies from above and ecclesiologies from below: 
‘Against the background of an ecclesiology that is abstract, idealist, and a-historical, an 
ecclesiology from below is concrete, realist and historically conscious.’57  Concrete 
ecclesiologies are empirical rather than doctrinal, from below rather than from above, 
real rather than ideal, concrete rather than abstract, local rather than universal, and so 
on.58  Again, we will explore later on some of the difficulties that come with concrete 
ecclesiologies’ tendency towards contrastive self-definition.  For now, we need to go 
on to explore the field we have begun to describe.  
 
  iii) A methodological common sense 
 
                                                
56 Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 50–68  
57 Haight, Christian Community Vol.1 4–5. While Haight makes clear that the distinctions are between 
ideal types, his description of ecclesiologies from above, and his articulation of his own programme in 
distinction from them, leaves little doubt that he has in mind a certain sort of Magisterial ecclesiology. 
For example, contrasting the approach of an ‘ecclesiology from below’ with an ‘ecclesiology from 
above’, he notes a number of factors that render the former appropriate: its historical consciousness, its 
attention to globalisation and pluralism, its ecumenical and interreligious focus, its recognition of the 
phenomenon of secularisation, and its attention to human suffering and the experience of women. 
(Haight, Christian Community Vol.1 27–35.) The implication is that ecclesiologies from above are 
unable or unwilling to address these issues, issues that Haight sees as requiring serious attention.  His 
comments on the historical consciousness that drives ecclesiologies from below sets him apart from 
much traditional Roman Catholic ecclesiology: a historical consciousness recognises that things could 
be different, that change is not problematic, and that structures do not have to be perennial. (Haight, 
Christian Community Vol.1 61.)   
58 For the empirical/doctrinal and from below/from above distinctions see Haight, Christian 
Community Vol.1 18–35, 56–66.  For the local/universal and concrete/abstract distinction see Walter 
Kasper, ‘On the Church,’ America Magazine April 23rd 2001,  in which he also quotes Henri de Lubac: 
‘A universal church which would have a separate existence, or which someone imagined as existing 
outside the particular churches is a mere abstraction.  God does not love empty abstractions.  He loves 
the concrete human beings of flesh and blood.  God’s eternal saving will intended the incarnation of the 
Logos in view of the concrete church composed of people of flesh and blood.’ (I am using an online 
copy of the article at http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=1569, for which 
no pagination is available.) Kasper gives no reference for the de Lubac quotation, and I have been unable 
to locate it. The closest quotation I have been able to source is de Lubac’s reference to J J von Allmen’s 
words, ‘God does not love empty abstractions’ in Henri de Lubac, The Motherhood of the Church, trans. 
Sr. Sergia Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982) 210. 
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So far, I have described a widespread rise in interest in the concrete church, and 
shown how ecclesiologists have picked up on this, and begun to develop concrete 
ecclesiologies.  I will retain use of the plural, concrete ecclesiologies, throughout the 
thesis, in order to draw attention to the fact that this is not a self conscious or unified 
movement.  Rather, it is a methodological common sense, a diverse group of 
theologians gathered around a methodological commitment to the concrete church.59  
While divided by their theological reasons for addressing the concrete church, 
concrete ecclesiologists are united by their instinct that the concrete church must be 
the primary focus of ecclesiology.  Without squashing this diverse body of theologians 
into a pre-prepared framework, it is possible to draw out three interlinked 
characteristics of their methodological common sense, which it will be helpful to 
explore. 
 
First, there is a basic sense of the church as a cultural entity or social body.60  This, not 
something behind, above, or beyond it, is the real church, and hence it is the focus of 
theological attention.61  This common sense brings with it a commitment to 
                                                
59 The simultaneous development of this methodological common sense is quite remarkable.  Jinkins 
and Healy, with no knowledge of one another’s work, critique model based ecclesiologies and call for 
the development of ecclesiological/theological ethnography within a year of one another, in strikingly 
similar language.  Compare Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 168–85 and Jinkins, The 
Church Faces Death 101.  See also Ideström’s comments at the beginning of Ideström, ed. For the Sake 
of the World: ‘The reflections of this book do not start from agreement on a common ecclesiology but 
from a common interest in doing ecclesiology based on concrete manifestations of the church…’ 1. 
60 See for example Jonas Ideström, Lokal Kyrklig Identitet: En Studie Av Implicit Ecklesiologi Med 
Exemplet Svenska Kyrkan I Flemingsberg (Skellefteå: Artos & Norma bokförlag, 2009) 36–40, and the 
contributors to Ideström, For the Sake of the World.  Lewis Mudge refers to the ‘ecclesio-social body’ in 
Mudge, Beloved Community 123. 
61 Rahner – though it would be stretching it to call him a concrete ecclesiologist – expresses the logic 
here quite well in his essay ‘What the Church Teaches and What the People Actually Believe’.  Here he 
argues that if there is a faith that saves, it is the faith that people actually have, not the faith that they 
ought to have, and that theological attention should therefore be focussed on the former.  See Karl 
Rahner, ‘What the Church Teaches and What the People Actually Believe,’ in Theological Investigations 
XXII: Humane Society and the Church of Tomorrow (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1991) 165–
75 (169–70). 
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engagement with social science.62  The church as social body is, like other human 
groupings, patient of social scientific description.63  While there is some debate over 
whether social science can do justice to the Godward dimension of the church’s 
existence, there is a basic affirmation that social scientific analysis has some purchase 
on the church’s life.64  The forthcoming chapters will focus on this aspect of concrete 
                                                
62 Healy talks about the rise of what he calls ‘practical ecclesiology’, which he defines as ‘a form of 
ecclesiological enquiry in which empirical accounts of the Church’s concrete life contribute vitally to 
the development and the formulation of a systematic-theological account of the Church.’  See his 
‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 120. 
63 Lewis Mudge talks about using social science to ask what the church’s Spirit-gathered communities 
say in their social context.  See Lewis Mudge, The Sense of a People: Toward a Church for the Human 
Future (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992) 138–41; see also Mudge, Beloved Community 
6–7, 13.  For a similar emphasis, see the introduction to Martyn Percy, Engaging With Contemporary 
Culture: Christianity, Theology and the Concrete Church (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).  Johannes van der 
Ven takes a semiotic approach and suggests that ‘social phenomena in the church function as religious 
signs’: see Johannes A van der Ven, Ecclesiology in Context (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 1996) 
107.  His work is influential in the Dutch context - Rein Brouwer, for example, follows van der Ven’s 
approach and asks about the social shape of koinonia: see Rein Brouwer, ‘Detecting God in Practices: 
Theology in an Empirical-Theological Research Project,’ Hervormde Teologiese Studies 66:2 (2010): 
1–5 (3–4). 
64 Concrete ecclesiologies’ common sense in this respect is not uncontroversial or uncontested.  See, for 
example, Barth’s anathema: ‘…we must not allow any general or special anthropology to intervene with 
its supposedly normative suggestions.  We cannot be helped to our goal by any definition of man 
projected from the sphere occupied by a biological, sociological, psychological or ethical conception.  
Common to all such anthropologies is the fact that their pictures of man are all products of the same 
human self-understanding…no help is to be found even in the most penetrating analyses of what in any 
given age…is called “modern” man.’ Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3.2: The Doctrine of 
Reconciliation: Jesus Christ the True Witness, trans. G T Thomson (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936) 803.  
Gary Badcock critiques Healy on Barthian grounds in his Gary Badcock, The House Where God Lives: 
The Doctrine of the Church (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 2009).  Badcock attacks Healy and 
eschews the grounding of ecclesiology in postmodern theory (6) or contemporary political liberalism’s 
concern for inclusion (23).  He writes, ‘…in order for us to develop an adequate ecclesiology, we must 
begin not with the human creature, but with God…To grasp the doctrine of the church aright is to 
begin from God…’ (25).  Badcock even disagrees with Healy’s premise that the church needs renewed 
approaches to ecclesiology: ‘…however bad our theological situation might be, it is not a theology that 
will cure it.  This would be to replace the Word and work of God with human words and works.’ (336). 
 
Another note of caution is sounded by John Milbank in his Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990).  Milbank argues that the social sciences cannot provide theology with a neutral account 
of history or society that could provide the basis for subsequent theological reflection.  He argues that 
the social sciences are implicated in the ‘secular ontology of violence’, and that theologians need to 
develop their own forms of social science based on the Christian ‘ontology of peace’.  Milbank’s critique 
seems to have made only a small dent in concrete ecclesiologies’ enthusiasm for engaging with social 
science.  Healy cautions about the dangers of uncritical correlationist use of social science, and in 
Church, World and the Christian Life suggests that theologians need to develop their own forms of social 
science (166).  However, beyond insisting that use of social science must be grounded in theology, his 
subsequent work has not pursued this call for developing theological forms of social science, and has 
focussed instead on the possibility of using social science to watch Christian communities with a 
minimum of theoretical commitments. (See ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 3).  Christian Scharen picks up on 
Milbank’s call for ‘judicious narratives’ to supplement his idealized picture of the church in Theology 
and Social Theory, but immediately goes on to suggest that ethnography - which he does not explicitly 
ground in theology - can help provide them, a move which suggests he does not share Milbank’s 
mistrust of social science.  See Christian Scharen, ‘”Judicious Narratives”, Or Ethnography as 
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ecclesiologies, and in particular on those theologians who are trying to develop 
theological forms of social science, or ‘ecclesiological ethnography’.65  Alongside this 
commitment to social science, concrete ecclesiologies also focus on the church’s social 
practices. 
 
Second, concrete ecclesiologies tend to view theology itself as a cultural practice.  This 
has been articulated most clearly by Kathryn Tanner, but it has found widespread 
acceptance among concrete ecclesiologists.66  Theology is not something done only by 
academics, specialists or clergy, but by every Christian who reflects on his or her 
faith.67  There is an essential continuity between what ‘ordinary’ theologians do, and 
what ‘specialised’ theologians do.  Both types of theological reflection confront the 
same kinds of questions, often in response to particular problems encountered in 
church life.68  Where ordinary theology deals with such issues in an ad-hoc way, 
specialised theology addresses them in a way that is more sustained and abstract.69  
Theology is an integral part of Christian life, not a detached speculative exercise.  
Extending the theological franchise in this way means that concrete ecclesiologies are 
also committed to the concrete church as the source and norm for specialised 
                                                                                                                                     
Ecclesiology,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 58:2 (2005): 125–42 (125–6). 
65 See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 169; Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 101. 
66 See Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1997) 61–92.  Harald Hegstad notes that this understanding of theology as something carried out by 
‘ordinary’ Christians in congregations is now widespread in his paper, ‘From Congregational Studies to 
Congregational Development’ 2–3.  See also McClintock Fulkerson’s comments in her Places of 
Redemption 233–5.  Healy distinguishes between three registers of theology – academic, institutional 
and ordinary, in a recent article, 'What is Systematic Theology?’ International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 11:1 (2009): 24–39. Jeff Astley’s book length study of ‘ordinary theology’ is the most in 
depth treatment of the topic yet: see Jeff Astley, Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in 
Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).  Astley defines ordinary theology as ‘the theology and 
theologizing of Christians who have received little or no theological education of a scholarly, academic 
or systematic kind’ (56). 
67 Tanner, Theories of Culture 70. 
68 While theological reflection is often prompted by glitches in Christian belief and practice, Tanner is 
clear that theology is not just what happens when things go wrong – it cannot be said to intervene in 
Christian practices that would ordinarily run smoothly without it.  See Kathryn Tanner, ‘Theological 
Reflection and Christian Practices,’ in Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in Christian Life, ed. 
Dorothy C Bass and Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 2002) 228–42 (228). 
69 Tanner, Theories of Culture 70–1. 
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theological reflection.  This means that the specialist ecclesiologist’s attention should 
be focussed on real churches, their faithfulness, the shape of their witness, and the 
challenges they face within their particular context.  It also means that practical 
usefulness is the test of the theologian’s efforts. 
 
It is a short step from this to the next characteristic of concrete ecclesiologies – their 
commitment to being practically useful.  Ecclesiological proposals are to be judged not 
on their ability to create a seamless theological garment, nor even on their ability to 
synthesise theological principle with institutional structure: they are to be judged on 
whether they help the church become more faithful to its Lord.70  As Kathryn Tanner 
puts it, theological reflection is called forth from Christian practices, and returns to 
them.71  This means that concrete ecclesiologies have not only a descriptive or 
hermeneutical function – making theological sense out of the concrete church’s life - 
but also a critical and evaluative function.72  This brings us back full circle to the first 
characteristic, concrete ecclesiologies’ use of social science.  Concrete ecclesiologies 
want to reflect on and be practically useful to the real, concrete church.  Social science, 
and particularly ethnography, are seen as useful tools for attending to the concrete. 
 
So far, I have described concrete ecclesiologies as theological reflection that takes the 
concrete church for its object.  I have briefly set the development of concrete 
ecclesiologies within the context of a wider theological turn to the concrete church, 
and that turn within wider shifts in the academy occurring as the humanities and 
social sciences encounter postmodernity.  The question we now need to address in 
                                                
70 See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 46; Christian Scharen, ‘Judicious Narratives' 133. 
71 Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny Or Empowerment? (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1988) 13. 
72 Which Healy calls ecclesiology’s prophetic function.  See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 
46–51. 
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depth is ‘where have concrete approaches to ecclesiology come from?’  We will deal 
with this in two sections, first looking at the theological provenance of concrete 
ecclesiologies, and then looking in greater depth at their cultural context. 
 
2. Theological origins 
 
One of the reasons I have chosen to describe concrete ecclesiologies as a 
methodological common sense is because they represent a variety of theologians 
committed to the concrete church for different reasons.  One of the things we will 
note in what follows is the degree to which the different theological impulses 
underlying this common sense create tensions and difficulties.  Although it simplifies 
the complex array of theological influences here, we will trace concrete ecclesiologies’ 
theological provenance in two strands, first looking at how Barth, Wittgenstein and 
Geertz meet in postliberal theology, and then looking at changes to Catholic 
ecclesiology following Vatican II. 
 
 a) Postliberal theology: Barth meets Wittgenstein. 
 
David Tracy remarks of Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine that ‘The hands may be the 
hands of Wittgenstein and Geertz but the voice is the voice of Karl Barth’.73  Concrete 
ecclesiologies’ roots in postliberal theology mean that they owe much to both the 
insights and pitfalls that come from such a combination.  Exploring the postliberal 
roots of the general turn to the concrete will help us to understand the influences that 
                                                
73 David Tracy, ‘Lindbeck’s New Programme for Theology: A Reflection,’ The Thomist 49 (1985): 
460–72 (465).  Lindbeck rejects this description in The Church in a Postliberal Age, ed. James J Buckley 
(London: SCM, 2002) 198–9. 
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produce concrete ecclesiologies and the tensions that beset them.  We will begin with 
the voice – the voice of Karl Barth. 
 
  i) Barth 
 
Barth, argues Bruce McCormack, caused a revolution in ecclesiology by rejecting the 
continuity implicit in substance metaphysics: there is to be no ontological continuity 
between the witness of the church and its being.74  That is, nothing that the church 
does makes it the church: only God makes the church the church.  In fact, for Barth, 
the church is not strictly necessary, because God does not strictly need the church to 
do what God wants to do.75  The church is only necessary insofar as it is part of God’s 
decision for the life of the world.76  The church is therefore not revelation itself, but 
only a witness to it, participating in the Spirit’s witness to what God has achieved in 
Christ.  Concrete ecclesiologies follow Barth in that they largely discard the search for 
a single principle of the church’s being, be it a property (like one, holy, catholic), or 
an action (like Eucharist, preaching or mission).  They also pick up Barth’s emphasis 
on witness, but with a twist.  The concrete church never became a direct object of 
inquiry for Barth.  Nigel Biggar argues that this is one of Barth’s methodological 
axioms – he refuses to treat Christian life as an independent object of thought, because 
                                                
74 Bruce L McCormack, 'Credo Sanctam Ecclesiam: The Holiness of the Church After Barth,' (Paper 
presented at the Rutherford House Conference in Christian Dogmatics, 2009) 1. 
75 When Barth talks about the non-necessity of the church for God’s purposes, it is in the context of 
talking about how God, Jesus, the church and the world relate in terms of ‘being-for’.  The church is 
for the world only in the sense that God is for the world in Jesus. Humanity, the church included, is not 
for anything, it is the object of the dynamic, so the church can only participate in Jesus’ being-for.  See 
Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3.2 786, 803–4. 
76 Barth relocates necessity in the divine will. See W Werpehowski, ‘Narrative and Ethics in Barth,’ 
Theology Today 43:3 (1986): 334–53. ‘The theological necessity of any claim is established by tracing 
back from it to an understanding of how its content refers to that gracious being [of God]. In this way, 
the integrity of divine revelation as God's self-interpretation is preserved.’  (336). 
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it has no independent existence.77  In this respect, concrete ecclesiologies want to go 
further than Barth, and inquire about the concrete shape of Christian life.78  Why do 
concrete ecclesiologies push further than Barth in this way?  Rusty Reno, reflecting on 
Yale Divinity School in the 1980s, suggests that his professors at the time – Hans Frei 
and George Lindbeck – were trying to identify ‘carnal anchors to enrich the Barthian 
legacy’.79  Reno writes,  
He [Barth] once said of Schleiermacher that the great founder of modern 
liberal theology tried to talk about God by talking about man in a loud voice. 
Perhaps we were unconsciously suspicious that Barth tried to talk about God 
by talking about theology in a loud voice. In a word, Barth’s voice seemed to 
lack “carnality.”80 
 
  ii) Wittgenstein 
 
What Barth needed, postliberals thought, was hands.  In Lindbeck’s scheme the hands, 
as Tracy points out, are those of Wittgenstein and Geertz.  The central Wittgensteinian 
point picked up by Lindbeck, and by concrete ecclesiologists after him, is his critique 
of empiricist theories of meaning.  Rather than locating meaning in intention, or tying 
it to ostensive definition, Wittgenstein shows that the meaning of signs is given by 
their use in a communicative exchange.  When I shout ‘Slab!’ on a building site, the 
meaning of my words is not constituted by me intending a block of stone, nor 
                                                
77 Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
140.   
78 While Barth is the hero of Stanley Hauerwas’, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness 
and Natural Theology (London: SCM, 2001), he critiques Barth for not providing an account of what 
difference the church makes, and moves beyond him to talk about particular lives of Christian witness.  
See Hauerwas, With the Grain 145, 216.  Healy criticises Barth’s ecclesiology along similar lines in his 
article, ‘The Logic of Karl Barth’s Ecclesiology: Analysis, Assessment and Proposed Modifications,’ 
Modern Theology 10:1 (1994): 253–70.  Healy’s criticism is taken up by Joseph Mangina in his article 
‘Bearing the Marks of Jesus: The Church in the Economy of Salvation in Barth and Hauerwas,’ Scottish 
Journal of Theology 52:3 (1999): 269–305.  Healy reconsiders his criticism of Barth in his ‘Karl Barth’s 
Ecclesiology Reconsidered,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 57:3 (2004): 287–99, where he suggests that 
Barth does not have enough theological ways of talking about the concrete church.  On this debate, see 
further Theodora Hawksley, ‘The Freedom of the Spirit: The Pneumatological Point of Barth’s 
Ecclesiological Minimalism,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 64:2 (2011): 180–94. 
79 Rusty Reno, ‘The Carnal Reality of Revelation,’ First Things, http://www.firstthings.com/ 
onthesquare/2010/04/the-carnal-reality-of-revelation (Accessed April 26th).  
80 Reno, ‘Carnal Reality’. 
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because you have checked my word ‘slab’ against your mental image of a slab.81  The 
meaning of words is nothing intrinsic to the words themselves, but their function in a 
communicative exchange.  So when I shout ‘Slab!’, the meaning of my utterance could 
be described by what comes next: you bringing me a large block of stone.82  Likewise, 
the meaning of the rule ‘add two’ is nothing intrinsic to the rule itself: it is rooted in 
the practice of adding two.83  In short, if we want to ask what things mean, we have to 
look at what people do with them.84  Lindbeck appropriates this by proposing an 
analogy: religion is like a language, or a language game, and doctrine is like 
grammar.85  Doctrines have meaning not because they refer propositionally, nor 
because they express experience, but because they act in a grammar or rule-like way 
in relation to a community.  This emphasis on language games and ‘forms of life’ 
(Lebensformen) naturally turns concrete ecclesiologists towards observing the social 
shape of the church.  If we want to know what Christian beliefs mean, we need to 
look at what Christians do.  If our forms of life are what carry meaning then, as Lewis 
Mudge puts it, we need to attend to what Spirit-gathered communities say in their 
social context.86 
 
  iii) Geertz 
 
It is easy to see how Barth’s emphasis on witness and Wittgenstein’s work on 
meaning, when filtered through postliberal concerns, result in an ecclesiology 
                                                
81 See also Wittgenstein’s discussion of the instruction, ‘Bring me a red flower from the meadow’ in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) 3ff. 
82 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G E M Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001) §19–21. 
83 Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown 12–14. 
84 There is a much more extensive discussion of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in chapter four: see 
167–84. 
85 Or, as David Kelsey puts it, a chain of metaphors and a final analogy.  See David H Kelsey, ‘Church 
Discourse and the Public Realm,’ in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation With George 
Lindbeck, ed. Bruce Marshall (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 7–33 (8). 
86 Mudge, Sense of a People 13.   
 42 
committed to using hermeneutical social science.  Using the analogy of culture for the 
church basically enacts the same Wittgensteinian move on a social level.  Lindbeck is 
not advocating the use of social science to study the church, but trying to make a 
point about how Christian belief and practice should be interpreted – intratextually.  
Intratextuality is a hermeneutical principle Lindbeck borrows from Frei.87  Intratextual 
accounts of meaning hold that the meaning of a given text (to take Lindbeck’s 
example, Oedipus Rex or War and Peace) is not found outside the text (in these cases 
in Freud’s theories or Russian history), but within the text itself: the meaning of the 
text is established by plot, character development, and so on.88  Lindbeck advocates 
intratextual hermeneutics directly in relation to the Bible, and analogically with regard 
to Christian belief – which is where Geertz comes in.89  In a famous essay in The 
Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz argues that we can only tell the difference between a 
wink and someone’s eye twitching if we immerse ourselves in the semiotic universe 
in which such signs (or non-signs) are exchanged.90  That is, we can only explain 
cultures from the inside, by laying out their parts in relation to one another.91  By 
drawing on Geertz, Lindbeck is again claiming that the significance and meaning of 
Christian belief and practice can only be explained from within.  He is advocating a 
kind of Christian cultural intratextuality.   
 
  iv) Non-foundationalism 
 
                                                
87 George A Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: 
Westminster John Knox, 1984) 135, 138; See also ‘Foreword to the German Edition of The Nature of 
Doctrine’ in ed. Buckley, The Church in a Postliberal Age 196–200 (197). 
88 See Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine 116–24, and Lindbeck’s comments on present exegesis in ed. 
Buckley, The Church in a Postliberal Age 211–7. 
89 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine 116–7. 
90 See Geertz, After the Fact 6–12. 
91 There is a much more extensive discussion of Geertz’s work in chapter three. See 119–27. 
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At the start of his ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’, Foucault talks about the 
‘epistemological mutation of history’.92  What he is talking about is a change in the 
discipline of historical studies from looking at continuity, progress and coherence, 
towards looking at disruption, transformation and rupture.  The rise of postliberal 
theology has effected a similar epistemological mutation in theology, altering the way 
in which theologians approach the truth, meaning, explanation and defence of 
Christian beliefs.  Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language games and forms of life has 
shifted theologians away from the idea that explaining Christian faith needs to begin 
from universally shared assumptions and beliefs.  Although Christianity still explains 
itself to its cultured despisers, it now thinks it can and should do so on its own terms.  
Bruce Marshall puts his finger on the key insight of this epistemological mutation:  
Lindbeck brought home to me, as did Hans Frei in a different way, the idea 
that Christians can and should have their own ways of thinking about truth 
and about deciding what to believe…They need not take their truth claims 
on loan from some other intellectual or cultural quarter, or regard the only 
alternative to epistemic servitude as isolation from the broader human 
conversation about what is true.93   
 
Concrete ecclesiologies owe much to the postliberal instinct that Barth’s theology 
needs to be more incarnate.  They also owe much to Lindbeck’s efforts to establish a 
kind of Christian intratextuality, and the resultant postliberal shift from a 
foundationalist to a non-foundationalist epistemology.  However, concrete 
ecclesiologies also go beyond Lindbeck’s conclusions, taking what is a formal analogy 
between religion and culture, and making it a methodological partnership.  Lindbeck’s 
emphasis on the integrity of belief and practice becomes an emphasis on how 
Christian practices form a whole way of life.  Looking at this in more detail will help 
                                                
92 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A M Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 
1972) 11. 
93 Interview with Bruce Marshall, quoted in Gary Dorrien, ‘The Future of Postliberal Theology,’ 
Christian Century July 18th–25th (2001): 22–29. I am using an online copy, for which no pagination 
is available. 
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us, again, to examine the promise and problems of the concrete ecclesiological 
approach. 
 
Concrete ecclesiologies, along with the wider turn to the concrete church, are 
interested in what the church does.  As well as being rooted in the general 
Wittgensteinian principles we have just discussed, concrete ecclesiologies’ discussion 
of practices also owes much to Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre defines a practice as: 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
results that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.94 
 
MacIntyre’s notion of a practice is widely used to explore Christian practices as varied 
as hospitality, testimony, honouring the body, forgiveness and ‘singing our lives’.95  It 
stands behind Hauerwas’ heavy emphasis on the importance of church practices for 
discussing Christian ethics, and indeed behind his statement that the church is a social 
ethic – a whole way of life.  Likewise, it is taken up by concrete ecclesiologists as a 
way of emphasising the integrity of the Christian life.  Dorothy Bass writes, ‘Practices 
are those shared activities that address fundamental human needs and that, woven 
together, form a way of life.’96 
 
                                                
94 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1984) 187. Nicholas Healy quotes the same definition in Healy, ‘Misplaced Concreteness?’ 289; 
the contributors to eds. Bass and Volf, Practicing Theology acknowledge their debt to MacIntyre in 
Craig Dykstra and Dorothy Bass’s chapter, ‘A Theological Understanding of Christian Practices’ 13–32 
(21).  Bass adds, ‘Our present understanding of practices differs from MacIntyre’s account in After 
Virtue in that ours is now theological and thus normed not only internally but also through the 
responsive relationship of Christian practices to God.’ (21 n.8).  
95 See Dorothy C Bass, ed. Practicing Our Faith: A Way of Life for a Searching People (San Francisco: 
John Wiley, 1997). 
96 Bass, Practicing Our Faith ix. Reinhard Hütter points out in his Suffering Divine Things that 
MacIntyre’s definition means that ‘…while bricklaying and planting turnips do not qualify as “practice” 
according to this understanding, architecture and agriculture do.’  See Reinhard Hütter, Suffering 
Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice, trans. Doug Stott (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 
2000) 35.  
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After exploring postliberalism, it should now be becoming clearer why the 
methodological common sense of concrete ecclesiologies has emerged.  
Postliberalism’s desire to make Barth more incarnate, in combination with 
Wittgenstein and Geertz’s relocation of meaning within the communicative exchange, 
produce concrete ecclesiologies’ hermeneutical quest, their desire to reflect 
theologically on what the concrete life of the church means.  As well as inheriting the 
promising moves of postliberalism, concrete approaches also inherit the considerable 
tensions that come from finishing with Wittgenstein and Geertz what was started with 
Barth.  It will be helpful briefly to draw attention to these tensions and – without 
covering the arguments here - note the debates surrounding them.97   
 
  v) Tensions 
 
Quine once wrote that ‘Meaning is what essence becomes when divorced from the 
object of reference and wedded to the word.’98  In some respects, concrete 
ecclesiologies’ hermeneutical quest – their move from substance to meaning to action 
- also shows signs of a displaced, rather than disenfranchised foundationalism.  That 
is, the combination of Barth and Wittgenstein to articulate a new non-foundationalism 
means that the wider turn to the concrete in theology sometimes looks rather like (as 
Bruce Marshall puts it) ‘realism in search of a truth bearer’.99  
 
Many of the other postliberal tensions arising in concrete ecclesiologies result from 
this fundamental difficulty.  Having turned to the concrete church, it now seems that 
                                                
97 I have indicated in the footnotes the specific debates surrounding postliberalism/concrete 
ecclesiologies’ interpretation of Barth and Wittgenstein, and so will focus here on the difficulties arising 
from the combination of these three influences. 
98 W V O Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism,’ in Concepts: Core Readings, ed. Eric Margolis and 
Stephen Laurence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999) 153–70 (154). 
99 Bruce D Marshall, Trinity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 217. 
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theologians lean too heavily on it, requiring it to bear an epistemological weight that 
it cannot support.  So there is some criticism, for example, of practices being 
idealised.100  Postliberal reliance on Christian practices seems not to take account of the 
fact that they are far from perfect, and rarely communicate what they are meant to in a 
consistent and clear manner.101  Much criticism has also focused on the fundamental 
analogies driving the postliberal project, between religion, culture and language.  
Kathryn Tanner’s Theories of Culture demonstrates that, on the crucial points, the 
analogies fall apart.  Christianity is not like a culture or language, and its practices do 
not form a whole way of life in the way that is often assumed. 102     
 
A brief summary will be helpful here, before we move on to look at concrete 
ecclesiologies’ roots in post-Vatican II Roman Catholic theology.  In this section, I 
have again set concrete ecclesiologies within the wider turn to the concrete, and traced 
this turn back to postliberalism.  We have seen how postliberals take Barth’s emphasis 
on the integrity of Christian speech and embody it, using Wittgenstein and Geertz, in 
order to talk about doctrine’s role within the integrity of the whole of Christian belief 
and practice.  We noted how concrete ecclesiology goes beyond postliberalism, taking 
its analogy between religion and cultures or languages, and turning this into a 
methodological partnership with hermeneutical social science.  Finally, we looked at 
some of the tensions arising from the postliberal project as it takes shape in concrete 
ecclesiologies.   
 
                                                
100 See Healy's comments on Hauerwas in his ‘Misplaced Concreteness?’ 301–2.  For critiques of 
concrete ecclesiologies’ use of Wittgenstein, see the same article by Healy, and also Kathryn Tanner’s 
critique of postliberals’ use of Wittgenstein on rules in her Theories of Culture 138–43, and 
Christopher J Insole, ‘The Truth Behind Practices: Wittgenstein, Robinson Crusoe and Ecclesiology,’ 
Studies in Christian Ethics 20:3 (2007): 364–82, which is a thorough treatment of Wittgenstein on 
practices and his questionable use by certain ecclesiologists. 
101 See Healy’s excellent critique in this regard in ‘Misplaced Concreteness?’  291–6. 
102 Kathryn Tanner’s incisive critique in her Theories of Culture of some theologians’ use of culture and 
practices is the best guide to this.  See Tanner, Theories of Culture 93–119. 
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 b) Post-Vatican II Catholic theology: nature and grace 
 
If we note one thing from the section preceding this one, it might be the sheer 
profusion of influences on concrete ecclesiology, from Barth to Wittgenstein, Geertz 
and MacIntyre.  To this competing and confusing array of influences we will now add 
another set, this time from post-Vatican II Catholic theology.   
 
I suggest it is with the Catholic influence that the general turn to the concrete becomes 
specifically ecclesiological, taking the church as its object of inquiry.  It is sometimes 
said that ecclesiology only became a distinct area of theology after Vatican II, with its 
two great pastoral constitutions on the church, Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes.  
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, the changing face of current ecclesiology 
owes much to the changes in Catholic theology that both fed the council’s 
deliberations and featured so strongly in its teachings.  Exploring the theological 
moves made at the council will help unpack its legacy for ecclesiology, and help us to 
discern more clearly the theological motives underlying the turn to the concrete.  
 
Behind all the changes in ecclesiology at Vatican II lies the question of the relationship 
between nature and grace.  Catholic theology in the modern period had relied on a 
strong distinction between the realms of nature and grace, such that reality had a two-
layered character: ‘…grace appeared there as a mere super-structure, very fine in itself 
certainly, which is imposed on nature by God’s free decree, and in such a way that the 
relationship between the two is no more intense than a freedom of contradiction’.103  
The two orders of grace and nature were seen as complete in themselves and, because 
                                                
103 Karl Rahner, ‘Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace,’ in Theological Investigations 
I: God, Christ, Mary and Grace (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961) 297–317 (298). 
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grace was not thought to be an object of human experience, ‘[a] free being at least 
could always reject such a good without thereby having inwardly the experience of 
losing its end.’104  Nature has no lack for grace to perfect or complete and human 
beings, therefore, have no natural desire for God.  This view of nature and grace has 
its roots in the interpretation of Aquinas proffered by Cajetan and Suaréz in the 
sixteenth century, whereby humans exist in a state of ‘pure nature’, to which God 
adds a supernatural end.105  Aquinas’ distinctions between intellect and appetite 
(Summa 1.79–80) and supernatural and natural virtues (1.2.57–58), abstracted from 
their place within a wider consideration of human beatitude, became rigidly 
understood as separate spheres, related only by God’s free decision.  This already 
difficult understanding of Aquinas was compounded by its ossification: scholastic 
theology was understood not only as the single authoritative mode of Catholic 
theology, but also as unchanging and monolithic. 
 
It was in this context that Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel had such a monumental impact.  
De Lubac’s work challenged the prevailing scholastic theology root and branch, 
proving not only that it had changed and developed, but also proving on that basis 
that modern scholasticism’s interpretation of Aquinas on nature and grace was 
drastically inadequate.  De Lubac showed that the idea of ‘pure nature’ was foreign to 
Thomas.  In place of the scholastic ‘two-tiered’ picture of reality and of the human 
person, de Lubac reinstated the picture of the human person common to Bonaventure, 
Augustine and Aquinas: ‘We are creatures, and have been given the promise that we 
shall see God.  The desire to see him is in us, it constitutes us, and yet it comes to us as 
                                                
104 Rahner, ‘Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace’ 298. 
105 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroad 
Herder, 1998) 6–12. 
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a completely free gift.’106  In the face of the typical scholastic objection that doing 
away with ‘pure nature’ destroys the gratuity of grace, de Lubac removed the 
opposition between the two by asserting God’s radical transcendence.107  To the 
scholastic insistence that faith is on the level of the intellect, de Lubac answered that 
human beings have natural desire for God because they are created in God’s image: 
‘The Creator’s power imprints a movement “deep within his creature, in the heart of 
the created being, at the moment of its creation”; a deep and hidden movement, 
which is at first different and apparently contradicted by all the surface movements, 
but which underlies them all.’108  As Rahner puts it, ‘nature’ in the theological sense is 
therefore a ‘remainder concept’.109   
 
De Lubac’s two shattering challenges to scholastic theology were, first, that theology is 
contextual and historical, and that doctrine changes and develops over time and, 
second, that grace can be the object of human experience, meaning that there is no 
such thing as ‘pure nature’ unaffected by grace.  The furore raised in Rome by de 
Lubac’s work led to his silencing by his superiors in 1950, with similar action also 
being taken against his fellow travellers in la nouvelle théologie, Yves Congar and 
Marie-Dominique Chenu.  Despite this, it was the theology of this small group that 
won through at Vatican II just over ten years later.  The fundamental shift in the 
relationship between nature and grace that underlies the work of these theologians 
resonated with the sensibilities of the council fathers.  As a result, it is the same shift 
that underlies the council’s pronouncements on ecumenism, the church’s relation to 
the world and the role of the laity.  
                                                
106 De Lubac, Mystery 167. 
107 See Humani Generis §26.  ‘Others [theologians] destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since 
God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific 
vision.’ 
108 De Lubac, Mystery 136.  De Lubac is quoting Bérulle here. 
109 Rahner, ‘Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace’ 313–5 (315). 
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So much for la nouvelle theologie’s impact on the council - what of the council’s 
impact on ecclesiology?  De Lubac’s understanding of nature and grace, and its 
ramifications in terms of the council’s view of the church, set up the theological 
momentum that has resulted in the widespread changes to ecclesiology I described at 
the beginning of the chapter.  Exploring these in some detail will help to explain the 
theological heritage of concrete ecclesiologies, and highlight some of the tensions in 
how they are currently conceived and practiced. 
 
De Lubac’s argument that theology was subject to ebb and flow, and changed its 
emphases and mode of expression according to its context and audience, freed 
Catholic theology from the burden of constantly defending a truth perceived as static 
and unchanging.  It also freed up Catholic theology for a more positive recognition of 
the contextual nature of all theological efforts – theologies could be positively 
contextual, arising from a specific socio-cultural context and addressed to a specific 
audience.  In this connection, the effect of gathering thousands of bishops from across 
the world cannot be underestimated: each brought the concerns of their own pastoral 
context to the council, and each faced the challenge of bringing the council’s teaching 
to their home dioceses.  This recognition of the contextual nature of theology paved 
the way for the development of liberation theologies, and local theologies that 
challenge the Euro-American bias of academic theology.  Following this 
acknowledgement that theology strives after truth from a particular time and place, 
ecclesiology has taken on a centrifugal character.  That is, there is an increasing sense 
that ecclesiology is not useful in spite of its locally conditioned character, but because 
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of it.110  The move to contextual theologies has led to the belief that ecclesiology ought 
to be done primarily at a local level, in order to help local churches and congregations 
live faithfully in their context. This contextual, local emphasis then becomes the 
primary sense and first purpose of ecclesiology as a practice. 
 
The changed relationship between nature and grace also underlies current ecclesiology 
in another, related way.  Because, in de Lubac’s scheme, grace becomes accessible to 
experience (albeit in a dark and mysterious way) theology can and should take human 
experience as a locus theologicus.  Because humans concretely experience God, the 
experience of their daily lives is material for theological reflection and discernment.  
The implications for concrete ecclesiologies are clear: theologians ought to consider 
the experience of ordinary churchgoers in their work, not only because such an effort 
might make their ecclesiology more relevant to its audience, but because that 
experience in itself is a source of revelation.  If the Holy Spirit is given to the whole 
people of God, then the experience of the whole people of God should guide 
theologians.  When theologians seek to address a concrete ecclesial context, they are 
engaged in the process of discerning the concrete shape of God’s grace in a particular 
community.  Philip Endean notes the centrality of this rehabilitation of experience to 
Rahner’s theology:  
Compelled to abandon a pre-critical, naive realist metaphysics, Christian 
theology has had to move – or move back – talk of the experience of God 
from the periphery to the centre of theology.  To integrate theology and 
spirituality in this way is not to surrender to anti-intellectualism in the name 
of piety, but rather to situate the academic enterprise of theology within 
something greater: God’s ongoing self-revelation in human experience.111   
 
This dissolution of the boundaries between theology and spirituality is evident in 
Healy’s call for theologians to engage in a ‘practical-prophetic’ kind of ecclesiology, 
                                                
110 See, for example, Robert J Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985). 
111 Philip Endean, Karl Rahner and Ignatian Spirituality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 64. 
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which seeks to address local congregations as its primary aim, and the academy 
second.  It is echoed in Michael Montgomery’s call for empirical studies of church 
congregations to be done for the congregations themselves, not just the academy.112   
  
Finally, the changed relationship between nature and grace lies behind current 
ecclesiology to the extent that theological anthropology has become a proper starting 
point for theological reflection.  Rahner places the inquiring human being at the 
centre of his theology, but rejects the idea that an anthropological starting point 
produces an atheistic result.  Instead, ‘precisely because the question or inquiry is 
theological, it points directly and self-evidently to anthropology as the horizon and 
presupposition of theology.  Thus, the basic possibility and legitimacy of an 
anthropological point of departure for theology become evident, on the one hand, 
and its urgency, on the other.’113  Because the human person, with its supernatural 
existential, always has to do with God, anthropology is both a legitimate starting point 
and a legitimate testing ground for theological proposals.114 
 
3. Cultural context 
 
 a) Introduction 
 
So far, we have explored two theological sources of the methodological common 
sense of concrete ecclesiologies: postliberal theology and post-Vatican II Catholic 
                                                
112 Michael H Montgomery, 'Finding the Right Direction: Ecclesiology From Below', (Paper presented at 
the American Academy of Religion, Ecclesiological Investigations Unit, Montreal, 2009). 
113 Anton Losinger, The Anthropological Turn: The Human Orientation of the Theology of Karl Rahner, 
trans. Daniel O Dahlstrom (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000) xxi. 
114 For a brief explanation of the supernatural existential in Rahner’s thought, see Stephen J Duffy, 
‘Experience of Grace,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E 
Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 46–7. 
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theology.  From the first, we gathered a sense of the multiple theological and 
philosophical influences behind the postliberal project itself, and how these impact on 
the turn to the concrete and take shape in concrete ecclesiologies.  From the second, 
we saw how changes in Catholic theology’s thinking about the relationship between 
nature and grace have opened up the possibility of looking at human experience as a 
locus theologicus.  One of the challenges of exploring concrete ecclesiologies’ 
theological roots is that the ‘common sense’ nature of their turn to the concrete means 
that the theologians involved rarely justify or explain it in any explicit way: its 
importance and self-evidence to the reader is, by and large, assumed.  This means that 
the two theological stories I have told are more like aetiologies, a sort of theological 
‘How the Leopard Got His Spots’.  These aetiologies are not found in their pure form 
in any particular theologian’s work; they are not offered as direct explanations of any 
particular theological project, nor are they speculations about particular theologians’ 
motives.  They are intended to highlight two powerful movements in twentieth 
century theology, and suggest their impact on a methodological common sense that 
has yet to reflect thoroughly on its own theological provenance and warrant.  As 
explanations of the turn to the concrete these aetiologies are incomplete, but they do 
not lack explanatory power.115  This explanatory power will become more evident as I 
                                                
115 For example, I have not explored the relationship between the turn to the concrete and liberal 
Protestant practical theology.  While practical theologies share the use of social science with concrete 
ecclesiologies, they are distinct insofar as (a) practical theologies tend to engage principally with 
congregational studies, for which see the note below, and (b) this engagement takes place in the 
context of discussions about theological education and the equipping of clergy with practical skills for 
ministry.  This liberal protestant/practical theology field does occasionally merge with concrete 
ecclesiologies, for instance in the work of the contributors to Bass and Volf, Practicing Theology and 
Bass, Practicing Our Faith.  See also Fulkerson, ‘Theology and the Lure of the Practical: An Overview’. 
As there is little cross-pollination between this area of practical theology and concrete ecclesiologies, it 
is not a major focus of the thesis.  
 
I have also not touched here on the relationship between congregational studies and concrete 
ecclesiologies.  Healy's Church, World and the Christian Life draws on the work of Nancy Ammerman, 
Congregation and Community (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), but subsequent cross 
pollination between the two fields has been less than might be expected.  Despite Healy’s pragmatic 
emphasis in that work, concrete ecclesiologies have tended to downplay the use of social science to 
promote church growth or to enable pastors and congregations (although see Montgomery, ‘Finding 
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move on to explore concrete ecclesiologies in greater depth in the chapters that 
follow. 
 
The two theological stories I have told are also incomplete in another, more important 
respect.  Although each provides a good theological account of the reasons behind 
ecclesiology’s turn to the concrete, the two accounts are very different: they rely on 
theological frameworks that are, if not antithetical, then certainly in tension with one 
another.  The premises about experience in the second aetiology are inadmissible in 
the first; the church-world relationship adumbrated in the first aetiology sits ill with 
the open stance to the world in the second.  The fact that two quite different 
theological fields have reached the same methodological conclusion should alert us to 
the fact that more is at play in the turn to the concrete than just the theological reasons 
I have outlined in these aetiologies.  Ecclesiology, in fact theology as a whole, is 
responding to something else as well. We need to explore some of the ways in which 
concrete ecclesiologies emerge as a response to postmodernity, and are shaped by that 
relationship. 
 
 b) What to say, and how to speak 
                                                                                                                                     
the Right Direction: Ecclesiology From Below’), and focussed on a ‘value-free’ engagement with 
ethnography (see  Healy, 'Chastened Ecclesiology' 3, 13), and the use of ethnography for its own sake, 
on a theoretical rather than pragmatic level.  Further, concrete ecclesiologies have engaged far more 
with ethnographic than sociological perspectives, with numerous suggestions that a qualitative, rather 
than quantitative approach, is what ecclesiologies need.  For this see Scharen, ‘Judicious Narratives’ 
127–9 and Hegstad, ‘Ecclesiology and Empirical Research on the Church’ 3.  A recent volume edited by 
Patrick Kiefert addresses how theology informs congregational studies: see Keifert, ed. Testing the 
Spirits: How Theology Informs the Study of Congregations (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
2009). 
 
A further field left untouched is that of Christian Anthropology, for which see Fenella Cannell, ed. The 
Anthropology of Christianity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), Timothy Jenkins, The 
Anthropology of Christianity: Situation and Critique (2010) forthcoming in Ethnos.  While some of the 
debates of this field will be relevant in the chapters that follow, the movement itself arises from 
religious studies and anthropology of religion, rather than theology, and is distinct both from the 





Concrete ecclesiologies’ response to postmodernity is complicated, because 
postmodernity is not a whole new context – it is not as if theology fell asleep on the 
train and woke up a few stops too late in an entirely new and bewildering destination.  
Postmodernity neither replaces nor displaces modernity, but exists in a complex 
relationship with it, variously transforming its influences, living off its legacy, 
rejecting its assumptions and repeating its faults.  Concrete ecclesiologies, as we shall 
see, exist in a similarly complex relationship with the modern ecclesiologies that are 
their forerunners.  Paul Lakeland describes postmodernity as constituted by the 
interplay between the given and the novel, and we would do well to approach 
concrete ecclesiologies in the same vein.116  Concrete ecclesiologies are simultaneously 
produced and constrained by their relationship to modern ecclesiologies; while often 
articulating their objectives in contradistinction to such approaches, concrete 
ecclesiologies nevertheless continue to work in their shadow.  Likewise, while 
theologians’ responses to postmodernity differ widely, each is unavoidably shaped by 
the issues to which it responds: even the most isolationist of theological projects is 
already implicitly responding to postmodernity in seeing it as a threat.  The 
complexity of the various relationships between concrete ecclesiologies and modern 
ecclesiologies, and between concrete ecclesiologies and postmodernity in general, will 
become clearer as we explore the movement further.  For now, it will be helpful to 
sketch the issues raised by postmodernity to which concrete ecclesiologies are 
responding, and briefly indicate some of the ways in which that response takes shape. 
 
                                                
116 Lakeland, Postmodernity xii. 
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 In every age, ecclesiology faces the challenge of what to say about the church, given a 
certain set of social descriptors.117  The task is one of making sense of our doctrinal 
beliefs about the church – its unity, wholeness, apostolicity and so on – in a concrete 
context.  During the Reformation, for example, the fracturing of the church meant 
finding new ways of talking about the church’s unity.  For the Protestant theological 
cause, this meant emphasising the unity of the elect in the invisible church across the 
ages, and its manifest visibility in the beleaguered minority preserving a faithful 
ministry of word and sacrament.  For the Catholics on the defence, this meant re-
emphasising unity around the papacy.  Concrete ecclesiologies today face the same 
task of correlating beliefs about the church with their concrete social contexts.  Today, 
those social contexts are marked by pluralism and globalisation, secularisation or 
resurgent fundamentalism, extremes of poverty and wealth and a new environmental 
awareness, to name only a few factors.118  As we shall see, these contextual challenges 
shape what concrete ecclesiologies say about the church’s nature, purpose and 
mission.  The challenge is to hold the truth of the church’s unity alongside its obvious 
disunity and the apparent stagnation of ecumenism.  The challenge is to talk about the 
church’s holiness in an environment increasingly hostile to public religion.  The 
challenge is to talk about apostolicity in an age where the legitimacy of every authority 
is questioned.  Yet concrete ecclesiologies also face something more than the perennial 
difficulty of correlating doctrinal beliefs with social context: in the postmodern 
context, the challenge facing ecclesiology is not just what to say, but how to speak at 
all.  Our exploration of the roots of concrete ecclesiologies will be incomplete without 
                                                
117 A formulation for which I am indebted to David Fergusson. 
118 See Roger Haight’s understanding of the context for his ecclesiology in Haight, Christian 
Community Vol. 1 27–35, and Gerard Mannion’s in his Ecclesiology in Postmodernity: Questions for 
the Church in Our Time (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2007) 16–24. 
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considering the ways in which they are shaped by the emergence of bodies in 
postmodernity and the crisis of legitimacy that this produces.119 
 
c) The emergence of bodies 
 
the body has been curiously absent in anthropology, despite the fact that the 
people under study invariably have bodies.  This is excactly [sic] the point: 
the view of people having bodies has made these disappear from analysis.120  
 
I quoted earlier Clifford Geertz talking about the ‘moral and epistemological vertigo’ 
that has struck culture generally in the postmodern period.121  In this section, we will 
explore another way of talking about the same phenomenon: the emergence of 
bodies.  In the same way as talk of ‘having’ bodies tends to make bodies disappear 
from analysis (they are of less interest than the people who ‘have’ them), so many of 
the ways in which we have habitually talked about, say, history or medicine, has 
tended to obscure the ‘bodies’, or material conditions, that sustain those discourses 
and disciplines.  In postmodernity, what we see is these bodies reappearing, or 
emerging, as the material conditions for the production of discourse are surfaced and 
deconstructed, and their self-evidence challenged.122  The chapter so far has already 
shown some of the ways this is occurring in theology.  In this section, we will draw 
those features out more explicitly, and describe them as a response to the challenges of 
postmodernity. 
 
  i) The church 
                                                
119 Mannion also refers to ‘crises of legitimation’, for which see Mannion, Ecclesiology in 
Postmodernity 20–2. 
120 Kirsten Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology: Between Experience and Theory (London: Routledge, 
1995) 80–1. 
121 Geertz, After the Fact 128. 
122 Foucault speaks of his project as tearing the unities formed by discourse away from their self-
evidence.  See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 26. 
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One of the things we have already noticed is the turn to the concrete, and the extent 
to which this occurs as a way of trying to make Christianity epistemologically self-
sufficient.  The idea of intratextual hermeneutics is extended from just the texts of 
Christianity – the Bible, doctrine and so on – to include also its concrete life, so that 
the Christian community becomes part of the larger ‘text’ of Christianity on which we 
draw to explain the significance of Christian belief and practice.  This epistemological 
shift follows, as well as produces, the emergence of the concrete church.123  That is, it 
arises in response to the cultural decentering of the church that is occurring in the 
Western postmodern context.  At the same time as Christian communities find 
themselves numerically contracting and increasingly marginalised by the secular state, 
they also find themselves isolated by the receding tide of modernity’s unified 
epistemological project.  The church emerges as a distinct public, or polis, with its 
own language, its own metanarrative, and its own standards of truth.124  
Metaphorically (and simplistically), we can think of modernity as a city, with a 
unified transport and communication system, where citizens speak the same language; 
postmodernity is more like a remote and mountainous region where, separated by 
mountains, each village has its own language and customs, and communication is 
shouting from mountain-top to mountain-top, hoping the other person can catch 
enough of what you say and understand the language you speak. 
 
                                                
123 ‘Philosophy does not dictate or direct culture; it mirrors it.’ Lakeland, Postmodernity 36. 
124 Ola Sigurdson comments interestingly on the Church of Sweden’s emergence as a social body 
distinct from the state in ‘The Return of the Body: Re-imagining the Ecclesiology of Church of Sweden’ 
in Ideström, For the Sake of the World 125–45. 
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In the face of the decentering of the Christian community in postmodernity, as 
Lakeland points out, theologians tend to make a virtue out of necessity.125  Several of 
the features of the turn to the concrete that we have already noted are illuminated by 
this analysis.  First, when the church emerges as a separate public, we can see why 
theologians lean more heavily on the concrete church as the justification and the 
condition for meaningfulness of what they do.  There is a renewed sense that the 
concrete church is the source and end of theological reflection.  Second, we can see 
how concrete ecclesiologies’ emphasis on witness develops alongside the demise of 
modernity’s project of universal reason.  With no shared understanding of the 
grounds of argument, or any shared way of deciding what is true or authoritative, 
theology’s rhetorical style has shifted from argument over shared premises to 
demonstration.  The theological task in itself, as well as theological intervention in 
public life, becomes the task of imaginatively replacing one world of sense with 
another.126 
 
At the same time as postmodernity causes this turn to the concrete, and the impulse 
for epistemological self-sufficiency, it also drastically complicates it.  The questions 
that follow an appeal to the whole ‘text’ of Christian belief and practice are, ‘Whose 
belief?  Whose practice?  What text?’  Two major challenges arise.  On one hand, 
                                                
125 Lakeland, Postmodernity 75. Milbank’s project for example, ‘accepts the isolation and 
incommensurability and makes it the justification for a non-dialogical assertion of superiority, like a 
little boy under pressure, blindly declaring, “My peaceable kingdom is bigger than your peaceable 
kingdom!”’ (76). 
126 A good example of this is Kathryn Tanner’s articulation of her method in God and Creation.  She 
picks up on the general shape of a Kantian transcendental argument – the idea of dissolving a tension, 
based on a meta-level agreement – but does not offer necessary premises or conditions for the 
possibility of her theological discourse (23).  Rather, she offers a certain way of reading Christian 
discourse, and a genealogy of modernity that both demonstrates the problem she addresses (tension 
between God’s action and ours) and provides the key to its solution (radicalising the transcendence of 
God).  Tanner recognises in Theories of Culture that this strategy often looks like a bad argument: 
‘Because the meaning of premises is often altered in these ways in the course of the argument, 
theological arguments are often bad arguments if assessed in strictly logico-deductive terms; they do 
not strictly prove anything, but transpose the ground of argument as they proceed.  A bad argument is 
in this case, however, a good rhetorical strategy.’  See Tanner, Theories of Culture 117.   
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postmodernity exposes the ways in which theological reflection on the church has 
hitherto been controlled by a white, male, western agenda.  On the other, it draws 
attention to the ways in the unified object of study – the church – is produced by this 
agenda, through a process of exclusion and silencing.  What does this mean? Any 
straightforward appeal to ‘the beliefs and practices of the church’ masks a whole series 
of decisions about whose beliefs and practices count as Christian, and whose do not.  
Postmodernity exposes the degree to which such decisions are mired in traditional 
Euro-American, white, male hegemonies which define and control which issues are 
seen as theologically important, what kinds of questions are viable, and even what 
kinds of writing and expression are acceptable.127  We will observe in the next chapter 
how this affects concrete ecclesiologies, particularly in their engagement with social 
science.  There is a strong pull towards the local, and away from the universal level, 
which is seen as general and abstract.128  At the same time, there is evidence of 
theologians trying to describe the church without engaging in that process of silencing 
minority voices. 
 
  ii) The theologian 
 
Foucault articulates three questions that his archaeological project brings to texts: 
‘Who is speaking?’, ‘What site are they speaking from?’ and ‘What relation do they 
                                                
127 Orlando Espín talks in this connection about the Euro-American bias of theology, and the 
‘hegemonic epistemology’ (94) of American society: ‘if we produce theology and social sciences in 
ways that follow the established mainstream methods, we are implicitly (and necessarily) accepting as 
sufficient and correct not the epistemological and ideological assumptions of our peoples but those of 
the dominant, hegemonic groups in American society – the very groups and ideologies that created 
and/or inherited those assumptions, and who are at the source of our people’s marginalization and 
suffering’.  See Orlando O Espín, The Faith of the People: Theological Reflections on Popular 
Catholicism (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1997) 157.  Part of his project involves exploring a specifically 
Latino/Latina epistemology (see 158ff).  
128 See Mudge’s plea for post-Foucaultian forms of ecclesiology in Mudge, Beloved Community 137. 
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have to the object?’129  It is the prevalence of questions like these that cause, alongside 
the emergence of the church, the emergence of the theologian.  The theologian is one 
of the material conditions for the production of discourse.  We have already seen the 
way in which postmodern viewpoints draw attention to the ways in which theology 
has been shaped by those who have typically engaged in it – white, Western men.  
The role of the theologian emerges as something that has historically been a position 
of power. 
 
We can see concrete ecclesiologies responding to this in a number of ways.  We have 
already seen one: what I called the ‘extension of the theological franchise’.  By 
defining specialist and ordinary theologies as essentially the same pursuit, though with 
differentiated ends, academic theologians are simultaneously trying to uncouple the 
historical connection between power and the role of the theologian, while justifying 
their continued work as academic theologians by orienting it more explicitly towards 
the church community.  There is a new awareness, as we explored above, that 
theologians are deeply implicated in the processes of simplification, smoothing over 
of exceptions, silencing and exclusion by which theological inquiry advances.130 
 
Another way in which we see concrete ecclesiologies responding to the emergence of 
the theologian is the new visibility of the theologian in the text itself.  Where, in 
modernity, the knowing subject tends to be elided from the texts to produce a more 
objective account, we now see the theologian making regular appearances on the 
                                                
129 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 50–1. 
130 McClintock Fulkerson, for example, expresses concern over the way that theological thinking about 
the significance of practices can exclude those whose participation in practices is more affective than 
cognitive.  See her critique of Miroslav Volf on this point in her Fulkerson, Places of Redemption 233, 
n.5. 
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textual stage as a way of explaining the relationship between knower and known.131  
One of the interesting ways in which this concern for the theologian is taking shape is 
in a concern for personal authenticity.  After suggesting that Latino theology needs to 
throw off the hegemonic epistemologies of the dominant Euro-American discourse, 
Orlando Espín begins to explore what an authentically Latino/Latina epistemology 
would look like: an epistemology of suffering.132  The question then becomes whether 
one can engage in authentically Latino scholarship if one does not share in that context 
of suffering.133  The theologian’s authority to speak – even permission to speak – is 
bound up in questions of personal authenticity.134   
 
  iii) The academy 
 
The cumulative nature of the exploration thus far means that, in exploring how the 
academy emerges as a body, there is not much ground left to cover.  In 
postmodernity, the self-evidence of the academy’s values, categories, epistemologies 
and methods of communication are called into question.  In theology, as we have seen 
above, the challenge to the academy has largely come from liberation theologies, and 
remains a call for action rather than a substantive reshaping of the academy’s concerns 
or communicative methods.135  For the majority of theologians involved in the turn to 
                                                
131 See, for example, Fulkerson, Places of Redemption 3–5, Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 11 in 
typescript.  Christian Scharen argues that ecclesiology should become more autobiographical in his 
Christian Batalden Scharen, 'Ethnographic Notes Towards a Carnal Ecclesiology' (Paper presented at the 
Being Surprised by God: Embodied Ecclesiology in Local Contexts Conference, Utrecht, 2010). 
132 Espín, Faith of the People 158–79. 
133 He writes ‘We might be qualified, I would say, only to the degree in which we do share and 
participate in our people’s real suffering, and to the degree in which we experience and interpret it as 
they do.’  See Espín, Faith of the People 159. 
134 Isasi-Díaz offers some autobiographical information at the beginning of her En La Lucha, as a way of 
establishing the extent to which she shares the experience of those for whom she writes.  See Isasi-Díaz, 
En La Lucha x–xi. 
135 For examples, see Espín above and also Rebecca Chopp, The Power to Speak: Feminism, Language 
and God (New York: Crossroad, 1989), and Ian M Fraser, Reinventing Theology as the People’s Work 
(Glasgow: Wild Goose Publications, 1980). 
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the concrete, the question is not so much the propriety of the existence of academic 
theology, which is defended, but its relation to what is now recognised as ordinary.  
There is an enduring sense that academic theology, its concerns, and the ways in 
which its inquiry typically proceeds, is useful.  There is, however, a new emphasis on 
its usefulness in relation to a particular community.  We will explore this further in 
the chapters that follow, but quoting here a (rather MacIntyrean) formulation from 
Kathryn Tanner will help to get a sense of how theologians increasingly understand 
their role: 
sustained and explicit theological reflection helps establish Christian practices 
as a whole way of life by sharpening commitments; by guiding performance 
of Christian practices in the face of the ambiguities, disagreements, and 
shifting circumstances of everyday life; by contributing to the excellence of 
such practices by making them more meaningful and meaning-giving; and 
by imbuing them with a historical, contextual and theological richness that 
might otherwise be lost from view at any one place and time, and thereby 
enhancing their resourcefulness to meet the challenges of that place and 
time.136 
 
In addition, I want to suggest that concrete ecclesiologies’ concern over the place of 
the theologian and the academy is also responding to a second factor: the laicisation of 
theology. We have seen how theology is now widely thought to be a cultural practice 
undertaken by all Christians as they reflect on faith – that is one kind of ‘laicisation’, 
and leads to reflection on the relationship between ordinary and specialised theology.  
The more unremarked laicisation is that specialised theology is now undertaken 
principally by lay people, non-ordained members of Christian churches working in 
academic institutions.  Even sixty or seventy years ago, the picture was different: it is 
hard to think of an influential lay theologian amongst the members of la nouvelle 
théologie who so influenced the Council, for example.  Why does this laicisation of 
theology make a difference?  Even in the comparatively recent past, the practice of 
                                                
136 Tanner, ‘Theological Reflection and Christian Practices’ 234.  
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academic theology tended to go hand in hand with ordination.  While those working 
as theologians may not have been pastorally active, their relationship to the church 
community was clear: there was an overlap of authority between the ecclesia dicens 
and those teaching in universities and seminaries.  Theological authority went hand in 
hand with pastoral leadership of one sort or another, and the authority and place of 
the theologian was therefore only rarely a matter for explicit reflection.  Today, while 
many theologians are ordained members of various denominations, theology itself has 
become largely a lay activity, located within the academy.  Without the crossover 
between pastoral leadership, institutional authority and the practice of theology, 
theologians in our own period are faced with the need to renegotiate their 
relationship with the communities from which and for whom they write.  Insofar as 
theology is knowledge and knowledge power, theological authority must become a 
matter for negotiated consent. 
 
 d) Summary 
 
In this section, we have examined postmodernity’s influence on the development of 
concrete ecclesiologies in a very general way.  The intention has not been to catalogue 
concrete ecclesiologies’ use of postmodern thinkers, but rather to see how 
postmodernity as an analytic standpoint can further illuminate the typical concerns 
and methods of concrete ecclesiologies and round out the picture we gained from the 
theological aetiologies.  Drawing out some of the classic themes and questions of 
postmodernity has enabled us to see how the theologians involved in the turn to the 
concrete church are responding not just to theological challenges, but also to the 
challenge of doing theology in their own place and time.  Our cultural climate, as well 
as our theological heritage, shapes the theological questions that appear for us, and 
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what shape they take.  In this section, I have described the major question facing 
theologians in postmodernity as not just what to say about the church, but how to 
speak. 
 
In short, as well as negotiating a turn to the concrete, ecclesiology is also faced with 
negotiating a crisis of legitimacy.  These two happen alongside one another, as the 
crisis of legitimacy partly causes the turn to the concrete, and simultaneously radically 
complicates it.  In the chapters that follow, we will see how concrete ecclesiologies 
both directly and implicitly engage with the questions raised by postmodernity – 
questions surrounding theologians’ authority, the ethics of representation and the 
priorities and methods of theological inquiry.  We will also see how unconscious 
engagement with, and reaction to, postmodern themes causes theological difficulties.  
In particular, we will be looking at how ecclesiology’s use of social science brings the 
crisis of legitimacy into sharper focus, partly because the postmodern waves now 
rocking the theological academy have already broken with force over the social 
sciences.    
 
4. Moving on 
 
 a) General summary 
 
Before moving on to the work of the next chapter, it will be helpful to revisit and 
summarise the ground we have covered so far.  At the start of the chapter, I described 
the rise of concrete ecclesiologies – ecclesiologies that take the ‘concrete’, historical 
and sinful church as their starting point – and set these in the context of a wider turn 
to the concrete that has been taking place for the last thirty years or so.  We noted that 
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the general turn to the concrete sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish between 
what is ecclesiology, and what is simply theological appeal to the concrete church in 
service of, say, ethics or discussions of biblical authority.  After initially defining 
concrete ecclesiologies, and exploring some of the ways concrete ecclesiologists 
articulate their concerns, we moved on to explore the roots of concrete ecclesiologies 
in twentieth century theology.  The first story traced concrete ecclesiologies’ roots in 
postliberal theology by looking at how Barth, Wittgenstein and Geertz meet in the 
work of George Lindbeck.  We noted how the cumulative influences of these three 
leads theologians to appeal to the church’s practices.  We also noted some of the 
difficulties that arise from the way these three influences pull against one another.  In 
the second story, we traced concrete ecclesiologies back to the changes sweeping 
Roman Catholic theology since Vatican II.  Here we saw how changes to thinking on 
the relationship between nature and grace made human experience a locus theologicus 
for the first time.  Finally, we set both these theological stories within a broader 
picture, and explored how theologians are also responding to the challenges of 
postmodernity. 
 
 b) The path from here 
 
What emerges, in my account as in others, reminds me of an old Red Skelton 
movie, whose title I no longer remember.  Skelton is a hack writer of 
adventure stories for boys.  Pacing up and down, he is dictating to an 
amanuensis.  “Wonder Boy was trapped in the tent.  All around him were 
circling Indians.  The prairie had been set on fire.  He had no more bullets.  
All his food was gone.  Night was coming.  How would Wonder Boy get out 
of the tent?  End of Chapter 22.”  A pause, while Skelton collects his 
thoughts.  Then: “Chapter 23.  After Wonder Boy got out of the tent…”137 
 
                                                
137 Geertz, After the Fact 120. 
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Clifford Geertz tells this story as a way of characterising the disjunction between the 
anthropologist’s experience in the field, and the finished work of ethnography 
resulting from it.  Looking back, he cannot understand how he got from one to the 
other - there seems to be a genre missing, as he puts it.  I quote it here because the 
story of Wonder Boy bears a good resemblance to the story we have told in this 
chapter, and characterises well the challenge ahead of us. 
 
Perhaps the most notable thing about the story told thus far is the huge number of 
influences, both theological and cultural, that converge to produce concrete 
ecclesiologies’ methodological common sense.  At the same time, concrete 
ecclesiologies’ thoroughly practical mindset means that the internal tensions resulting 
from these disparate influences are not confronted or resolved, and we will see in the 
following chapter that engaging with social science tends to compound the problems, 
rather than alleviate them.  What we have begun to see in the explorations of this 
chapter is that concrete ecclesiologies face the problem of a ‘missing genre’.  We have 
chapter twenty-two, in that this chapter has sketched out the difficulties facing 
concrete ecclesiologies.  We have chapter twenty-three, insofar as we have already 
looked at several studies that show the promise of this methodological common sense.  
What we are missing is the story of how Wonder Boy escapes the tent, or how 
concrete ecclesiologies negotiate the difficulties facing them.  Our task from here on 
will be filling out that missing genre, and answering the question, ‘How does Wonder 
Boy get out of the tent?’   
 
The other striking thing about the story told thus far is the sheer breadth and weight 
of material here.  In order to begin teasing out some of the problems and suggesting 
constructive solutions, we need to narrow our focus considerably.  At the beginning 
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of the chapter, I talked about the ways in which theologians could learn from 
ethnographers a more reflexive sense of being ‘in the field’.  I suggested that the 
stories I have told about the development of the field of concrete ecclesiologies also 
shed light on my reasons for being in the field.  I am in the field because I share, to an 
extent, concrete ecclesiologies’ methodological common sense: I do hold that the 
ordinary, sinful, concrete church of our experience is also a place of grace and 
encounter with God, and that it is worthy of theological attention; I also think that 
ethnography may help us attend to this church (although not, as we shall see, for the 
same reasons as concrete ecclesiologists).  And if I thereby share the predicament of 
Wonder Boy, I also share Skelton’s sense that Wonder Boy does escape the tent, and 
have further adventures.  This shared common sense provides both the approach for 
the chapters that follow, and the particular focus I adopt. 
 
As for the approach, the chapters that follow suggest that concrete ecclesiologies 
might need to become gentler in their claims.  Earlier on, I quoted Rusty Reno’s 
suspicion that Barth tried to talk about God by talking about theology in a loud 
voice.138  In what follows, I will also be arguing that we need to speak about 
‘theology’ more softly, chastening its claims and restoring something of the 
stumbling, apophatic register that has waned in contemporary theology since its 
adoption of Barth’s confident Christian speech.139  I will also be suggesting – for good 
theological as well as good ethnographic reasons - that we should speak of ‘the 
church’ more softly, and refrain from tying up for the concrete church an 
epistemological burden that it cannot bear. 
 
                                                
138 Reno, ‘Carnal Reality’.  
139 In this instinct, I am also a product of my age.  The last twenty years have also seen increased interest 
in apophatic theology.  See, for example, Oliver Davies and Denys Turner, eds. Silence and the Word: 
Negative Theology and Incarnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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As for the topic, in the chapter that follows we will pick up, critique and explore one 
of the central characteristics of concrete ecclesiologies’ common sense: their use of 
social science.  We will be pursuing concrete ecclesiologies’ quest for the ‘real 
church’, asking what ecclesiology wants from social science, and what social science 
can give it.  We will explore what theologians are appealing to when they talk about 
the ‘real church’, and what ethnographers mean when they talk about the ‘social real’.  
From this critical and evaluative engagement, we will be able to move into a 
constructive exploration of how ethnography’s conception of the social real can help 
ecclesiology overcome some of the tensions I have described in this chapter. 
 
The purpose is not to press a shared common sense into an esoteric special-school 
outlook, nor to ensure that everyone is making the same methodological moves for 
the same reasons.140  Nor is the purpose to develop a one-size-fits-all approach to 
ecclesiology, or a definitive account of how ecclesiology should engage with social 
science.  The purpose of what follows is, first, to delineate more clearly the dangers 
facing concrete ecclesiologies as they undertake an imaginative and difficult 
interdisciplinary conversation.  The second purpose is to fill out the missing genre of 
how Wonder Boy escapes the tent.  The story I tell here is not the only possible story, 
and it is not intended as a normative template for future concrete ecclesiologies.  
Rather, the purpose of what follows is to provide a constellation of theological and 
ethnographic resources that will help us to navigate into new and promising 
landscapes. 
                                                
140 I have in mind Hans Frei’s caution, ‘Very often, especially in theology, scholars start off from shared 
convictions, a “common sense” in the best sense of that term, shared views and a shared sensibility, 
and then relentlessly pursue some element in that amalgam, untying one knot after another, until at 
some point a common vocabulary and a shared sensibility turn into a technical, often esoteric special-
school outlook.’  See Hans Frei, ‘Epilogue: George Lindbeck and the Nature of Doctrine,’ in Bruce 
Marshall ed., Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation With George Lindbeck (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 275–82 (276). 
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In the last chapter, we described theology's recent turn to the concrete church, and the 
emergence of concrete ecclesiologies.  Having described this emergent methodological 
common sense, we then explored its roots in twentieth century theology, and 
completed the picture by looking at how the turn to the concrete also arises in 
response to the challenges of postmodernity.  One of the characteristics of concrete 
ecclesiologies we noted was their turn to the social sciences, and in particular 
ethnography.  This turn, more than any other characteristic, exhibits most clearly the 
emergent methodological common sense of concrete ecclesiologies: we see a gradual 
rise in ecclesiological engagements with social science, from Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum 
Communio in 1930, through Marxist social analysis in the hands of liberation 
theologians in the 1980s, culminating in repeated calls over the past ten to fifteen 
years for ‘theological social science’ as a way of addressing the reality of the church.141  
Calls for ‘theological ethnography’ (Jinkins, 1999) and ‘ecclesiological ethnography’ 
(Healy, 2000) have been answered by a rapid rise in the number of ecclesiologists 
undertaking fieldwork or using ethnographic methods and analyses in their work.142  
We are seeing an increasing number of theologians engaged in questioning and 
                                                
141 Lewis Mudge calls for ‘depth sociology’ capable of dealing with the spiritual aspects of social reality 
in his Mudge, Sense of a People 29.  Michael Jinkins calls for ‘theological ethnography’ in The Church 
Faces Death 101.  Nicholas Healy calls for ‘ecclesiological ethnography’ in his Church, World and the 
Christian Life 169.  Neil Ormerod renews the call for properly theological forms of social science in 
Neil Ormerod, ‘Ecclesiology and the Social Sciences,’ in The Routledge Companion to the Christian 
Church, ed. Mannion and Mudge 639–54. 
142 See, for example, the work of the Ecclesiology and Ethnography Research Network.  Formed in 
2007, this currently 150+ strong group has been awarded a grant from the British Academy to fund 
five conferences exploring ethnography and ecclesiology.  Two volumes of collected papers from these 
conferences are forthcoming in spring and autumn 2012 from William B. Eerdmans.  
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transforming ecclesiology, and the use of qualitative social science seems to be central 
to their purposes.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to pursue that common sense, and ask what concrete 
ecclesiologies are looking for in turning to social scientific disciplines and methods.  
The discussion in chapter one has already helped us to establish the historical 
provenance of the turn to the social sciences.  In this chapter, we will pursue a more 
positive line of inquiry: what is it that social science is being used for?  What is its 
function within ecclesiological discourse? What moves is it being used to make, or 
what is it accomplishing?  These questions will move us beyond concrete 
ecclesiologies’ explicit reflections on the use of social science, and help us bring to the 
surface some of the implicit desires, assumptions and challenges driving the 
methodological changes we are witnessing.   
 
In the first section, we will explore what might be called concrete ecclesiologies' 
conscious use of social science, looking at the reasons concrete ecclesiologists give for 
turning to social science, and some of the ways in which it is used.  In the second 
section, we will dig deeper into what might be called concrete ecclesiologies' 
unconscious uses of social science. Here, by examining more closely how social 
science is deployed in a theological context, we will be able to sketch out a fuller 
picture of how and why concrete ecclesiologies turn to social science.  As with the last 
chapter, we will see that concrete ecclesiologies' use of social sciences is a result of 
multiple influences and mixed motives, not all of which are available on the surface 
for reflection.  Therefore, in the third section, we will look at some of the theological 
and methodological difficulties at work in concrete ecclesiologies' current use of social 
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science.  This critique will help us to identify the areas needing ethnographic and 
theological attention in subsequent chapters. 
  
1. What do concrete ecclesiologies want? 
 
The question for the first section, then, is 'What do concrete ecclesiologies want?'  
What is it that they are looking for in turning to social science?  The explorations of 
the last chapter have already given us some sense of why this methodological common 
sense has developed.  There we saw that concrete ecclesiologies want to be more 
practical, and for their theological reflection on the church to be rooted in reality 
rather than idealism.  We also saw that the turn to the concrete owed something to the 
postliberal drive for epistemological self-sufficiency, and to the post-Vatican II 
Catholic desire to see human experience as a locus theologicus.  In this section, we 
will deepen and develop that analysis, by looking at five aspects of concrete 
ecclesiologies' use of social science.  In each case, we will also note some features of 
concrete ecclesiological language, and how concrete ecclesiologies express their 
reasons for turning to social science.  
 
 a) Concrete shape and identity 
 
The primary object of ecclesiology is the historical organization that has a 
historical life; to understand it, one must attend to it.  Against the 
background of an ecclesiology that is abstract, idealist, and a-historical, an 
ecclesiology from below is concrete, realist and historically conscious.143   
 
This is how Roger Haight begins his three-volume treatment of the church, Christian 
Community in History.  The link between this statement about the church and 
                                                
143 Haight, Christian Community Vol. 1  4–5.   
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Haight’s subsequent method is clear, even commonsensical: the church is historical, 
the church is socially real – so why wouldn’t an ecclesiological inquiry make use of 
social science?  The first thing to note about concrete ecclesiologies’ use of social 
science is its pragmatism.  We have already seen that concrete ecclesiologies do not 
found their methodological turn on an extended theoretical or theological 
consideration of what the church is.144  Rather, what we see in concrete ecclesiologies 
is a common sense that the concrete shape of the church, its visible nature, has 
theological significance.145  Concrete ecclesiologies need a way of describing identity, 
attending to experience and analysing how communities function within their cultural 
contexts, and anthropology is ready to hand.  But for some adjustments to 
anthropology’s traditional methodological atheism, to create theological forms of 
social science, there is no need to reinvent the wheel.  Appropriating anthropology 
and ethnography seems to be a natural step for a discipline seeking to be more 
engaged in the empirical and more contextually self-aware.   
 
Social science is also pragmatically helpful in another sense.  We have seen how 
concrete ecclesiologies advocate a close relationship between ecclesiological reflection 
and ordinary ecclesial life.  Ecclesiological reflection should help church communities 
to become more faithful to their Lord, and should help them address problems in 
                                                
144 The editors of Converging on Culture also note the lack of explicit reflection on theology’s turn to 
using resources appropriated from cultural studies.  See ed. Brown et al, Converging on Culture vi. 
145 Healy writes, ‘Christianity can be adequately understood only if one gives an account of its local, 
concrete forms to complement broader, more generalizing descriptions.’  See his ‘Ecclesiology and 
Practical Theology’ 117.  Jeff Astley, advocating the use of empirical research into ‘ordinary theology’, 
writes, ‘The general assumption behind my position is that truth claims about empirical reality, 
particularly the empirical reality represented by human beings and their individual and social 
behaviour, have some relevance for truth claims in theology and therefore must be taken account of in 
theological discussion.  This…ought to be accepted for those parts [of theology] that attempt a 
theological account of the nature of human beings and of human society (including the church).  This 
should be no more controversial than arguing that the doctrine of creation needs to take account of 
scientific claims about evolution and cosmology…’  See Astley, Ordinary Theology 105–6. 
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their own life of discipleship and witness.146  Ethnography helps here because, as Chris 
Scharen points out, it helps us recognise that there are multiple kinds of churches and 
multiple kinds of faithfulness.147  Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, ethnography 
can help us to create ‘thicker’ descriptions of different churches’ lives of discipleship 
and witness in their concrete contexts, and then reflect theologically on these 
descriptions.148  Paying close ethnographic attention to communities in this way can 
help theologians understand and describe the nature of the gaps between beliefs and 
practices.149  In some concrete ecclesiologists’ work, this pragmatic use of social 
science extends to empowering congregations.  For Michael Montgomery, for 
example,  ‘ecclesiology from below’ is not just about balancing theological talk about 
the church with empirical talk – it is about using social science to empower 
congregations in their lives of discipleship.150 
 
 b) Attention to experience 
 
In very recent years, some concrete ecclesiologists have become more cautious about 
the use of ecclesiological ethnography for congregational development.  The idea that 
ecclesiologists can use ethnographic study to help churches be more faithful is waning 
                                                
146 See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 38 and Kathryn Tanner's example of a professional 
theologian at work in ‘Theological Reflection and Christian Practices’ 240–2. 
147  See Christian Batalden Scharen, ‘Judicious Narratives' 133. 
148 A good example is Gilbert I Bond's chapter, ‘Liturgy, Ministry and the Stranger: The Practice of 
Encountering the Other in Two Christian Communities,’ in ed. Bass and Volf, Practicing Theology 137–
56. The expression ‘thick description’ comes from Gilbert Ryle, via Clifford Geertz.  See Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973) 6.   
149 See for example Amy Plantinga Pauw, ‘Attending to the Gaps Between Beliefs and Practices,’ in ed. 
Bass and Volf, Practicing Theology 33–50. 
150 Montgomery criticises the work of McClintock Fulkerson in this respect, saying that there is a 
difference between empowering academics and empowering congregations.  He also writes of Healy’s 
Church, World and the Christian Life, ‘What was called for were not more and better models of what to 
do, but ecclesiological maps that empowered congregations to locate themselves in Christian history 
and within the options of the Christian faith, to empower the congregations as theologians.  Implicit in 
his call for theological maps was a relocation of agency from the academy (and, dangerously, from the 
magesterium [sic]?) to the congregation or parish.  They need to be empowered as constructive 
theologians, making decisions as to how to lead their practices of the Christian faith.   Ecclesiologies 
must be constructed from the bottom up.’ See Michael H Montgomery, ‘Finding the Right Direction’ 3. 
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somewhat: apart from the fact that it raises questions about the power relationships 
between ecclesiologists and congregations, it also enlists ecclesiology in the modernist 
myth that things (in this case the church) are always progressing and improving – or 
at least ought to be doing so.151  There is now greater emphasis on the usefulness of 
ethnographic study of congregations for its own sake, rather than for promoting 
faithfulness or church growth, or even empowering congregations.  Alongside this, 
there is a developing sense of the importance of experience for ecclesiology.  Two 
things are notable here.  The first is that concrete ecclesiological rhetoric equates the 
real church with the church of experience.  That is, if we experience the church as 
confused and confusing, that is how the church actually is.152  The real church is not 
something behind or above or beyond the church of potluck dinners and endless 
meetings – the real church is the church of experience.153  Concrete ecclesiologies take 
their task to be asking how the church of faith is present in experience.154  
Ethnography presents itself as a useful tool for engaging this experience and asking 
how the church of faith is present in it.      
 
                                                
151 Comments to this effect were made at the conference of the Ecclesiology and Ethnography Research 
Network in Aberdeen, in March 2009.  See also Michael Montgomery’s cautions in Montgomery, 
‘Finding the Right Direction’ 7 and also  Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 13.  Here Healy acknowledges 
that, while the congregational development side of concrete ecclesiologies is important and 
worthwhile, his own work has moved on to considering how ethnography might affect theological 
claims about the church. 
152 Healy writes, ‘…in general ecclesiology in our period has become highly systematic and theoretical, 
focused more upon discerning the right things to think about the church rather than orientated to the 
living, rather messy, confused and confusing body that the church actually is.’  See Healy, Church, 
World and the Christian Life 3. 
153 My language here is indebted to Stanley Hauerwas, who refers to potluck dinners in ‘The Servant 
Community’ 383, and Michael Jinkins’ reference to endless meetings in The Church Faces Death 73.  
Although saying that what we experience is real sounds obvious, and is treated by concrete 
ecclesiologists as a straightforward claim, it is ecclesiologically contentious. Some classic ecclesiology, 
for example, would maintain that in spite of our experience of the church’s sinfulness, the church is 
really holy: the church’s deepest and most essential reality is not necessarily open to our experience.          
154 Harald Hegstad, ‘Ecclesiology and Empirical Research’ 3. Jinkins captures the difference well in 
saying, ‘…essential “churchness” is unworthy of our seeking while “church” is essential to our life of 
faith.’ Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 80. 
 76 
The second notable thing is how concrete ecclesiologies use ethnography to engage 
with experience.  What we see here is an emphasis on the irreducibility of experience, 
and on the use of ethnography to preserve that irreducibility.  One of the reasons 
concrete ecclesiologies tend to draw on qualitative, rather than quantitative, social 
science, is a concern to preserve people’s experience in all its complexity and variety.  
Because of this emphasis on small-scale social science, theologians using large-scale or 
quantitative analysis come in for some criticism.155  For some theologians, preserving 
the irreducibility of experience means using ethnography to look at individual 
experience.  Perhaps the clearest example of this is Ada Maria Isasi-Díaz’s use of 
ethnography in her attempt to articulate a mujerista theology. In place of the false 
universalism of ‘official’ church and ‘official’ theology, Isasi-Díaz uses the particular 
voices of Latinas to ‘…point to the universal by being as specific as possible’.156  
Ethnography becomes part of a liberative praxis: Isasi-Díaz’s ethnographic interviews 
are designed to heighten Latina’s sense of agency, and her almost word-for-word 
transcription of those interviews is intended to give Latinas a voice.157  She writes of 
her chosen method, ‘The purpose of knowledge synthesis is not to examine what the 
women say to the point where the analysis and not the lived-experience of Latinas 
becomes central to the theological enterprise, but to allow the voices of Latinas to be 
heard because they have the right to be heard.’158   
                                                
155 See, for example, Christian Scharen’s critique of Robin Gill in Scharen, ‘Judicious Narratives’: 
Scharen wants to attend to real Christian who go to real churches, not generic Christians who go to 
generic churches 127–9.  See also Healy’s critique of Roger Haight in  Healy, 'An Ecclesiology for 
Receptive Ecumenism?' (Paper presented at the Receptive Ecumenism and Ecclesial Learning: Learning 
to be Church Together Conference, Durham, 2009) 2.  Jeff Astley defends the use of quantitative 
studies in his Ordinary Theology 99–100. 
156 Ada María Isasi-Díaz, En La Lucha: Elaborating a Mujerista Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2004) 81. 
157 Isasi-Díaz’s decision to present the voices of Latinas almost unedited in her work reflects her 
conclusion that ‘…the conceptual frameworks and epistemological presuppositions of the world of 
theology cannot hold the meaning of our daily lives and concerns, knowledge and understandings of 
the divine without distorting them.’ Isasi-Díaz, En La Lucha 82. 
158 Isasi-Díaz, En La Lucha 105. Isasi-Díaz uses a mixture of ethnography and ‘meta-ethnography’ to 
present the experience of her interviewees.  The interviews focussed on questions designed to highlight 
how the women involved made decisions in their lives.  The practice of meta-ethnography then brings 
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Concern for the irreducibility of experience is also evident in those ecclesiologists 
whose work foregrounds the turn to the communal rather than the individual subject.  
Christian Scharen argues that there must be different kinds of faithfulness, and that a 
generic definition of faithfulness is not useful, and Kathryn Tanner seeks to move 
away accounts of church unity that depend on the search for generalities, or a 
continuous ‘essence’.159  This springs from her determination that the particularity of 
different forms of church must not be smoothed over in the interests of unity: we 
must come up with different ways of explaining unity that preserve historical 
particularity and irreducibility.160  There is a sense not just that looking at the 
particular balances out ecclesiology’s tendency toward generalisations, but that 
attention to the irreducibly particular is somehow the key to ecclesiology.161   
 
 c) Balancing talk about the church 
 
Concrete ecclesiologists also talk about using qualitative social science as a way of 
balancing talk about the church.  The most interesting thing to note here is the way in 
which this need for balance is expressed in Christological terms.  Healy describes the 
dangers of an overly theological or idealist picture of the church in terms of 
                                                                                                                                     
the interviews together, finds commonalities and differences between them, and uses this ‘knowledge 
synthesis’ to produce ‘generative themes’.  This process of knowledge synthesis works by holding the 
differences and similarities between accounts side by side, without collapsing them into one another: 
instead of saying ‘Olivia and Lupe mean the same thing when they say…’, we say ‘Olivia’s experience is 
similar to Lupe’s except that…’ (86–7).  
159 See Tanner’s chapter on commonalities in Christian practice in Theories of Culture 120–55. 
160 Thus the church’s unity across time and space is a unity of engagement: see Tanner, Theories of 
Culture 152, and my comments on this in chapter four, 203–5.  Michael Jinkins has a similar emphasis 
on the historical plurality of the church: see Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 58–63.   
161 Michael Jinkins argues that ‘the creative potential to expand our understanding of the church lies not 
in reading into the church’s history a uniformity (or, even, a harmony) that was never there and trying 
to develop taxonomies that reflect only this nonexistent uniformity (or harmony).  Rather, it lies in 
detecting the places of paradox and contradiction in our theoretical categories, in describing their 
nature, and in pressing them further.’ Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 64. 
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'ecclesiological Nestorianism' or 'ecclesiological Monophysitism'.162  Jinkins makes the 
same point using a different heresy, by warning of the dangers of 'ecclesiological 
Docetism'.163  Like Christological language, ecclesiological language needs to be 
carefully balanced, to avoid the risk of over-emphasising one aspect of its reality at the 
expense of another.  Christological language also illustrates for us how concrete 
ecclesiologies see the challenge of describing the church.  Christ’s humanity and 
divinity are not two separate realities existing side by side, which we must 
subsequently reconcile: they are two natures of a single person, a single subject both 
fully human and fully divine.164  There is no competition between the divine and 
human natures of the Word made flesh; likewise, there ought to be no competition 
between empirical and transcendent in the Body of Christ.  Concrete ecclesiologies’ 
task is therefore akin to the Christological task: we must be able to look at the concrete 
church and see there a subject both wholly empirical and wholly theological.  
Concrete ecclesiologies do not ask how the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church of 
faith can be reconciled with the church of concrete experience, but how the former is 
present in and revealed by the latter.165  
 
We should note two things about the way concrete ecclesiologies call upon social 
science for balance in connection with the Christological analogy.  The first is that the 
Christological analogy suggests that concrete ecclesiologies see their task as balancing 
                                                
162 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 75. 
163 Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 73. 
164 My wording here is indebted to Schillebeeckx, who talks about ‘pseudo-problems’ building up in 
theology around the questions of human reality and the reality of grace.  See his Edward Schillebeeckx, 
Church: The Human Story of God, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1990) 211.  The Christological 
theme is also evident in Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 92.  Kathryn Tanner’s work is characterised by 
an emphasis on non-competitive relations between God and creation, first developed in her God and 
Creation in Christian Theology.  For this emphasis in a Christological setting, see her Kathryn Tanner, 
Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001). 
165 This fact explains concrete ecclesiologies’ frequent emphasis on the church’s sinfulness: as there is 
no other church more real than the one we experience, ecclesial sin must be taken with theological 
seriousness.  For this emphasis, see Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 10 and Jinkins, The 
Church Faces Death 38. 
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two languages to describe an external, objective reality.166  The real church is ‘out 
there’, and it can be more or less well described.  The reality of the church – the 
reality we experience - can be ignored, distorted, idealised and so on.  Ethnography is 
used as a way of getting at that ‘real’ church and balancing out our talk about it.  The 
second point of note is that this use of Christological ways of characterising the task of 
ecclesiology occurs alongside an interest in the individual body, or moral agent, as an 
analogy for the church.  We see this tacit analogy at work in the prevalence of 
language about the church as agent, or body-in-life.167  Jonas Ideström’s Lokal Kyrklig 
Identitet is a particularly clear example of this.  His inquiry into the identity of the 
local church, focussed on a church in suburban Stockholm, is founded on an analogy 
of the church as body.168  In order to inquire about the church as social body, 
Ideström draws on the organisational theory of Niklas Luhmann, who defines an 
organisation as a form of social system where communication is made up of 
decisions.169  The initial analogy of ‘body’ goes hand in hand with a focus on agency.  
The ‘body’ with which the analogy is drawn is an individual, not a social body, an 
individual self whose identity is created by its decisions, actions and impositions on 
the world.170  The same quiet analogy of the church as body is also visible in some 
                                                
166 While Johannes van der Ven does not use the Christological analogy, he does draw on the idea of 
social science and theology as two languages describing a single object, for which see Johannes A van 
der Ven, Ecclesiology in Context (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 1996) 87.  The church’s 
functions can be described in either exclusively social scientific (87–90) or exclusively religious 
language (91–2); the key is to balance them (93).  Van der Ven writes, ‘ecclesiology should be 
developed proceeding from the coordination of the social and religious aspects of the functions of the 
church.’ (98, author’s emphasis). 
167 Healy references Schleiermacher’s characterisation of the church as a ‘moral person with an 
individual life’.  See Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 1.  The social body analogy is also characteristic of 
the contributors to Ideström, ed. For the Sake of the World: see Ola Sigurdson’s comments in ‘The 
Return of the Body: Re-imagining the Ecclesiology of Church of Sweden’, 125–45.   
168 Ideström, Lokal Kyrklig Identitet 36–40, 251–5. 
169 Ideström, Lokal Kyrklig Identitet 275. 
170 Though the analogy leans heavily on the side of the individual body as moral agent, some 
theologians have a sophisticated sense of the body as constructed by, and permeable to, the influences 
of society.  McClintock Fulkerson draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu to make this move.  See her 
‘“We don’t see colour here.”: A Case Study in Ecclesial-Cultural Intervention,’, in ed. Brown et al, 
Converging on Culture 140–157.  William Cavanaugh also distinguishes between individual and social 
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ecclesiologies that focus on the significance of practices for an account of the concrete 
church.171  In these ecclesiologies we can see an operative analogy of the church as an 
individual moral agent, whose identity is shaped by practices.172  Likewise, the same 
analogy with the embodied individual also underlies concrete ecclesiologies that 
focus, in a more Wittgensteinian way, on what communities ‘say’ in their social 
context.173  We will explore the connection between these two points – balancing 
language about an objective ‘real church’, and the church as body – more critically in 
a later section.  
 
 d) Particular and local 
 
Concrete ecclesiologies also use social science to make a turn to the particular and 
local.  One of the interesting things about concrete ecclesiologies is the degree to 
which their methodological common sense remains untroubled by – and largely not 
engaged with – major debates over the propriety of using social scientific language.  
Why not?  Such debates are often concerned with the church as an object of belief.  
The question that then arises is which language, theological or social-scientific, is best 
suited to describing ‘church’ in general.  If ‘church’ is primarily an object of faith, 
social science cannot have anything authoritative to say about the church.174  Concrete 
                                                                                                                                     
bodies in his William Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 17. 
171 Gerard Mannion’s attempt to develop a ‘virtue ecclesiology’, despite its vocal criticisms of Hauerwas, 
stands in continuity with a whole series of ecclesiologies influenced by the MacIntyrean return to virtue 
in modern ethics.  See Gerard Mannion, Ecclesiology in Postmodernity 192–215. 
172 Nicholas Healy suggests that it is not unreasonable ‘to describe the concrete church, at least initially, 
more in terms of agency than in terms of being.  Its identity is constituted by action.  That identity is 
thoroughly theological, for it is constituted by the activity of the Holy Spirit, without which it cannot 
exist.  But it is also constituted by the activity of its members as they live out their lives of discipleship.’  
See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 5.  Stanley Hauerwas argues that the difference 
between church and world is not an ontological difference, but the difference between agents.  See 
Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom 101. 
173 Mudge, Sense of a People 138–41 and Mudge, Beloved Community 13. 
174 Joseph Ratzinger, for example, argues that the church is ‘not ours, but his [Christ’s]’, and this means 
that ‘Behind the human exterior stands the mystery of a more than human reality, in which reformers, 
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ecclesiologies, by contrast, are interested in the church of experience, the church in 
particular.  Although the task of concrete ecclesiology does involve using two 
(potentially) mutually exclusive academic languages side by side, and to some extent 
balancing their claims, it is not focussed on ‘church’ as an abstract category.  As 
Jinkins puts it, ‘…essential “churchness” is unworthy of our seeking while “church” 
is essential to our life of faith.’175  
  
The way in which concrete ecclesiologies define themselves in opposition to modern 
ecclesiologies occasionally makes it sound as though modern ecclesiologies’ problem 
is that they are too theological, and that rebalancing our approach to the church 
means becoming more empirical – hence the turn to social science.  But not every 
ecclesiology that makes use of social science is necessarily ‘concrete’, a point that 
comes up clearly in responses to Roger Haight’s attempt to construct an ‘ecclesiology 
from below’ in his Christian Community in History.176  Healy argues that Haight’s 
work is only concrete to a limited degree,  
since he must pick and choose from amongst the confusions and 
complexities of real life to generate his account of trends and isolate general 
ecclesiological principles…In order to present an orderly and comprehensible 
account, they [sic] must select the usual experience of the majority rather 
than describe the plural experiences of the minorities, and smooth away the 
exceptional as but a proof of the rule.177 
 
Healy argues that by refusing to start with doctrine, Haight risks prioritising other 
large accounts of human experience: social theories, or the hegemony of one particular 
                                                                                                                                     
sociologists, organizers have no authority whatsoever.’  See Joseph Ratzinger and Vittorio Messori, The 
Ratzinger Report: An Exclusive Interview on the State of the Church (Leominster: Fowler Wright, 
1985) 46–48.  
175 Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 80. 
176 Neil Ormerod criticises Haight along the same lines in his Ormerod, ‘Ecclesiology’ 648–49. 
177 Healy, ‘An Ecclesiology for Receptive Ecumenism?’ 2.  Healy makes the same criticism in his 
‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 121–2, but adds here that Haight’s ‘smoothing over’ in this way is 
reasonable.    
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group’s experience.178  The real bogeyman for concrete ecclesiologies is not being too 
theological, but being too general.  
 
 e) Chastening claims 
 
The final way in which concrete ecclesiologies deploy social science is to chasten 
claims about the church.  Ethnography is used to chasten ecclesiology in two respects. 
The first is with regard to its social claims about the church.  The turn to the concrete 
that we noted in chapter one, with its emphasis on epistemological self-sufficiency, 
placed a fair amount of weight on the church’s practices and social distinctiveness. The 
suggestion here is that ethnographic attention to Christian communities shows that 
they cannot support such claims, that the church fundamentally is not like that, or 
does not practice in that way.  Both Healy and Tanner point out the degree to which 
borrowing language of culture and practice to emphasise Christian social 
distinctiveness trades on a church/world distinction that does not inhere in reality.179  
Healy also criticises the degree to which many proponents of what he calls ‘the new 
ecclesiology’ idealise practices.  By so doing, they do not take account of the ways in 
which practices are misperformed and misunderstood.180  Both Healy and Tanner are 
supportive of the use of cultural theory and ethnography in ecclesiology, but they are 
also clear that these disciplines should used to present an accurate picture of the 
church’s social reality – which is not one theologians necessarily want to see. 
                                                
178 See Healy, ‘An Ecclesiology for Receptive Ecumenism?’ 2.  Healy argues here that empirical or 
concrete studies of church do need to be rooted in doctrine, because only doctrine stipulates the 
conditions of the possibility of being church, and establishes its nature and function.  See also similar 
comments in his ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 122.  The Dutch practical theologian Johannes 
van der Ven also argues that ‘Empirical facts are meaningful only when they are placed within a 
hermeneutic context of theological concepts and theories and evaluated from within that context.’  See 
Johannes A van der Ven, Practical Theology: An Empirical Approach, trans. Barbara Schultz (Kampen: 
Kok Pharos, 1993) 153. 
179 See Healy, ‘Misplaced Concreteness?' 293–4 and Tanner, Theories of Culture 96–102.  
180 Healy, ‘Misplaced Concreteness?’ 294–5. 
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The second use of ethnography is to chasten theological claims about the church.181  
Healy argues, following Webster and Schillebeeckx, that what we need is ‘negative 
ecclesiology, church theology in a minor key’.182  Ethnography fits into this negative 
ecclesiology by prompting ‘revisions of traditional claims the church makes about 
itself, theological claims as well as empirical…I want to say that ethnography supports 
and to some extent guides such a chastening of the church’s doctrinal self-
understanding.’183  The suggestion now is that modern ecclesiology’s doctrinal claims, 
and indeed postliberal appeals to the church as a distinctive community, are over-
confident and in need of cutting down to size.  Positive ecclesiology needs to be 
followed by a negative, perhaps more humble, kind of ecclesiology, in which 
ethnography plays a key role.184 
 
2. How is social science being used? 
 
So far, I have drawn out five ways in which concrete ecclesiologies use social science, 
by looking at what concrete ecclesiologists engaged in such interdisciplinary 
borrowing say about what they do.  We have seen how qualitative social science is 
                                                
181 Louis-Marie Chauvet suggests scientific anthropology can be of critical and theological service to 
theology: critical because it forces theologians to flush out their theological prejudices and review their 
paradigms , and theological because ‘practising or frequenting anthropology requires them 
[theologians] to rethink from scratch a certain number of classical questions within theology.’  See 
‘When the Theologian Turns Anthropologist’ in ed. Sweeney et al, Keeping Faith in Practice 148–62 
(159). 
182 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 2.  He is quoting Schillebeeckx, Church xiii. 
183 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 1–2.  Healy gives an example of how empirical study might chasten 
doctrinal claims about authority.  In the Roman Catholic church, there is some talk of a ‘crisis of 
authority’ – the faithful are not conforming to centralized church teaching on various moral issues, and 
church authorities blame ‘cafeteria Catholicism’ and a culture of consumerism and individualism.  
Healy suggests that ‘…it may be that the crisis is due more to the failure of the authorities to recognize 
and adequately address the way the Christian life is actually lived.’  He suggests empirical study should 
prompt a massive reconsideration of the doctrine of teaching authority:  ‘It may be that the doctrine is 
at present distorted by an assumption that the Holy Spirit works to bring conformity rather than rich 
complexity and experimentation.’  See Healy, ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 127. 
184 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 2; see also Healy, ‘An Ecclesiology for Receptive Ecumenism?’ 4. 
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used to balance and chasten talk about the church, making it more particular, local and 
experiential, and also making ecclesiology more pragmatically helpful.  I have also 
drawn attention to some of the implicit features of concrete ecclesiologies’ engagement 
with social science: the way they express the challenge of balancing two languages 
about an external reality in Christological terms, and the quiet analogy between the 
church and the body-in-life that underlies the turn to the concrete church.  Already, 
we are beginning to see something of the variety of reasons that concrete 
ecclesiologists have for turning to social science.    
 
In the introduction, I noted that one of the characteristics of the critical analysis in this 
thesis would be attention to the ‘unconscious’ of concrete ecclesiological discourse.  
Concrete ecclesiologies, as we have already seen, do not often reflect explicitly on their 
theological or cultural influences.  This means that if we are to answer the question 
with which we began this chapter, ‘What do concrete ecclesiologies want?’, we need 
to look beyond concrete ecclesiologists’ explicit rationales for using social science.  We 
need to situate concrete ecclesiologies in the cultural context I explored in chapter one, 
and ask what function social science is performing for ecclesiologists, and what 
theological work it is doing.  In this section, we will look at two ways in which social 
science seems to be being used unconsciously by theologians: as a means of encounter, 
and as a site of resistance.  We will then move on to draw out some of the difficulties 
in concrete ecclesiologies’ use of social science in the section that follows.  
 
 a) Means of encounter 
 
What is it that concrete ecclesiologies want?  What is it that they are looking for in 
turning to social science?  So far, we have seen that concrete ecclesiologies are not just 
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seeking empirical language with which to describe the church as concrete and 
historical, for they recognise that social theories can be just as abstract as theological 
theories.  We have also noted concrete ecclesiologies’ use of incarnational/body of 
Christ language: repeated calls for ecclesiological language to be balanced in the same 
way as Chalcedonian Christ-language, suggestions that ecclesiology become more 
incarnational, less Docetic, and so on.  But who or what is it that is becoming 
incarnate here?  What change is being called for?  It is not that the church needs to 
become more incarnate, for it has always involved humans.  It is partly that theology 
needs to become more incarnate, reflecting in its language more of the human reality 
of the church.  Instead of a Platonic approach that starts from the primacy of a 
universal idea, or that argues over the nature of the church’s ideal form, what is being 
called for is an Aristotelian approach that sees the essential nature of the church as 
existing in and through concrete reality.185  Concrete ecclesiologies’ use of 
incarnational and Christological language also signifies its belief that the theologian 
should be becoming more incarnate.186  The theologian is the one whose interests 
need to come back down to earth, and who must learn to root her reflection in the 
‘real church’, in experience, in lives actually lived.  It is this incarnational instinct, I 
think, that lies at the root of concrete ecclesiologies’ turn to ethnography, rather than 
                                                
185 My language here is indebted to Walter Kasper, ‘On the Church’. 
186 Chris Scharen, for example, became doubly trained in ethnography and theology in order to make 
sense for himself of the ‘yawning gap between the thrilling intersection of vibrant communal worship 
and work for justice and the frankly boring recital of dry biblical, historical and theological data 
seemingly hovering above history required of us, so it felt at the time, as a kind of professional hazing 
required as much for its inscription of distinction—a class marker painfully achieved for those 
ascending to the pulpit and altar—as for any practical use in ministry.’  See Christian Batalden Scharen, 
‘Ethnographic Notes Towards a Carnal Ecclesiology’ (Paper presented at the Being Surprised by God: 
Embodied Ecclesiology in Local Contexts, Utrecht, 2010) 3.  The arrival narrative at the beginning of 
McClintock Fulkerson’s  Places of Redemption (3–5) is also the story of a theologian becoming 
incarnate. She writes, ‘From overly cognitive and orthodox definitions of Christian faithfulness to 
concepts of practice that ignore the contribution of bodies and desire, prominent theological options 
risk overlooking both the worldly way that communities live out their faith and the worldly way that 
God is among us.’ (6).  
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to quantitative forms of social science.  Part of the desire here is to be, as Tim Jenkins 
puts it, ‘committed in the body’.187  The question we need to answer now is: why?   
 
Back in chapter one, we looked at some of the cultural dynamics underlying the 
development of concrete ecclesiologies, and I talked about the ‘emergence of bodies’.  
As the unified epistemological project of modernity has receded, theologians have 
found themselves having to re-negotiate their relationship to the church, both 
justifying their existence in relation to the church as a distinct public, and justifying 
their function in relation to the church’s life.  Finding themselves isolated in the 
academy by the same receding tide, theologians have also begun to argue that 
Christian theology can and should be explained on its own terms, rather than (as 
Bruce Marshall puts it), borrowing its truth claims from other intellectual or cultural 
quarters.188  Ethnographic engagement with church communities provides a way for 
theologians to reconnect with the Christian public that they appeal to as the source 
and end of their theological reflection.189  It also gives theologians a way of lending 
practical force to their belief that theology is a practice undertaken by all Christians, 
not just by specialists – it allows theologians to listen to ordinary theology.   
                                                
187 Timothy Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork and the Perception of Everyday Life,’ Man 29 (1994): 433–55 (451).  
See Chris Scharen’s comments on his own apprenticeship as an ethnographer: ‘Positing that Bourdieu is 
right that “we learn by body” I have pursued studies that position the worshipper and in a broader 
sense the congregation as a whole not merely as object to be understood, as perhaps a part of the 
burgeoning sociology or theology of the body, but also from the body, requiring submitting myself to 
the painful apprenticeship in context that allows forging the corporal and mental dispositions that make 
up the competent worshipper within the crucible of congregational life.’ Scharen, ‘Ethnographic Notes’ 
1 (italics in original). 
188 Interview with Bruce Marshall, quoted in Gary Dorrien, ‘The Future of Postliberal Theology,’ 
Christian Century July 18th–25th (2001): 22–29. I am using an online copy, for which no pagination 
is available. 
189 Concrete ecclesiologists sometimes appeal to people’s experience as a way of anchoring the 
theological nature of their studies.  Roger Haight states that Christian Community in History is a 
theological as well as an historical study because the church’s history was experienced religiously or 
theologically.  The church’s experience, rather than an abstract doctrinal starting point, is what makes 
his study theological. See Haight, Christian Community Vol.1 5.  In a similar vein, Joseph Komonchak 
writes, ‘If the church is the People of God, the Body of Christ, the Temple of the Holy Spirit, it is all of 
these things as a human reality, that is, because certain events occur within the mutually related 
consciousness of a group of human beings.’  See Joseph A Komonchak, ‘Ecclesiology and Social Theory: 
A Methodological Essay,’ The Thomist 45:2 (1981): 262–83 (274–5).  Johannes van der Ven makes 
the same move in van der Ven, Ecclesiology in Context 106–7.   
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At least in some ways, then, we could say that ethnography is being used to shore up 
Christian theology’s epistemological self-sufficiency.  Intriguingly, ethnography is also 
simultaneously being used to undermine it.  Postliberal attempts to give Barth ‘hands’, 
as Tracy put it, mean that fairly robust claims are often made about the distinctiveness 
and integrity of the Christian community.190  We saw earlier on in the chapter that 
ethnography is used to puncture some of these more inflated claims for Christian 
practices.  Additionally, greater awareness of the way in which academic theology’s 
priorities and claims have been shaped by the experience of its chief practitioners 
(white, Western, ordained men) leaves some theologians looking for ways to include 
the theological views of those whose experience academic and ecclesiastical theology 
has often marginalised.  Ethnography seems a good way of encountering those 
viewpoints - and we will go on now to talk about how those viewpoints are deployed.   
 
 b) Site of resistance 
 
Earlier in the analysis, I remarked that concrete ecclesiologists occasionally talked in 
ways that suggested that the task of concrete ecclesiologies was to balance the claims 
of two languages, theological and social scientific, in order to arrive at an accurate 
picture of the concrete church.  Several of the features we have described, however, 
suggest that this is not yet enough of an explanation.  We have seen the way concrete 
ecclesiologies are concerned to preserve the irreducibility of experience.  We have 
seen that their turn to social science is not just a turn to the empirical, but to the local, 
particular and experiential.  We have also seen in this connection that a grand-scale 
                                                
190 David Tracy, ‘Lindbeck’s New Programme for Theology: A Reflection,’ The Thomist 49 (1985): 
460–72 (465). 
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rapprochement between theology and social science is not concrete ecclesiologies’ 
primary task.  What we have seen, I suggest, is social science being deployed not just 
as a way of balancing talk about the church, but also as a way of ‘…jamming the 
theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth 
and of a meaning that are excessively univocal.’191  Social science is being used to 
found sites of resistance.  Social science is used to deploy examples of the irreducibly 
particular in order to ‘jam the theoretical machinery’, or resist the metanarratives that 
exclude or marginalise various ecclesial perspectives – especially those of the global 
church, and those of laypeople and women.  We will look at a few examples of this, 
and then go on to ask about which ‘metanarratives’ are being disrupted.   
 
Earlier on, I drew attention to Ada Maria Isasi-Díaz’s use of ethnography in her En la 
Lucha.  There, we saw her using ethnography to foreground particular experience and 
individual voices.  She uses ethnography to prioritise lived-experience and popular 
religiosity, as a way of resisting the Euro-American orthodoxies, both academic and 
ecclesial, that keep Latina women on the margins.   
By using our lived experience as a source of mujerista theology, we are trying 
to validate our world, our reality, our values.  We are trying to reverse the 
schizophrenia that attacks our lives by insisting that who we are and what we 
do is revelatory of the divine.192       
 
Isasi-Díaz uses Latina voices to call into question the truths of white, Euro-American 
academic discourse.193  Likewise, McClintock Fulkerson uses attention to disability and 
race to draw attention to the ableism and racism that underlie the liberal church’s 
                                                
191 A phrase of Luce Irigaray’s.  See Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1985) 78. 
192 Isasi-Díaz, En La Lucha 91. 
193 Orlando Espín begins his theological reflections on popular Catholicism with Latino popular 
devotion to the Virgen, in order to challenge the Tridentine ‘orthodoxies’ that would correct or quash 
it.  See Espín, Faith of the People 7–10. 
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claim that ‘We don’t see colour here’.194  Haight uses social science to found a starting 
point that challenges ‘ecclesiologies from above’ by prioritising historical 
consciousness, global perspectives, the experience of women and ecumenical and 
interreligious perspectives.195  Haight’s robust sense of the historical nature of the 
church demands such a method, but his starting point in history and social science is 
not just determined by how he conceives the object of ecclesiological enquiry.  
Rather, Haight’s starting point in social science is about founding a site of resistance, 
and it is driven by frustration with the institutional structures that shape and generate 
the kind of ecclesiologies he criticises.  Each of these thinkers uses social science to 
introduce into the theological conversation people and perspectives that disrupt and 
challenge presumptions about its own universality and neutrality.   
 
The use of the particular as a site of resistance is easy to spot in the work of 
ecclesiologists who have a clear object to resist, be it racism, able-ism or the 
Magisterium.  But this particular-as-site-of-resistance theme does not just crop up in 
ecclesiology where there is a clear-cut situation where one ecclesial perspective is 
being marginalised.  Rather, this use of the particular signals a general trend within 
ecclesiology, a prevailing sense that the particular is good, and that metanarratives are 
bad.196  What metanarratives?  One of the features of postmodernity to which we did 
                                                
194 See Fulkerson, Places of Redemption 15–18.  In a similar vein, Andrea Grillo attends to the ‘familial 
rites’ that take place in bathrooms, bedrooms and dining rooms, arguing that ‘It is the concrete 
resistance of the family that can rein in a liturgical rhetoric capable of, for example, constructing the 
strange legal fiction of a “personal parish”.’  See Andrea Grillo, ‘Ecclesial Rites and Familial Rites: 
Anthropological and Theological Perspectives of Relationships,’ (Paper presented at the Households of 
God and Domestic Households: Revisiting the Domestic Church Conference, Leuven, 2009) 2. 
195 Haight, Christian Community Vol.1 27–35. 
196 ‘Metanarrative’ is, of course, a slippery term to use, not least because it is a general theory about the 
way human beings understand and deal with reality, which evolved as a way of critiquing one 
particular such way – the white, western, male way.  This means that, like ‘foundationalism’, 
‘metanarratives’ are most often discussed by theologians in order to deny, reject, modify or re-
understand them.  (For comments on foundationalism see Marshall, Trinity and Truth 80).  Here I am 
using the term to designate an all-encompassing way of understanding the world.  Paul Lakeland 
provides a good caricature: ‘Possessed of a metanarrative, any one at all, everything is accounted for in a 
supreme exercise of the comprehension of reality, a tour de force of imagination and a textbook 
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not draw attention in chapter one is the extent to which doctrine appears as 
problematic metanarrative in postmodernity.  The difficulty is not so much that 
doctrine makes claims about the way the world works, and the way reality is – for 
example, that human beings are created and will face the judgement of Christ.  The 
difficulty is that the universal claims made by Christian doctrine belie its very 
particular and human roots – what Foucault calls the ‘hazardous career that Truth has 
followed’.197  In short, the difficulty is that postmodern critiques suggest that the 
gospel proclaimed by theologians is the gospel according to the white, male and 
privileged, and that Christian doctrine is implicated in the historic (and current) 
hegemony of this group.198  Unable to undo that problematic history, and still to an 
extent bound up in it, theologians turn to precisely the kind of tactics we are 
witnessing: turning to subjects previously excluded or marginalised, using their 
particular experience to ‘jam the theoretical machinery’, and thereby undermining 
ecclesial or theological claims to universality and neutrality.  
 
3. Some difficulties 
 
We began this chapter by looking at the reasons concrete ecclesiologists give for their 
turn to social science, and noting some of the features of concrete ecclesiological 
language in this connection.  We then went behind concrete ecclesiologies’ self 
expressions, to ask how their turn to social science might be implicitly responding to 
postmodernity, by seeking ways of encounter and sites of resistance.   We now need 
                                                                                                                                     
exercise of power in which the Other is only perceived in and through the metanarrative.’  See Paul 
Lakeland, Postmodernity 32. 
197 Michel Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’ in Colin Gordon, ed. Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972–77 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980) 63–77 (66). 
198 Espín, for example, writes of how ‘evangelisation on the Trinity in and from the West has apparently 
been held hostage to European linguistic and cultural thought patterns.’  See Espín, Faith of the People 
33. 
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to draw out some of the problems that arise from the interplay of the various different 
desires, ways of talking, moves and influences that we have uncovered so far.  We will 
look first at the difficulties caused by the way concrete ecclesiologists often express 
their ecclesiological task – as the balancing of two kinds of language, theological and 
social scientific, about the single reality of the church.  I will suggest that this results 
in a problematic view of the nature of ethnography, and a problematic view of the 
nature of theology.  We will then go on to look at some more specifically 
ecclesiological difficulties. 
  
 a) A balancing act 
 
Earlier in the chapter, we noted concrete ecclesiologies’ tendency to think about the 
task of ecclesiology in Christological terms.  As in talking about Christ theologians 
must balance their language in such a way as to show how the divine reality is present 
in and through the human reality, so concrete ecclesiologists need to balance language 
about the church to show how the church of faith – one, holy, apostolic and so on – 
is present in the church of experience.  Concrete ecclesiologies’ task is to balance two 
languages in relation to one reality, showing how one is present in and through the 
other.  We have also seen how the concrete ecclesiological project tends to be 
expressed in opposition to modern ecclesiology.  Concrete ecclesiologies are concrete 
rather than abstract, particular rather than general, focus on the real church rather than 
the ideal church, and so on.  Concrete ecclesiologists turn to social science to help 
them attend to all these things: the local, the real, the concrete, the particular.  Social 
science is being used to present the human reality of the church, and draw attention to 
how the church of faith is present in experience. 
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In the chapter so far, we have seen that concrete ecclesiologists use qualitative social 
science in two ways.  On one hand, it is being used to say, ‘No, it’s not like that.’  
This means social science is being used to critique and balance out idealist, abstract 
theological language, which is seen as having only limited purchase on the church’s 
concrete life.  Social science is also used to puncture over-confident claims for the 
church’s practices and social distinctiveness.  So faced with a statement like, ‘The 
church does not sin, only its members do’, concrete ecclesiologies use social science 
to draw attention to the experiential significance of sin and therefore (at least in a 
concrete ecclesiological scheme) its theological significance.  Faced with a statement 
like, ‘The church is a colony of resident aliens’, concrete ecclesiologies use social 
science to point out that the church often does not look much like an alien colony at 
all.  So social science is being used to critique ecclesiology, to say, ‘No, it’s not like 
that.’  But on the other hand, as well as this critical project, concrete ecclesiologies also 
want to use qualitative social science constructively to say, ‘In fact, it’s like this.’  They 
want to use social science to ground theological reflection in an accurate picture of 
what the church is really like.199  This does not necessarily mean a correlative method, 
but it does mean (as Healy puts it) that ethnography is being used to support and 
guide a chastening of the church’s self-understanding.200  This is because, as Healy 
explains, ethnography enables us to look at church communities in a way relatively 
unburdened by theoretical presuppositions.201  By using ethnography, we can even set 
aside presuppositions about what a religious community is, and gain a picture of the 
real church that enables us to say ‘It’s not like that; in fact, it’s like this.’  The 
                                                
199 So, for example, Martyn Percy grounds his theological and practical reflections on baptism, 
confirmation and eucharist in sociological accounts of the state of these practices in English culture.  See 
Martyn Percy, Shaping the Church: The Promise of Implicit Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010): 
baptism 17–33, confirmation 35–48 and eucharist 49–63.   
200 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 1. 
201 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 3. 
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suggestion is that reflecting theologically on that picture enables concrete 
ecclesiologists to produce better, more concrete and more helpful ecclesiology. 
 
 b) Oppositional pairs 
 
So far, this sounds very common sense and promising.  I want to suggest, however, 
that this idea of balancing two languages about one reality, in combination with 
concrete ecclesiologies’ oppositional self-definition, causes significant theological and 
ethnographic difficulties.  What is the difficulty here?  The problem is that the 
oppositional pairs concrete ecclesiologies often use to express their methodological 
project tend to become associated with one another, such that good ecclesiology is 
particular, concrete and real, and bad ecclesiology is general, overly doctrinal and 
abstract.  We have also seen that use of social science is associated with the first group 
of pairs, the good kind of ecclesiology: concrete ecclesiologies' use of social science is 
bound up in a turn to the local, particular and experiential.202  I noted in chapter one 
that these oppositional pairs were being used in a fairly impassioned and rhetorical 
way.203  Yet, despite the fact that these oppositional pairs are only being used 
rhetorically, oppositional thinking nevertheless ends up structuring the relationship 
between theology and social science.  How?   
                                                
202 In her ‘Text and Practices’, Clare Watkins notes a similar phenomenon in practical theology.  
Practical theology’s emergence in the intellectual/rational-oriented milieu of late Western modernity 
(164–5) has meant that it often expresses its task as one of bringing together (correlating) dichotomies 
(166–7).  Watkins suggests that practical theology trades, among others, on the following dichotomies 
(167):  
theory   practice 
general principle situational reality 
reality   ideality 
theology  other disciplines (167) 
Watkins argues that the use of these dichotomies undermines practical theology’s theological maturity 
(163).  Concrete ecclesiologies’ self-expression in terms of oppositional pairs has the same effect of 
impeding its growth to theological maturity.   
203 Roger Haight takes care to point out that his 'ecclesiology from below' and 'ecclesiology from above' 
are just illustrative models.  See Christian Community Vol.1 31. 
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The key is in the idea that both languages, theological and social scientific, address 
one reality and that, within that balancing act, ethnography is being used to chasten 
the church’s doctrinal self-understanding.  This raises some interesting questions 
about the implied characteristics of ethnography and theology within the concrete 
ecclesiological scheme.  Putting it simply, the idea that ethnography can ‘chasten’ the 
church’s doctrinal understanding rests on an implied understanding of theology as 
idealising, generalising and abstract, and an implied understanding of ethnography as 
realistic, concrete and particular.204  Both languages are being used to describe a single 
reality. Theology on its own has a tendency towards abstraction, idealisation and the 
general: social science is used to cool down theological rhetoric about the church 
when it is becoming overheated.  The implied relationship between theology and 
social science could be described as thermostatic.205  The major difficulty underlying 
the concrete ecclesiological project is this: when concrete ecclesiologies’ Christological 
understanding of their task meets their tendency to define themselves in opposition to 
modern ecclesiologies, theology and ethnography become implicitly defined by the 
way in which they act as functional opposites in ecclesiology.  
 
                                                
204 Van der Ven notes this problem and attempts to break down the opposition between theology and 
social science. See van der Ven, Ecclesiology in Context 101. 
205 Healy’s ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ provides a good example of this thermostatic 
relationship between theology and social science in ecclesiology.  He argues that theology and social 
science should both be normative for ecclesiology (123).  Theology must ground empirical study 
(125), because ‘Unless doctrine contributes from the very beginning of the enterprise, and does so in a 
way that critically informs and guides the analysis of the situation in some way while at the same time 
leaving the empirical critical disciplines unimpeded, then it is difficult to see how practical theology can 
be critical in a theological sense – as an exercise in theology.’ (122–3).  Having established a doctrinal 
basis, theologians can then turn to empirical study: ‘The kind of enquiry useful for practical 
ecclesiology is thus one that simply gives an account of what is going on in a congregation, using the 
members’ own language(s), with minimal theorizing and generalization, and maximum attention to 
detail and complexity.’  (126, see also 125).  Healy then suggests that the function of practical 
ecclesiology is to ‘negotiate, as it were, a more adequate understanding of the Church that is then tested 
by experimentation in church life, where further negotiations will occur concretely, to become known 
through subsequent empirical accounts and be brought into critical engagement with doctrines once 
again, and so on.’  Practical ecclesiology is an ongoing process, where theology and ethnography are 
opposing forces that mutually regulate one another – very like a thermostat in a central heating system.  
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Looking at an example of this at work will help.  Recall Healy's critique of Haight's 
work that I noted earlier.  The complaint there was that his use of social science was 
too generalising and that unseating doctrine simply meant prioritising some other 
large-scale account of human existence.  Healy maintained in response that doctrine 
ought to ground social scientific study and that social scientific engagement ought to 
be very local.206  This, Healy acknowledges, introduces a necessary tension into 
ecclesiology with regard to how it relates the concrete to the general, and how it 
progresses from empirical description to theological reflection.  This tension is simply 
inherent in the task of concrete ecclesiology.  The danger here – and I think a slight 
tendency in this regard is evident both in Haight’s method and Healy’s critique – is 
that the bipartite divisions of modern ecclesiology silently map themselves onto the 
new empirical approach.  To caricature modern ecclesiology, it looks for Church 
(with a capital C), behind, under or beyond the local and particular church.207  This 
manifests itself in a preference for talking about doctrine and the church’s essential 
nature, and talking about the universal church.  Concrete ecclesiologies, or 
ecclesiologies from below, seek church in the local and particular.  Yet the ‘necessary 
tension’ Healy describes results from continuing to locate doctrinal reflection on the 
level of the general, universal and abstract.  There is a sense here that the more 
doctrinal our reflections become, the further away we get from the concrete, which 
by implication is the local and particular.   
 
                                                
206 Healy, ‘An Ecclesiology for Receptive Ecumenism?’ 2–3, 5.    
207 Healy argues that modern ecclesiologies have a tendency to think of the church as having a twofold 
ontological structure: ‘One of its aspects, the primary one, is spiritual and invisible, often described as 
the church’s “true nature” or its “essence.”  The other aspect is the everyday, empirical reality of the 
church, its institutions and activities.  The relation between the two aspects is often described by saying 
that the primary one “realizes” or “manifests” itself in the subsequent one, or that the visible church is 
the “expression” of its invisible aspect.’  See Church, World and the Christian Life 28.  
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This tendency to view theology and ethnography as functional opposites creates 
significant difficulties.  The two most fundamental problems are the resulting pictures 
of ethnography and theology.  Seeing ethnography as the ‘real’ opposite to theology’s 
‘ideal’ risks leaving us with a problematically simplistic view of the way ethnography 
works, and the kind of ‘real’ it can give ecclesiology.208  Simultaneously, seeing 
theology as the ‘ideal’ opposite to ethnography’s real fails to undo the problems of 
modern ecclesiologies, in favour of simply ‘balancing’ or disrupting them with 
ethnography.  I will argue in the chapters that follow that continuing to think of the 
task of concrete ecclesiology as balancing the descriptive claims of two functionally 
opposite languages leaves us with an impoverished understanding of ethnography, an 
impoverished understanding of theology, and only a Procrustean way of putting the 
two disciplines together.  But I am running ahead of myself.  We need to look first at 
how the view of ethnography and theology as functional opposites causes a range of 
difficulties in concrete ecclesiologies.  I will begin by showing how concrete 
ecclesiologists underestimate the complexity of ethnography’s relationship to the real, 
and fail to take account of the degree to which the theologian’s subjectivity is involved 
in using social science.  We will address this in much greater depth in the following 
chapter, but it will become evident here that closer attention to ethnography 
complicates concrete ecclesiologies’ turn to it for an account of the ‘real church’.  
 
 c) A closer look at ethnography 
 
We saw earlier on that Healy advocated the use of ethnography because it enabled 
ecclesiologists to ‘watch’ the church with minimal theoretical and theological 
                                                
208 Martyn Percy writes, ‘Sociology is an attempt at social realism; religion though, is about idealism.’  
See Percy, Shaping the Church 35. 
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commitments.209  Ethnography, it seems, offers theologians a picture of the ‘real’ 
church, which they can then use critically, to disrupt bad ecclesiology, or 
constructively, to create truly concrete ecclesiology.  I want to show briefly here, 
before our more in-depth exploration in the next chapter, how the implicit 
understanding of ethnography and theology as functional opposites leads theologians 
to drastically underestimate the complexity of ethnography, and in particular the 
involvement of the ethnographer’s subjectivity in the production of ethnographic 
knowledge.  Moreover, the way ethnography is deployed by ecclesiologists tends to 
downplay the degree to which theological judgements and predilections are involved 
at every step of the way.  We will look first at some of the ways in which closer 
attention to ethnography complicates and qualifies theologians’ straightforward use of 
it to say ‘It’s not like that’ and ‘In fact, it’s like this.’ 
 
The ethnographer’s subjectivity is unavoidably tied up in the social reality she 
describes.  First of all, ethnography is not straightforward ‘watching’ of a social group 
from the outside, but observation from the inside. Ethnographers can only gain 
knowledge of other people’s everyday lives by participating in them – and that means 
participating from a particular place, or a particular social role offered by the 
community.210  Second, in this process of participative understanding, the 
                                                
209 Healy writes, ‘…it is also necessary for those engaged in practical ecclesiology to have on hand good 
empirical accounts of particular congregations, for it is in these that the full complexity of the Church’s 
concrete experience comes to light.  These accounts should, of course, be developed by those with the 
appropriate training, who will often be non-theologians.  This is a good thing since, as far as possible, 
no theological presuppositions or doctrines should be permitted to inform the empirical analysis, either 
by suggesting things to look for, or setting out some kind of heuristic structure or agenda.  That would 
be to bypass the local experience too quickly and undermine the critical and concrete nature of the 
enquiry.’  See ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 125. 
 
 
210 Jenkins writes, ‘…the anthropologist must give up the ideal of objective knowledge, in the sense of 
an understanding that everybody might share.  To understand is to acknowledge one’s own 
participation, and therefore to be changed since, in order to participate, one of the roles on offer has to 
be taken up and explored.’ Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 443.  He adds, ‘Knowledge of everyday life is not 
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ethnographer can only understand what she does not know in terms of what she does.  
In this connection, James Clifford draws attention to the allegorical nature of 
ethnography.  When drawing attention to how another culture does a certain thing 
differently, the ethnographer depends on what Clifford calls an ‘abstract plane of 
similarity’.211  So, to understand what is different about !Kung childbirth practices, for 
example, I must have an underlying understanding that childbirth is a common 
human experience.  This then allows me to point out ways in which this sameness is 
done differently: as Clifford puts it, a difference is posited, and simultaneously 
transcended.212  The ethnographer’s understanding of the other unavoidably goes hand 
in hand with her understanding of herself.213  As Kirsten Hastrup puts it, ‘the relation 
between the ‘knower’ and the ‘object’ of necessity bends back into the perception of 
the object itself and is cemented in writing.’214  The third thing we need to note is that 
this complicates simple appeals to ‘the facts’ of a situation.  In the field, the 
anthropologist is engaged in a far from value-free process of selecting which facts are 
pertinent to her inquiry.  Identifying facts means the anthropologist is already reading 
the phenomena concerned in a certain way.  Hastrup argues that ‘…it seems 
impossible to even speak of ‘stubborn facts’ without implying a particular scheme of 
understanding to which they do not lend themselves as evidence.’215  The 
ethnographer’s (or theologian’s) subjectivity, her vested interests, are inevitably 
involved in the process of saying, ‘In fact, it’s like this.’   
   
                                                                                                                                     
available to the disinterested gaze of an inquirer; rather, fieldwork is an apprenticeship of signs, a 
process of entry into a particular world’ (445). 
211 James Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’, in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986) 98–121 (101). 
212 Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’, 99.  
213 Astley recognises this in connection with the descriptive task in the study of theology: describing 
another’s theological viewpoint is inevitably done by understanding it in relation to my own.  See 
Astley, Ordinary Theology 109–10. 
214 Kirsten Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right: Knowledge and Evidence in Anthropology,’ Current Anthropology 
4:4 (2004): 455–72 (456). 
215 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’  459. 
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One last characteristic of ethnographic writing should be noted before we move on.  
As well as drawing attention to the allegorical character of ethnographic 
understanding in the field, Clifford also notes the allegorical nature of ethnographic 
texts themselves.  Ethnographic texts do not just tell one story, about the subject under 
investigation.  They are also invariably caught up in extraneous moral and ideological 
narratives.216  Margaret Mead’s famous work on Samoa, for example, is not just an 
investigation of adolescence in the South Seas: it also speaks to the nature-nurture 
debates surrounding cultural determinism that were raging at the time, and the deep 
post-war need to see human nature as essentially malleable.217  So ethnographic texts 
are not simply a flat reproduction of a living culture into a text.  They are three-
dimensional, depending for their meaning on interaction between the world of the 
ethnographer and the world of the reader, and acting with moral and ideological force 
in those worlds.  Because ethnography is allegorical in this way, appealing to the ‘real’ 
in a way that equates the anthropological task with a laboratory experiment does not 
do justice to the literary complexity involved.218  In a laboratory experiment, we have 
some way of specifying how it is that our metaphors – the ‘shells’ of electrons circling 
the nucleus of an atom, for example – fall short of explaining the reality we want to 
describe.  With ethnographic description, the task is much more complicated.  The 
allegorical character of ethnography means that we discover and create the other at the 
same time.  Ethnographic work is not just baldly representative or descriptive, but 
creative.  Because ethnographic representation is a matter of creation as well as 
                                                
216 James Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’, 98.  Clifford Geertz draws attention to the way Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’ Tristes Tropiques functions on four allegorical levels (which he describes as five thin 
books ‘wildly signalling to get out inside this fat one’) in his Works and Lives 33–44 (33). 
217 James Clifford briefly points this out in ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’ 102–3.  For further reading, see 
Derek Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).  See also Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa: A 
Study of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Societies (London: Penguin, 1928). 
218 To say nothing of the philosophical complexity involved in scientific experiments and the process of 
challenging scientific paradigms.  See Kirsten Hastrup’s comments on ethnography and the spurious 
distinction between ‘hard science’ and ‘soft science’ in Kirsten Hastrup, ‘Hunger and the Hardness of 
Facts,’ Man (New Series) 28:4 (1993): 727–39. 
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description, and because we have no access to reality uninfluenced by our own 
particular place in that reality, we have only limited means to specify how it is that 
our descriptions fall short of reality. 
 
If we think back over the ecclesiologies we have explored in this chapter with 
Clifford’s points in mind, we can see without much difficulty that concrete 
ecclesiologies are very much involved in telling doctrinal and disciplinary stories at the 
same time as appealing ethnographically to the ‘real church’.  Roger Haight’s social-
scientific survey of church history is, on one level, an attempt to tell church history 
like it was.  It is also a story told to undermine and argue against certain 
understandings of ecclesial origins, institution and authority.  Likewise, Isasi-Díaz is 
using ethnography to attend to the experience and voices of Latinas, but she is also 
thereby telling a story about the ecclesial and academic exclusion of such voices, and 
their need for liberation.  Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s use of ethnography tells a 
story about experiences of race and disability in Good Samaritan Methodist Church, 
but also speaks to larger stories about the priorities and methods of academic 
theology, the voices and experiences it tends to exclude, and the living legacy of race 
history in US churches.  
 
My point here is not that any social science tainted by ‘values’ is fatally compromised 
from the outset – far from it.  My point is that the way concrete ecclesiologists appeal 
to ethnography, as the functional opposite of theology, tends to downplay both the 
complexity of ethnography in itself, and the degree to which theological assumptions 
are involved in their use of ethnography at every step of the way. If ethnography is 
implicitly defined as theology’s opposing force, then we end up with a caricatured 
image of ethnography as dealing in description, objectivity, facts, the real: an image 
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that simply does not stand up to scrutiny.  The features of ethnography that we have 
noted so far complicate somewhat Healy’s idea of ethnography as guiding an 
empirical and doctrinal chastening of ecclesiology. Currently, concrete ecclesiologies 
lack a sufficiently reflexive awareness of the degree to which their use of ethnography 
is bound up in their theological outlook and aims.  We need a much more 
sophisticated and detailed understanding of what ethnography can offer us by way of 
the ‘real’ church.  We also need more reflexivity with regard to how ethnography and 
ecclesiology interrelate.219  The next chapter will undertake much of this work.  What 
we need to do now is look at how a similarly caricatured understanding of theology 
causes concrete ecclesiologies significant difficulties. 
 
 d) The suppression of the doctrinal register 
 
Looking back, we saw that concrete ecclesiologies’ problem with modern ecclesiology 
was that it was too preoccupied with models and metaphors – too interested in 
whether ‘community of the faithful’ or ‘body of Christ’ was a better description of the 
church’s nature, and not interested enough in the nitty-gritty reality of the church’s 
concrete existence.  Language about the church’s ideal nature, it seems, lacks purchase 
on the day-to-day reality of ecclesial existence.  Concrete ecclesiologies pick up social 
science as a way of getting at that day-to-day concrete reality, and using it to critique 
and balance out idealistic theological talk about the church.  Again, this sounds fairly 
straightforward - what is the difficulty here?  
                                                
219 Van der Ven comes close to this, by arguing against ‘the sharp contrast between the observer’s and 
the participant’s perspective, the hard and soft method, and the objective and subjective approach’.  He 
argues that theology and social science are complementary in ecclesiology because ‘in explaining reality 
objectively, one automatically comes across aspects that should be considered for subjective 
understanding; and in understanding something subjectively, one automatically comes across aspects 
that should be considered for objective explanation.  This implicative relation rests on the fact that the 
two poles attract each other: the object and the subject of study.’ See van der Ven, Ecclesiology in 
Context 103–4.  Although van der Ven’s approach is promising, he still contrasts the functions of 
theology and social science more strongly than I will argue we should.    
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We have already noted one difficulty - the way in which concrete ecclesiologists tend 
to see theology and ethnography as having opposite functions in ecclesiology means 
that they tend not to be very aware of the ways in which their use of ethnography is 
already functioning on a number of allegorical levels.  Ecclesiological use of 
ethnography does not just tell ‘small’ stories about particular communities of faith; it 
also tells ‘big’ stories about the kind of thing that the church is, and therefore the 
kinds of ways that theologians should be engaging with it.  Yet, though present, these 
substantively theological arguments tend not to appear explicitly in concrete 
ecclesiologies.  What we see instead is straightforward, pragmatic appeals to the way 
the church is.  So, for example, even though Roger Haight disagrees with magisterial 
ecclesiology on a theological level, we see his theological disagreement expressed in 
terms of an alternative telling of church history – a different historical and social-
scientific account of how the church is.  We have also seen ecclesiologists using 
ethnography to present stubborn facts about the way that the church is in reality: that 
its practices are badly performed, or misunderstood, for example.  As Hastrup points 
out, such stubborn facts are only stubborn in a scheme that does not explain them.220  
Yet, again, the ecclesiologies against which such stubborn facts are being deployed are 
not often explicitly argued against in the text on a theological level. 
 
The problem here is not that social science is being used to puncture theological and 
ethnographic claims.  The problem is that the theological dimension of ecclesiological 
arguments tends to get repressed.221  We will have a look at some of the problems this 
causes, and then ask why it is that the theological dimension of ecclesiological 
                                                
220 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’  459. 
221 Healy recognises that failing to explicitly ground empirical studies in doctrine simply means that 
doctrinal agenda operate below the surface.  See ‘Ecclesiology and Practical Theology’ 123. 
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arguments gets repressed in this way.  The ‘parent’ difficulty here is that concrete 
ecclesiologies are saying one thing and doing another.  What we see concrete 
ecclesiologies saying is that modern ecclesiologies’ abstract, doctrinal, metaphorical 
language floats free of reality – it does not address the actual reality of the church.  
What we see concrete ecclesiologies doing suggests the opposite problem.  That is, we 
see them using ethnography to call into question models and metanarratives that do 
have power despite their lack of fit, the concrete effects of which are precisely what 
concrete ecclesiologies are contesting. Haight is not just using social science to argue 
against ecclesiology from above: he is using social science to argue against the church 
from above.222   
 
This parent difficulty has a number of problem children.  Theological or doctrinal 
perspectives, as we have seen, end up being associated with metaphorical language, 
abstract speculation and general or universal-level talk about the church; ethnography 
is about the particular, the real, and so on.223  We have already seen that this results in 
a picture of ethnography that is insufficiently aware of the way in which the 
ethnographer’s (or theologian’s) subjectivity is involved in the account of social 
reality that he produces.  An associated problem is that ethnography is sometimes seen 
as flatly descriptive.  We will pursue this in more detail in the next chapter, but the 
basic problem here is this: ethnography’s task is regarded as the description or 
representation of an irreducibly complex external reality.  The less ‘smoothing over’ 
and generalising ethnography does in order to produce its picture of a given social 
                                                
222 Gerard Mannion has a good appreciation of this, and discusses Haight’s work in the context of what 
he calls a growing climate of ‘neo-exclusivism’ in the Roman Catholic church.  See Mannion, 
Ecclesiology in Postmodernity 32–7. 
223 Or, as Nick Adams and Tim Jenkins put it, ethnography deals in parts, and theology deals in wholes.  
See Nicholas Adams, and Timothy Jenkins, ‘Parts and Wholes’ (Paper presented at the Ecclesiology and 
Ethnography Research Network Conference, Aberdeen, March 2010). 
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reality, the better.224  Ethnography’s natural entropy is what makes it a good 
counterbalance to theology’s tendency to generalise.  Because ethnography is 
implicitly understood as the functional opposite of theology in this way, concrete 
ecclesiologists tend to downplay the explanatory role of social science.  Ethnography is 
not just about ‘horizontal’ description or people’s experience, as Kirsten Hastrup puts 
it, but ‘vertical’ explanations as to the way that experience is formed and organised.225  
Concrete ecclesiologists’ picture of ethnography also does not take adequate account 
of the degree to which ethnography deals in metaphors.226  Metaphorical language is 
identity-forming, and therefore historical: ‘metaphors are not conceptual puzzles 
external to social life; they intervene, shape and produce action.’227 
 
This is a very summary treatment of a complex topic that will have more attention in 
the next chapter.  The important point here is that concrete ecclesiologies’ tendency to 
suppress the substantive theological aspects of their arguments, in favour of appeals to 
flatly descriptive accounts of the ‘real church’, makes ethnography bear too much 
theological weight.  It is not that ethnography cannot and does not do theological 
work – we have already seen that it can and does, whether or not ecclesiologists are 
aware of it.  My suggestion here is that concrete ecclesiologies’ unwillingness to tackle 
theological disagreements on a theological level makes ethnography do work that it 
                                                
224 Healy, ‘An Ecclesiology for Receptive Ecumenism?’ 2. 
225 For the difference between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ generalisations, see Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 
458. 
226 Clifford Geertz writes, ‘The strange idea that reality has an idiom in which it prefers to be described, 
that its very nature demands we talk about it without fuss – a spade is a spade, a rose a rose – on pain of 
illusion, trumpery and self-bewitchment, leads onto the even stranger idea that, if literalism is lost, so is 
fact.’ Geertz, Works and Lives 140. 
227 Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology 37.  To give an example, Nancy Scheper-Hughes documents the 
rumour among native Andean Indians that the UN food programme was designed to fatten up Andean 
babies so that the US Air Force could steal them, and use their bodies to grease their jet engines.  
Scheper-Hughes notes that such myths are metaphorical, speaking to ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘actual’ 
truths – the metaphorical idea is of the US as an all-consuming invading power.  Nevertheless, the 
metaphor formed history: the Andean Indians refused the food aid provided by the UN, and many 
starved as a result.  See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping: The Everyday Violence of Life 
in Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 236–7. 
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should not be made to do.  The danger is that, in using ethnography as a way of 
correcting theology’s tendency to generalise, concrete ecclesiologists make it do too 
much theological work, such that they risk ending up – as Vincent Crapanzano puts it 
- sacrificing complex and contested events, lives and experiences to their rhetorical 
function in a literary (or in this case theological) discourse.228  
 
A satisfactory understanding of ethnography is not the only casualty of concrete 
ecclesiologies’ tendency to treat theology and ethnography as functionally opposite.  
The resulting understanding of theology itself also ends up constraining the promise 
of concrete ecclesiologies.  At the same time as concrete ecclesiologies acknowledge 
the ways in which theological perspectives can be too abstract, idealistic and general, 
they fail to challenge theology’s association with these characteristics.  Within a 
concrete ecclesiological scheme, theology is simply assumed to be naturally 
abstracting, generalising and so on – it is simply a tension theologians have to live 
with, Healy suggests.  Concrete ecclesiologies’ newly gained awareness of the ways in 
which doctrine can function, and historically has functioned, as a problematic 
metanarrative, is a gain not to be squandered.  Concrete ecclesiologists are right that 
we need to find ways of using doctrinal perspectives, and simultaneously 
acknowledging their particular historical provenance and outlook.  But the tension 
Healy is describing, whereby theological perspectives are seen as always pulling away 
and abstracting from concrete complexity, and ethnography is always pulling in the 
opposite direction, is not a fruitful tension: it is a Procrustean one. 
 
e) Distinctiveness and ‘lowest common denominator’ ecclesiology 
                                                
228 Vincent Crapanzano, ‘Hermes’ Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in Ethnographic Description,’ 
in ed. Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture 51–76 (76). 
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This brings us to the final set of difficulties with concrete ecclesiologies.  Here, I want 
to explore the ways in which the characteristics we have explored so far can work 
together to produce a problematic preoccupation with the church’s distinctiveness, 
which results in what I will call ‘lowest common denominator’ ecclesiology.  In order 
to explain this we will look in more depth at one of the most promising pieces of 
concrete ecclesiological reflection produced thus far: Healy’s ‘A (Somewhat) 
Chastened Ecclesiology’.229  Drawing out the difficulties with this piece will give us a 
clearer idea of the constructive work needed in the chapters that follow. 
  
  i) A (somewhat) chastened ecclesiology 
 
Healy’s paper has two aims.  The first is to challenge theologies that begin with the 
church, either using a cultural linguistic approach or a correlative method, by 
challenging the degree to which the church can be distinguished as a distinctive and 
coherent community.  The second, as we have already noted, is to suggest that 
ethnographic descriptions of church might have a direct bearing on systematic 
theology (1).  After suggesting that ethnography allows us to watch the church 
without theological or institutional assumptions about what churches are (3), Healy 
notes three points from empirical studies that complicate methods that begin with the 
church.  Empirical studies show, first, that congregations differ extensively in their life 
and language, and therefore in how they understand God (3–4).  Second, empirical 
studies show that congregations exhibit a great deal of internal pluralism: describing 
congregational ‘identity’ cannot be done without a degree of distortion and editing 
(4).  Third, empirical studies suggest that congregations cannot be adequately 
                                                
229 For simplicity, references to Healy’s typescript will be given in brackets within the text. 
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described without setting them in context: ‘the congregation itself is also as it were a 
Christian expression of the town or region in which it is located, rather than 
something separate built on another foundation.’ (4) 
 
Healy moves on to argue that such empirical studies complicate the methodological 
turn to the church, whether that turn is to a particular congregation or, even more so, 
the worldwide church.  Though we may be able to find shared characteristics across 
all churches – the use of scripture, for example – these shared characteristics are only 
formal, and too general to be useful (5). He writes,  
Although these elements are present in virtually all congregations, the 
ethnographic view undermines the notion that they constitute the church as a 
‘community’ or a moral person in a sufficiently rich and consistent way to 
work as a principle for theological or ecclesiological method…Indeed, the 
worldwide church – the church that is often the subject both of 
contemporary ecclesiology and of modern theological method – when 
considered with a focus on detail, particularity and the exceptional, is 
arguably little more than a congeries of diverse forms of life, languages and 
meanings of the word ‘God’. (5) 
 
The implications for both cultural-linguistic and correlative method are clear (5): we 
cannot start with the church as it exists (6).  The question then arises as to whether, if 
ethnography cannot give theologians the church as an empirically distinctive 
community, theology ought to place so much emphasis on the church as being an 
empirically distinctive community. ‘If the church’s empirical distinctiveness is 
limited’, Healy argues, ‘its practices and beliefs largely determined by the resources of 
the world’s cultures and societies, it is the church’s theological distinctiveness that is 
of primary significance.’ (12) 
 
From here, Healy begins to explore an alternative way of thinking about the church’s 
distinctiveness as lying in its mediating function (8).  By ‘mediating’, Healy means the 
basic claim that the church brings its members into a closer relationship with God 
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than would otherwise be the case.  The basic argument here is that, if ethnography 
cannot give us a ‘distinctive Christian tradition’ in a strong sense, we should not base 
our theology on it.  If ethnography shows us both the great plurality of beliefs and 
practices at the level of congregational life, and the degree to which those beliefs and 
practices are a product of the congregations’ cultural surroundings, then we would do 
well to build on these features in our theological scheme, rather than try to ignore 
them or brush them aside.  Healy draws attention to the way in which ordinary 
Christians ‘pick and choose’ doctrines, beliefs and practices, both from official 
teaching, and from the lives of their congregations (10).  While this kind of practice is 
sometimes regarded as defective by theologians, Healy suggests we might look at it 
another way, and quotes Charles Taylor’s words, ‘one has to see what is great in the 
culture of modernity, as well as what is shallow or dangerous’ (11). The suggestion 
here is that we see the church’s mediating function, the distinctive way in which it 
brings people closer to God, as being constituted by the ongoing efforts of its 
members to ‘live authentically’ as Christians within the world, using both the 
resources of church tradition, and the resources of the world (12).  
 
So, attention to ethnography might lead theologians to place less theological weight 
on community, and more theological weight on individuals.  However, Healy is not 
simply shifting the theological weight from communal distinctiveness to individual 
distinctiveness.  The church’s theological distinctiveness is of primary significance, 
and Healy is clear that the church is theologically distinctive because of God’s call, not 
its response to that call:  
Scripture indicates its members are called to be the church, to respond to the 
Gospel, the truth about the world. They do so haltingly and feebly for the 
most part, and that’s alright, because God’s salvation of the world is not 
contingent upon the church embodying or displaying the Gospel 
successfully. Nor does the church possess the Gospel. Rather, through the 
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power of the Holy Spirit, the church is to point away from itself to the 
Gospel of Jesus Christ. It is as a personal instrument of God, as it were, that it 
is theologically distinctive: here, if anywhere, we can talk about a moral 
Person with a truly individual life. But this person and life is not empirically 
visible or even empirically actual; the church cannot display its special 
relation to God in, say, a shared set of distinctive practices or beliefs, or in 
some depth dimension of its essence. (12–13) 
 
What emerges is an understanding of the church as ‘but the worldly expression of the 
Christian response to God’s saving work in the world.’ (13) Healy concludes, 
We are hidden, yet truly called by God, and we are the church irrespective of 
the quality of our response. As the church, then, our true centre, our essential 
existence, lies outside ourselves, in God and in the world. As the Christian 
expression of the world, we remain a worldly product, for to be the church 
as it is called to be, we must be in and of the world; we are not called to 
leave the world and anyway, how could we? But we are indeed called, so our 
lives as Christians are centered in God’s call to us in the world. The world 
and God constitute the church; the church isn’t the church apart from both 
the world and God working in it. (13) 
 
Some of Healy’s theological conclusions are attractive, and I will echo some of his 
themes as I develop my understanding of the church more fully in the chapters that 
follow.  What I want to pick up on is his emphasis on the church’s distinctiveness. 
  
  ii) Distinctiveness and the lowest common denominator 
 
I have already pointed out above that concrete ecclesiologies rely on an implicit 
analogy between the church and an individual embodied agent.  In Healy’s work, the 
analogy becomes more explicit.  He quotes Schleiermacher’s understanding of the 
church as a body of people that, as a moral person, has a genuinely individual life (1). 
The church is analogous to the individual moral agent.  The assumption that follows, 
in his critique of claims for the church’s distinctiveness, is that if the church is to be 
an individual – one thing – then it must be recognisably such, it must actually 
empirically look like one thing.  When we ask whether the church is distinctive, we 
are asking whether it has an empirical and substantial (not merely formal) consistency 
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of belief and practice.  We are asking whether the entire church exhibits the same self-
consistency of belief and action that could be expected of an (implicitly virtuous) 
individual.  The underlying analogy, and the assumption that if something is really 
distinctive it is perceptibly so, sets us looking for obvious commonalities of belief and 
practice.   
 
These underlying assumptions tend to produce a ‘lowest common denominator’ 
ecclesiology.  For the church to be intelligibly one thing, as a single person is, it must 
have concrete commonalities.  Close attention to the plurality of churches’ belief and 
practice frustrates the search for substantive commonalities.  The only commonality 
ethnography can give us, it seems, is individuals – and so Healy builds his theological 
reflection on the lowest common denominator.  Discussing the possibility of finding 
significant universals in human nature, Clifford Geertz argues in a similar vein to 
Healy that any universals found across the breadth of human culture and history 
would be too general to be significant.  Geertz also concludes, 
even if I am wrong (as, admittedly, many anthropologists would hold) in 
claiming that the consensus gentium approach can produce neither 
substantial universals nor specific connections between cultural and 
noncultural phenomena to explain them, the question still remains whether 
such universals should be taken as the central elements in the definition of 
man, whether a lowest-common-denominator view of humanity is what we 
want anyway.230 
 
This, I think, is the major question for Healy’s ecclesiology.  The presumed analogy 
that underlies his work produces the obvious answer to the question of whether the 
church is a perceptibly distinctive unity: the church is not empirically one person so, 
no, it is not perceptibly distinctive in the way that an individual moral agent is.  The 
question that remains in our context is whether a theology built on the lowest 
                                                
230 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 43. 
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common denominator ethnography can offer us – individuals – is what we want 
anyway.  I suggest it is not, for good ethnographic and theological reasons. 
 
iii) Ethnographic and theological problems    
 
What are the problems here?  The difficulty here occurs when the analogy between 
the church and an individual moral person meets the assumption that the church of 
experience is the real church, or the church in actuality.  Putting it more simply, the 
problem arises in the idea that, if the church is distinctive, it should exhibit visible and 
consistent commonalities in its empirical life.  This causes Healy to focus his use of 
social science (in this paper, at least) on whether it will or will not deliver concrete 
commonalities.   Yet social science is not just about finding distinctive commonalities 
in experience, and representing collections of individuals.  It is also about explaining 
the production of experience, and the persistent relations between individuals.231  
Overlooking the causal dimension of social science also leads to a further problem.  
Critiquing a naturalist view of social science, Bhaskar writes, 
The standard hermeneutical fork, generated by the conceptual/perceptible 
dichotomy of classic empiricist ontology…ignores of course precisely those 
possibilities opened up by a causal criterion for ascribing reality.  Thus both 
parties to the naturalist dispute have assumed that the social must be either 
merely empirically real or in effect transcendentally ideal, so producing either 
a conceptually impoverished and deconceptualising empiricism or a 
hermeneutics drained of causal import and impervious to empirical 
controls.232 
 
What I want to pick up on here is the way in which the premises of Healy’s discussion 
force us into the same position – we must choose whether the distinctiveness of the 
church is transcendentally ideal, or empirically real.  On his view of social science, 
enquiring after the empirical distinctiveness of the church leaves us with the lowest 
                                                
231 See Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary 
Human Sciences (Brighton: Harvester, 1979) 35.  The following chapter explores this further. 
232 Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism 16. 
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common denominator – individuals.  And, as he points out, individual Christians are 
not terribly distinctive, we cannot put much theological weight on that either.  If the 
church’s distinctiveness cannot be empirically real, then it must be transcendentally 
ideal, or, as Healy puts it, ‘If the church’s empirical distinctiveness is limited, its 
practices and beliefs largely determined by the resources of the world’s cultures and 
societies, it is the church’s theological distinctiveness that is of primary significance.’ 
(12) 
 
The problem here is that the assumptions of Healy’s argument lead us in a circle: what 
is theologically significant is what the church is in actuality; the church in actuality is 
not a distinctive community in any simple empirical sense; therefore the 
distinctiveness of the empirical community of the church cannot be theologically 
significant.  Quite apart from the ethnographic difficulties we have already noted, there 
are a number of theological problems here.  First, Healy’s circular argument simply 
repeats the error that concrete ecclesiologies attribute to modern ecclesiology.  There 
we saw the reasoning that if the church is not holy or one on an empirical level, then 
the empirical level cannot be theologically significant: the church’s oneness and 
holiness must exist only on a theological level.  This produces ecclesiologies that see 
the church’s theological significance as somewhere other than its concrete life.  Healy’s 
reasoning here tends towards the same problem.   
 
Second, even as Healy seeks to downplay the significance of the church’s 
distinctiveness, the distinctiveness of the church is in fact what ends up controlling the 
theological discussion.233  This, again, throws us back into the problem of lowest-
                                                
233 The brief doctrinal basis for empirical study that Healy provides in ‘Ecclesiology and Practical 
Theology’ also focuses quite heavily on the church’s distinctiveness.  The church is distinctive because 
the Holy Spirit works in it, making it possible to be the church. ‘Although the Church is a human 
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common-denominator ecclesiology, because all the theological weight falls on what 
makes the church distinctive.  Because what distinguishes does not wholly constitute, a 
rather thin account of ecclesiality results.  An analogy will help explain my point here: 
if someone was to give an account of me in terms of my distinctiveness from my three 
sisters, they would not have a full account of me as a person, because the attributes that 
distinguish me from my sisters (dark hair, ability to play the guitar) are neither the 
only things that make me who I am, nor likely the most important things.   Moreover, 
Jesus’ first words in Mark’s Gospel are not, ‘The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of 
God has come near; be distinctive, and believe in the good news.’  Rather, the call is to 
repent – to change, to convert and to follow (Mk 1:15).  For sure, an emphasis on 
Jesus’ followers’ separateness from the world emerges in John’s gospel and the Pauline 
letters.  Yet separateness from the world, and the world’s hostility, is the result and not 
the cause of Christian distinctiveness.  That is, distinctiveness follows on change – and I 
suggest Healy’s account of the church, while promising, is still too determined by the 
first and too little by the second.  
 
The final theological problem we need to note is the way in which forcing a choice 
between an empirically real or transcendentally ideal account of the church’s 
distinctiveness leaves us, as Sebastian Moore puts it, ‘making Christ the answer without 
doing the homework’.234  What I want to suggest here is that Healy’s focus on the 
church’s theological distinctiveness ends up making the inevitable failure of humans to 
                                                                                                                                     
institution, it is different from any other group of people in this regard.’ (123).  The Holy Spirit works 
in other groups, he adds, and perhaps all groups, but it does not bring them together as church (124).  
The church has a distinctive relation to God, although other groups may have their own distinctive 
relation to God too (124). The church’s members are called by the gift of faith to love and serve Jesus 
Christ; they therefore also have a distinctive relation to Jesus Christ through grace.  He adds: ‘(To some 
degree this is also empirically evident: no other group tries to follow Jesus Christ.)’ (His parentheses, 
124.)  Healy’s emphasis on distinctiveness can also be found in his definition of the concrete church in 
Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 4–5. 
234 Dom Sebastian Moore, ‘Four Steps Towards Making Sense of Theology,’ Downside Review 382 
(1993): 79–100 (100). 
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live lives changed by the gospel undermine the force of the gospel challenge to do so.  
Christians respond to the call of scripture ‘haltingly and feebly for the most part, and 
that’s alright, because God’s salvation of the world is not contingent upon the church 
embodying or displaying the Gospel successfully.’ (12) My difficulty here is not with 
the idea that God’s salvation is not contingent on the church’s performance because, 
thank God, it is not: my difficulty is with the alacrity with which, in Healy’s scheme, 
our failure to live changed lives undercuts the theological significance of our struggle 
to do so.  For sure, the Christian life does involve ambiguity, confusion and mistakes.  
Above all it involves the failure over and over again to reflect in our own mean lives 
and loves the fullness of life and love that God offers us, and longs for us to participate 
in.  Yet in the face of such failure, to simply say ‘and that’s alright’ not only fails to do 
justice to the concrete character of our struggle to live differently: it also fails to do 
justice to the costly character of the struggle by which God’s victory is won.  In short, 
Healy fails to do justice to the incarnate character of our struggle and our salvation.  
Kathryn Tanner writes, 
Of course we are likely to fail in our efforts to realize a community of mutual 
fulfilment: what effort for the good – whatever its goal – isn’t likely to fail in 
a world as wracked by sin as ours is?  That is not to say, however, that God 
hasn’t created a world of finite persons with this sort of end for us in mind 
and, in the incarnation, found a way beyond the fact of both our sin and 
finitude to give it to us.  If we are called to be ministers of that divine 
mission through such gifts, let us not use the excuse of sin and finitude to 




We have come a long way from our starting point at the beginning of the chapter, and 
it will be helpful to summarise the ground gained before outlining the constructive 
work needed in the chapters to come.  This chapter has pursued one aspect of concrete 
                                                
235 Tanner, ‘Church and Action’ 232. 
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ecclesiologies’ common sense: their use of social science.  At the beginning of the 
chapter, we looked at what concrete ecclesiologists say about their use of social 
science.  We saw social science being used to balance and chasten talk about the 
church, to attend to particular experience, and to make ecclesiology more practically 
helpful.  We also noted some of the ways in which concrete ecclesiologists talked 
about the task of ecclesiology by drawing analogies with Christology, and working 
with an analogy between the church and the embodied individual.  From here, we 
moved on to look at the function of social science in ecclesiology, and what moves it 
was being used to make.  Here we saw concrete ecclesiologies using social science to 
make a turn to the subject, both as a means of encounter and as a site of resistance.  
Social science is used to foreground particular experience both as a way of grounding 
theology, and as a way of disrupting theological claims to universality and neutrality.  
Surveying the variety of ways in which social science is used by ecclesiologists 
prepared the ground for a critical exploration of the tensions that emerge in concrete 
ecclesiologies.  Here we saw that the tendency for ethnography and theology to be 
implicitly defined as functional opposites within the ecclesiological scheme left us with 
considerable difficulties: an underestimation of the complexity of ethnography, and in 
particular the role of the ethnographer’s subjectivity, and the tendency for the doctrinal 
aspect of ecclesiological debates to be suppressed.  We then explored in greater depth 
how the presuppositions of concrete ecclesiologies work together to produce a 
preoccupation with the church’s distinctiveness, and a tendency toward what I called 
‘lowest common denominator’ ecclesiology. 
  
The analysis of this chapter leaves us with considerable constructive work to undertake 
in the chapters that follow.  The major problem to address is concrete ecclesiologies’ 
tendency to think of theology and ethnography as functional opposites – a problem 
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that arises, as we have seen, from concrete ecclesiologies’ tendency to think of their 
task as balancing these two languages in relation to a single object.  The best way to 
unpick this tangle of problems will be to turn concrete ecclesiologies’ current approach 
inside out.  Instead of asking how both languages, theological and ethnographic, relate 
to a single object, I suggest that we should focus instead on how ethnography and 
theology understand and relate to their own objects of study.  In the next chapter, we 
will explore in depth how ethnographers have understood their object of study, the 
social real.  This will provide us with a more sophisticated understanding of 
ethnography, and a clearer picture of the kind of ‘real church’ it can offer ecclesiology.  
It will also undermine the idea of theology and ethnography as functional opposites, 
by enabling us to draw some similarities between the ways in which ethnography and 
theology relate to their objects of inquiry.  The exploration of ethnography in chapter 
three will prepare the ground for the theological discussion of chapter four.  There, I 
will develop some proposals for thinking about the object of ecclesiological inquiry 
and the purpose of ecclesiological reflection that might enable us to avoid a ‘lowest 
common denominator’ approach to ecclesiology, and develop a theologically rich 













Attempts to bring together theological and social scientific perspectives on the church 
have often been frustrated by the claim that social scientists and theologians have 
different objects of inquiry.  Theologians are apt to tell social scientists that they are 
only examining the institution, the outward social appearance of the church – with 
the implication that they are missing what is realest and truest about the church’s 
existence.  The social scientific retort to such claims, and to theologians’ insistence 
that they are studying the church of faith, the universal, invisible or ideal church, is to 
deny that the object of theological inquiry exists at all.  Concrete ecclesiologists, as we 
have seen, are determined that theology and social science are not condemned to 
talking past one another, each defending its own object of inquiry while denying the 
validity of the other’s claims about it.  Concrete ecclesiologies are defined by the 
conviction that theology and ethnography have one and the same object, that the 
church of experience is also the church of faith, and that theological and ethnographic 
perspectives can be integrated to produce an account of the church that is both 
concrete and theological. 
 
While I share concrete ecclesiologies’ conviction that the concrete church is worthy of 
theological attention, and that ethnography can help us attend to it, I do not share 
their approach.  In the last chapter we saw that even as concrete ecclesiologies attempt 
to move between the traditional impasse between theology and social science, they 
become mired in the oppositions generated by that impasse: ideal/real, 
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concrete/abstract, particular/universal, and so on.  It is concrete ecclesiologies’ 
determination that theology and social science can have the same object of inquiry, 
combined with the operation of these oppositional pairs, that produces the 
‘thermostat’ effect I noted towards the end of the chapter.  Understanding theology 
and ethnography as functional opposites in ecclesiology, I argued, left us with 
problematically caricatured understandings of theology and ethnography, and an 
unsatisfactory way of relating the two disciplines.236  I suggested at the end of the 
chapter that the best way forward would be to take a closer look at how ethnography 
understands and relates to its own object of study, and then take the conversation 
from there.  
 
The principal purpose of this chapter is to look at how ethnography understands and 
relates to its own object of study, the social real.  Our first task is to complicate 
concrete ecclesiologies’ simplistic view of ethnography.  We will undertake this by 
looking at four different understandings of the ethnographic task: (i) scientific 
anthropology, (ii) interpretative anthropology, (iii) postmodern anthropology and 
(iv) pragmatic/relational anthropology.  Surveying these four understandings will 
give us a better understanding of how ethnography understands and engages with its 
object of study.  It will also show us how ethnographic methods are linked to 
substantial claims about the way the world is, and the way we know about it.  
Although the concern of the survey is substantially theoretical, its form is historical: 
we will be looking at the history of twentieth century anthropology, a history of 
scholars constructing and defining their understandings of anthropology in 
conversation and disagreement with one another.   
                                                
236 It also tends to produce arguments about ‘starting points’, and whether concrete ecclesiologies 
should begin with social scientific accounts of church communities, define their theological parameters 




Like any history, the story I will tell in this chapter is selective.  My focus will largely 
be on North American and British anthropology.  While this means I will miss out a 
chunk of the tale of twentieth century anthropology by omitting Claude Levi-Strauss 
and structuralism and (except tangentially) the influence of European sociology, there 
are good reasons for doing so.237  Two understandings of the anthropological task I 
will cover, the interpretative and postmodern, have been dominant during the period 
in which concrete ecclesiologies have developed.  So an interpretative understanding 
of anthropology was prevalent in the 1970s, but gradually gave way to postmodern 
concerns from the mid 1980s onwards, which are in turn giving rise to a more 
pragmatic, or relational, understanding of the anthropological task.  As we might 
expect, then, these understandings of the anthropological task – the hermeneutical and 
postmodern - correspond to the two dominant kinds of social science used by 
concrete ecclesiologists.  We will be pursuing their connection to concrete 
ecclesiologies later in the chapter.      
 
The second task of this chapter is to ask what kind of ‘real church’ ethnography can 
give ecclesiology.  If concrete ecclesiologies want to reflect theologically on the real 
church, they need to attend more closely to what kind of real church ethnography can 
give ecclesiology, and how.  So for each of the four understandings of anthropology, 
we will be asking three interlinked questions, in order to clarify the nature of the 
ethnographic real: ‘How do anthropologists know?’, ‘What do anthropologists know?’ 
and ‘What is the resulting character of ethnographic knowledge?’ When we have 
                                                
237 The scholars to whom we will turn to explore pragmatic/relational anthropology, Tim Jenkins and 
Kirsten Hastrup, are both deeply influenced by Pierre Bourdieu, and share his emphasis on the 
importance of embodiment in talking about social agents and practices.  See Kirsten Hastrup, Passage to 
Anthropology, 77–98 and Timothy Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork' 435. Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice 
contains the major themes upon which Hastrup and Jenkins draw.  See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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established in what sense ethnography can give ecclesiology an account of the ‘real 
church’, we will be in a better position to work out how an interdisciplinary discourse 
might proceed.  Like any history, the story I will tell in this chapter is also not simply 
a straightforward telling of things like they are (or were), but an argument for seeing 
the task of anthropology a certain way.  Specifically, I will be arguing that the fourth 
(pragmatic/relational) understanding of anthropology is the most satisfactory 
ethnographically, and the most promising theologically too.   
     
The principal aims of this chapter then, are to provide a more complex understanding 
of how ethnography relates to the social real, and show what kind of ‘real church’ 
ethnography can give ecclesiology.  A third, background aim is to hedge off particular 
concrete ecclesiological uses of ethnography.  I have already noted that it is very 
difficult to trace concrete ecclesiologists’ ethnographic influences much further than 
looking at their bibliographies to see whom they have read.  It is for this reason that 
critical engagement with concrete ecclesiologies’ use of social science will, in this 
chapter, remain largely implicit.  I will focus on explaining and critiquing 
anthropological understandings from an anthropological perspective: to the extent that 
concrete ecclesiologists are drawing on those understandings, it is also a criticism of 
their work, but my work in this chapter will not be focussed on pinning critical tails 
on ecclesiological donkeys.  
 
We turn, then, to the history of twentieth century anthropology, and to the three 
questions we will be asking for each of the understandings I will cover: ‘How do 
anthropologists know?’, ‘What do anthropologists know?’ and ‘What is the resulting 
character of ethnographic knowledge?’.  To simplify the story somewhat, we will be 
focussing on one representative scholar, or group of scholars, for each understanding 
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of the anthropological task.  We will look at the enduring strengths of each 
understanding, and also explore its weaknesses, and how these weaknesses result in 
the rise of new and different understandings of the social real and ethnography’s 
relation to it.  We will go into the fourth understanding of anthropology in greater 
depth.  This exploration will open up a new space for conversation with theology.  
The latter part of the chapter, then, is focussed on initially mapping out that new 
space for conversation between theology and ethnography, by exploring the 
similarities between how each relates to its object. 
 
1. Scientific anthropology 
 
We will begin the story with one of the most famous figures, and one of the most 
famous controversies, in the history of anthropology.  In 1925, at the height of an 
anthropological controversy over cultural determinism, the twenty-three year old 
Margaret Mead was sent to Samoa by her professor at Columbia University, Franz 
Boas.  Boas’ idea was for Mead to study female Samoan adolescents, and ascertain 
whether their experience of this stage of life was like that of American adolescents – a 
time of stress, conflict and emotional turbulence. If Mead found that Samoan 
adolescence was, as for American teenagers, a time of stress, conflict and difficulty, 
then anthropologists would know that such adolescent troubles were a matter of 
biology, not culture.  If Samoan adolescence proved to be otherwise, it would be a 
‘negative instance’, suggesting that experiences of adolescence were determined by 
nurture, not nature.238  Mead’s findings, it transpired, gave Boas the answer he was 
looking for: the turbulent experiences of American adolescents were not shared by the 
Samoans, and therefore could not be due to the biological effects of adolescence.  
                                                
238 Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa 12, 17. 
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Mead described Samoan adolescent girls, and Samoan society in general, as carefree, 
untroubled, easy and sexually liberated.239  This is how Derek Freeman summarises 
her depiction of Samoan adolescence: 
What is the most difficult age in American society becomes in Samoa the age 
of maximum ease, “perhaps the pleasantest time the Samoan girl will ever 
know.”  With “no religious worries,” “no conflicts with their parents,” and 
“no confusion about sex” to vex the souls of Samoan girls, their development 
is “smooth, untroubled, unstressed,” and they grow up “painlessly…almost 
unselfconsciously.”240 
 
Mead’s investigation had an astonishing impact.  For anthropologists, Mead’s study 
seemed to be the decisive empirical contribution that the still-simmering theoretical 
debate over cultural or biological determinism had been waiting for.  The impact of 
this realisation of the power, even sovereignty, of culture over biology was what made 
the book a bestseller.  Likewise, educational theorists took great interest in the fact that 
cultural determinism seemed to show humans as essentially malleable.  The post-war 
spirit, which longed to believe that humans could escape the strictures of the status 
quo and fashion a new future, found Mead’s work a captivating source of hope.241  
 
 a) A scientific understanding  
 
Although Mead begins her account of Samoan life with an evocative, flowery essay, 
the basic framework of her study is scientific. Studying adolescence, Mead argues, is 
not like an experiment in a biological laboratory, where all the necessary variables can 
                                                
239 Mead explains that, as the bulk of childcare duties falls on six and seven year old girls, adolescent 
girls essentially ‘mark time’ for three or four years.  Notwithstanding routine tasks like cooking, 
learning to weave and working on the plantation, an adolescent girl is comparatively carefree. (Mead, 
Coming of Age 33) Mead describes seventeen as the ‘best time’ of a girl’s life, where responsibilities are 
minimal and ‘all her interest is expended on clandestine sex adventures’ (34). 
240 Derek Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa 93–4. 
241 Mead herself wrote, ‘Realizing that our own ways are not humanly inevitable nor God-ordained, but 
are the fruit of a long and turbulent history, we may well examine in turn all our institutions, thrown 
into strong relief against the history of other civilizations, and, weighing them in the balance, be not 
afraid to find them wanting.’ Mead, Coming of Age 186. 
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be controlled.242  Ruling out the ‘test colony of Herodotus’ approach (isolating babies 
and recording the results), as well as the possibility of testing hundreds of adolescents 
from ‘our own civilisation’, Mead states that the only remaining method ‘is that of the 
anthropologist, to go to a different civilization and make a study of human beings 
under different cultural conditions in some other part of the world’.243  Anthropology 
is the laboratory taken out into the field.244  The anthropologist’s description of a 
culture simply is that culture: Mead argued that ‘to the extent that the anthropologist 
records the whole pattern of any way of life, that record cannot fade, because it is the 
way of life itself.’245  She compared Coming of Age in Samoa to ‘well-painted portraits 
of the famous dead…[which]…stand forever for the edification and enjoyment of 
future generations, forever true because no truer picture could be made of that which 
is gone.’246 
 
A few years after Mead’s death, in 1983, Derek Freeman disputed Mead’s portrait by 
publishing a full-scale attack on her methods and conclusions.  His claim was simple: 
In this book I adduce detailed empirical evidence to demonstrate that Mead’s 
account of Samoan culture is fundamentally in error.  I would emphasize that 
I am not intent on constructing an alternative ethnography of Samoa.  Rather, 
the evidence I shall present has the specific purpose of scientifically refuting 
the proposition that Samoa is a negative instance by demonstrating that the 
depictions on which Mead based this assertion are, in varying degree, 
mistaken.247 
 
Freeman challenged Mead’s vested interests, the length of her fieldwork, the degree to 
which her informants had lied to her and tricked her, and her inability to observe 
male-only rituals.  In what James Clifford calls ‘170 pages of empirical overkill’, 
                                                
242 Mead, Coming of Age 12. 
243 Simpler and more primitive societies, she adds, make for better results.  See Mead, Coming of Age 
14. 
244 On the ‘natural laboratory’ notion, Geertz comments, ‘…what kind of a laboratory is it where none 
of the parameters are manipulable?’  See Interpretation of Cultures 22. 
245 Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa 105. 
246 Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa 106. 
247 Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa xii–xiii. 
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Freeman challenges Mead on almost every point, from religion, sex and aggression, to 
childrearing, punishment and experiences of adolescence, arguing that her work is 
misinformed, misinterpreted and confused.248 
 
 b) Difficulties with a scientific approach 
 
Freeman and Mead’s scientific rhetoric provides an attractive amount of certainty 
about their conclusions.  As we have already seen in the last chapter, however, the use 
of straightforwardly scientific rhetoric masks the literary complexity of ethnographies, 
as well as the degree to which the ethnographer’s subjectivity is involved.  Freeman’s 
work, Clifford argues, is just as caught up in allegory as Mead’s.249  Both are using 
small, Samoan facts to speak to larger disciplinary arguments and (as Clifford Geertz 
points out) small facts only speak to larger realities when they are made to.250  
Freeman leans heavily on the idea of objectively existent facts and evidence but, as 
Kirsten Hastrup points out, there is not enough distance between facts and evidence 
for the latter to prove the former.251  We have no access to an objective, empirical 
reality apart from our particular concerns.  These shape the way we see that reality to 
the degree that calling it ‘objective’ and suggesting it can be a source of value-free 
facts which can be co-opted into interpretative schemes as evidence is deeply 
problematic.252  The anthropologist both discovers and creates the other’s world at the 
same time.  When we add to these two difficulties – allegory and facts – the obvious 
                                                
248 On sex and violence, see Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa 226–53; on etiquette and rivalry, see 
ibid. 131–40.  For Clifford’s remark, see his ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’ 102–3. 
249 Clifford writes, ‘In a revealing final page he admits as much, countering Mead’s “Apollonian” sense 
of cultural balance with biology’s “Dionysian” human nature (essential, emotional, etc.)  But what is 
the scientific status of a “refutation” that can be subsumed so neatly by a Western mythic 
opposition?...Mead and Freeman form a kind of diptych, whose opposing panels signify a recurrent 
Western ambivalence about the “primitive”.’ See ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’ 103. 
250 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 23. 
251 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right' 460. 
252 Tim Jenkins argues that anthropological accounts ‘build in the relation of outside observer to object, 
as if it were a property of the object itself.’  See Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’  443. 
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problem that the anthropologist only has descriptive terms belonging to her own 
world to describe the other’s world, it becomes clear that a ‘hard science’ approach to 
anthropology is fatally compromised, even disingenuous.253  Anthropology cannot 
relate to the social real in a straightforwardly ‘scientific’ way.  We need an account 
that makes better sense of the role that the anthropologist’s subjectivity plays in the 
production of anthropological knowledge. 
 
2. Interpretative anthropology254 
 
 a) Clifford Geertz 
 
Although Mead’s understanding of anthropology is resolutely scientific, her study 
marked a turn in twentieth century anthropology, away from preoccupation with 
racial biology, and towards ‘culture’.  Anthropology was henceforth to be primarily 
cultural anthropology.  But what was ‘culture’, this distinctive object of 
anthropological knowledge?  And if anthropology’s relation to it was not scientific, 
how was it to be understood?  The decades following Coming of Age in Samoa saw a 
flurry of attempts to define what culture itself actually was.  By the time Clifford 
Geertz entered the scene after the Second World War, he was put to work reviewing 
Kluckhohn’s attempt to sort 171 different definitions of culture into thirteen 
categories.255  Looking back on the plethora of definitions of culture extant during his 
graduate studies in the 1950s, Geertz recalls that the concept ‘culture’ back then 
seemed ‘so diffuse and all embracing as to seem like an all-seasons explanation for 
                                                
253 See Strathern, ‘Out of Context' 256. 
254 A Geertzian understanding of anthropology is usually designated as ‘symbolic’.  Geertz himself 
prefers ‘interpretative’, and as I think this more accurate, I will use either ‘interpretative’ or 
‘hermeneutical’.  See Geertz’s comments in Clifford Geertz, Available Light 17. 
255 Geertz, Available Light 12; see also Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 4–5. 
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anything human beings might contrive to do, imagine, say, be, or believe…We were 
condemned, it seemed, to working with a logic and a language in which concept, 
cause, form and outcome had the same name.’256  Geertz’s lasting contribution to 
anthropology was his attempt to cut that expansive concept of culture down to size.257  
He did so by shifting the focus away from questions about the ontological status of 
culture, towards questions of meaning.  He writes, 
The thing to ask about a burlesqued wink or a mock sheep raid is not what 
their ontological status is.  It is the same as that of rocks on the one hand and 
dreams on the other – they are things of this world.  The thing to ask is what 
their import is: what it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or anger, snobbery or 
pride, that, in their occurrence and through their agency, is getting said.258 
 
Mention of sheep and winking brings us to Geertz’s most well known coinage – ‘thick 
description’.259  Geertz gives the example of two boys rapidly contracting their right 
eyelids.  One does so involuntarily – it is a twitch.  The other does so deliberately, 
according to a social code in which performing that action communicates something 
– it is a wink.  Geertz then adds a third layer, where another boy parodies the second’s 
wink, and a fourth, where a would-be parodier practices winking at home, in front of 
the bathroom mirror.  According to a thin description, all these boys are doing the 
same thing: rapidly contracting their right eyelid.  According to a thick description, 
one is twitching, one winking, one mocking, and one ‘practicing a burlesque of a 
friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy is in motion’.260   
Between thin description and thick description, argues Geertz, lies the object of 
ethnography:  
                                                
256 Geertz, Available Light 12–13. 
257 ‘It seemed urgent, and it still seems urgent, to make “culture” into a delimited notion, one with a 
determinate application, a definite sense, and a specified use – the at least somewhat focused subject of 
an at least somewhat focused social science.’ Geertz, Available Light 13. 
258 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 10. 
259 Geertz himself borrows the phrase from Gilbert Ryle.  See Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 11. 
260 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 7. 
 127 
a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, 
winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived, 
and interpreted, and without which they would not (not even the zero-form 
twitches, which, as a cultural category, are as much nonwinks as winks are 
nontwitches) in fact exist, no matter what anyone did or didn’t do with his 
eyelids.261 
 
Culture, Geertz argues, is a web of meanings: ‘Believing, with Max Weber, that man is 
an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be 
those webs, and the analysis of it therefore not an experimental science in search of 
law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.’262  The task of the anthropologist 
is to explicate that web of meanings ‘from the inside’, as it looks to a native 
participant.  So anthropology is a kind of reading over the native’s shoulder, ‘guessing 
at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the 
better guesses’, gradually constructing a picture of the frames of meaning in which 
people live their lives.263  This method means that, for Geertz, culture itself is 
somewhere between a reality ‘out there’ and an anthropological construction.  The 
basic metaphor underlying interpretative anthropology is between culture and text.264  
Cultures are texts ‘out there’ to be read, and they can be read well or badly.  A good 
reading, says Geertz, is ‘incisive’, it ‘takes us to the heart of that of which it is the 
interpretation.’265  But using the same textual metaphor, Geertz also maintains that 
anthropological constructions are not the culture itself, in the same way that A 
Skeleton Key to Finnegan’s Wake is not Finnegan’s Wake. 266  Anthropological 
explanations are fictive, a construction.267  So at the same time as Geertz sees 
                                                
261 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 7. 
262 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 5. 
263 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 20.  He states that ‘anthropological writings are themselves 
interpretations, and second and third order ones to boot’ (15). 
264 Ethnographic fieldwork is ‘like trying to read a manuscript’, and culture is an ‘acted document’.  See 
Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 10. Geertz’s central proposition is that social realities, from kinship to 
cockfights, can be read as texts: see Geertz, Available Light 17. 
265 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 18, 25. 
266 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 15. 
267 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 15. 
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anthropological knowledge as the clarification of a text out there to be read, he also 
acknowledges that anthropological knowledge is fashioned.268  Yet he states,  
Just why this idea, that cultural description is fashioned knowledge, second 
hand, so bothers some people is not entirely clear to me… Perhaps it is the 
result of a fear that to acknowledge that one has put something together 
rather than found it on a beach is to undermine its claim to true being and 
actuality.  But a chair is culturally (socially, historically…) constructed, a 
product of acting persons informed of notions not wholly their own, yet you 
can sit in it, it can be made well or ill, and it cannot, at least in the present 
state of the art, be made out of water or – this for those haunted by 
“idealism” – thought into existence.269 
 
What the anthropologist knows is constructed knowledge, but no less real for being 
so.    
 
Clearly, Geertz’s interpretative mode of anthropology addresses many of the 
difficulties with a rigidly scientistic approach. We have already seen that it enables 
anthropology to move beyond endless discussion over what ‘culture’ is.  It also 
provides a way of acknowledging anthropological knowledge as both constructed and 
useful.  Interpretative approaches also reinforce a shift (already made by Malinowski), 
towards documenting and explaining people’s practices within their immediate social 
context.  Instead of explaining individual social practices by references to other 
cultures, Malinowski explained individual Trobriand social practices in terms of their 
connection to other Trobriand practices.270  The rest, Strathern says, is well known:  
this led to a view of individual societies as entities to be interpreted in their 
own terms, so that both practices and beliefs were to be analysed as intrinsic 
to a specific social context; that societies so identified were seen as organic 
wholes, later as systems and structures; and that the comparative enterprise 
                                                
268 He states that anthropology is ‘a bringing to light and definition, not a metaphrase or decoding.’ 
Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 10. 
269 Clifford Geertz, After the Fact 62. 
270 See Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and 
Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (London: Routledge, 2002) 8–9.  See also 
Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 254.   
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which modern anthropologists set themselves thus became the comparison of 
distinct systems.271 
 
Geertz’s hermeneutical approach clearly follows on from this intra-textual approach to 
anthropology and, as we shall see, shares both its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 b) Difficulties with interpretative anthropology 
 
Covering three interlinked sets of difficulties with hermeneutical approaches will give 
us a clearer picture of why alternative approaches have been sought, and a sense of the 
problems facing concrete ecclesiologists who seek to draw on Geertz’s approach.  
These are not the only difficulties that have been raised with the hermeneutical 
approach, and they are perhaps not fatal, but they do represent tensions or potential 
blind spots in its method.272 
 
The first set of difficulties spring from hermeneutical anthropology’s guiding 
metaphor between culture and text.  The problem here is that the idea of ‘context’ is 
as much an advantage as a disadvantage.  In order to explicate practices ‘from the 
inside’, and treat native cultures as coherent wholes, the anthropologist has to do what 
Marilyn Strathern calls ‘framing off’.273  The advantage is that we can then explicate 
cultural practices ‘in context’, according to their own terms and connections.  The 
                                                
271 Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 254.  Malinowski himself did not take much of a systems approach, 
however: see Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 260. 
272 For a bibliographic overview of anthropologists’ attempts to address the problems I will raise in this 
section, see Malcolm Crick, ‘Anthropology of Knowledge,’ Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982): 
287–313.  For a scientistic criticism of Geertz’s hermeneutical project, see Paul Shankman, ‘Thick and 
Thin: On the Interpretative Theoretical Program of Clifford Geertz,’ Current Anthropology 25:3 
(1984): 261–80. 
273 Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 261. That is, we need to put a decisive break between ‘our’ culture and 
‘theirs’, so that we can continue to use our language (e.g. about kinship), but empty it of its meaning 
for us, so that we can fill it with new, different content (e.g. that kinship might be thought of in a 
particular culture as primarily about trade or exchange, rather than emotion and family). As Strathern 
puts it, ‘Space must be cleared before I can convey the unity of an action which an English-language 
description renders as a composite of disjunct elements.’  Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 256.  
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disadvantage is that, to do this, we need to seek or posit the same coherence in 
Kwakiutl culture as we do in David Copperfield.  The problem of culture-as-text, then, 
is that it risks making cultures seem more different, more meaningful and more 
coherent than they are.   By trying to ‘frame off’ the other culture in order to take it 
seriously, and by trying to explicate its practices in terms of a general web of 
meaning, anthropologists may exhibit a ‘disciplinary vested interest in portraying 
other peoples’ culturally constructed worlds as radically different from our own.’274  
Moreover, the judgements by which anthropologists ‘frame off’ and create the 
coherent whole they study can leave them leaning heavily on categories that may have 
little purchase on the ground.  This emphasis on cultural coherence also means that 
any diversity of knowledge about a given social practice is seen as problematic.275  
Faced with such diversity, the impulse is to make sense out of it, by trying to find 
some shared meaning ‘underneath’ the diversity.  The problem is, as Keesing points 
out, that this may result in the anthropologist over-reading, or over-attributing sense 
or consistency.276  Similarly, any native reflections elicited by the anthropologist’s 
questions about the meanings of various cultural practices may not indicate the 
‘kernel’ or deep meaning of the practice, but rather an extrapolation on what is a fairly 
basic and unreflected operational understanding.277   
                                                
274 Roger M Keesing, ‘Anthropology as Interpretative Quest,’ Current Anthropology 28:2 (1987): 161–
76 (168).  See also See Strathern, ‘Out of Context’  256.  The most well known debate over these issues 
arose over Marshall Sahlins’ interpretation of the death of Captain Cook, and took place between Sahlins 
and Sri Lankan anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere.  See Clifford Geertz’s summary of the debate in 
Geertz, Available Light 97–102. 
275 Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’ 163. 
276 Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’ 167.  Keesing suggests this over-reading in connection with 
understandings of mana, a concept widespread in Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia.  
Anthropologists have construed it as an invisible medium of ‘spiritual energy’ or ‘electricity’.  Keesing 
argues that, as objects and spells ‘are’ mana rather than ‘have’ mana, ‘that anthropological inferences 
that sacred objects and humans distinguished by their deeds or rank are “soaked in” or “infused with” 
mana are reifications of the abstract bordering on absurdity, like inferring that the Pope’s crucifix is 
soaked in sanctity.’  See Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’ 168; see also Roger M Keesing, ‘Rethinking 
Mana,’ Journal of Anthropological Research 40 (1984): 137–56 on mana, and also Roger M Keesing, 
‘Exotic Readings of Cultural Texts,’ Current Anthropology 30:4 (1989): 459–79. 
277 Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’ 164.  To give a very close-to-home example, asking why Catholic 
churches use incense elicits a variety of answers: because ancient congregations didn’t used to wash, 
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In addition to these problems of wholeness, interpretative approaches also face 
problems to do with power.  The basic problem here is that talking about cultures in 
terms of shared meanings tends to obscure power relations.278  To take Marshall 
Sahlins’ extreme example, an Aztec priest and a sacrificial victim may share an 
understanding of what it means to tear a heart from a living body, but talk of shared 
meanings in that context obscures both the power relation between the two 
protagonists, and the degree to which they experience the shared meaning in 
profoundly different ways.279  Less dramatically, Roger Keesing points out that a 
hermeneutical approach is not well placed to acknowledge the ways in which 
‘[c]ultures as texts…are differently read, differently construed, by men and women, 
young and old, experts and non-experts, even in the least complex societies.’280  
Keesing argues that attention to how cultural knowledge is produced, controlled and 
distributed is important.  The additional power-related problem is that, as Scholte puts 
it, ‘one cannot merely define men and women in terms of the webs of significance 
they themselves spin since…few do the actual spinning while the…majority is simply 
caught.’281  To give an account of the way in which people are caught by webs, we 
need an account of culture that takes account of power, and the way in which culture 
is produced and reproduced by agents at the same time as producing and reproducing 
the agents themselves.282 
 
                                                                                                                                     
because it symbolises prayers rising to God, because it symbolises purification, to get rid of flies – all 
rather ‘How the Leopard Got His Spots’ riffs on a general theme of ‘We just do, and always have.’ 
278 The problem with a hermeneutical ‘shared meanings’ approach is that ‘where feminists and Marxists 
find oppression, symbolists find meaning.’  See Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’  166. 
279 Marshall Sahlins, ‘Reply to Marvin Harris,’ New York Review of Books (June 28th, 1979): 52–53. 
280 Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’ 161.  Kathryn Tanner critiques some postliberal theologies on these 
grounds in her Theories of Culture 42–5. 
281 Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’  162.  Keesing’s reference to Scholte’s quote is incorrect, and I have 
been unable to trace the original source. 
282 As Bhaskar puts it, people do not create society: they reproduce and transform it. See Bhaskar, The 
Possibility of Naturalism 42. 
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Finally, interpretative approaches run into difficulties over how they deal with 
people’s self-understandings.  Vincent Crapanzano has critiqued Geertz’s famous essay 
‘Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight’ along these lines.283  Geertz presents a 
compelling case that cockfights in Bali function as a way of displaying social tension in 
a society which is very reserved and almost pathologically afraid of situations of open 
social conflict.  His account of the cockfight is a kind of metacommentary on Balinese 
life.  He writes: 
An image, fiction, a model, a metaphor, the cockfight is a means of 
expression; its function is neither to assuage social passions nor to heighten 
them (though, in its playing-with-fire way it does a bit of both), but, in a 
medium of feathers, blood, crowds, and money, to display them…Balinese 
go to cockfights to find out what a man, usually composed, aloof, almost 
obsessively self-absorbed, a kind of moral autocosm, feels like when attacked, 
tormented, challenged, insulted, and driven in result to extremes of fury, he 
has totally triumphed or been brought low.284 
 
Crapanzano points out that Geertz offers no evidence, nor any indication of what 
those attending the cockfight think.285  He argues that, at least to the Balinese, a 
cockfight is a cockfight - not a fiction, metaphor, image or anything else.286  
Crapanzano acknowledges that Geertz’s essay is intended as a piece on how to do 
interpretation rather than serious ethnography per se, but he has nevertheless raised an 
important point:  
there is in “Deep Play” no understanding of the native from the native’s 
point of view.  There is only the constructed understanding of the 
constructed native’s constructed point of view…His constructions of 
constructions appear to be little more than projections, or at least blurrings, 
of his point of view, his subjectivity, with that of the native, or more 
accurately, of the constructed native.287   
 
                                                
283 Vincent Crapanzano, ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ 53. The original essay ‘Deep Play’ can be found in Geertz, 
Interpretation of Cultures 412–453. 
284  This composite quotation from Geertz’s ‘Deep Play’ is found in Crapanzano’s essay: see ‘Hermes’ 
Dilemma’ 73.  For the original context, see Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 444, 450. 
285 See also William Roseberry, ‘Balinese Cockfights and the Seduction of Anthropology,’ Social 
Research 49:4 (1982): 1013–28 for criticism along these lines. 
286 Crapanzano, ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ 73. 
287 Crapanzano, ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ 74. 
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Geertz engages with the reader, but not with the Balinese – they remain, as 
Crapanzano points out, cardboard cut-outs.288  In a telling metaphor, Geertz talks 
about culture as an ensemble of texts that the anthropologist strains to read over the 
shoulder of those to whom they belong.289  Crapanzano’s criticism is that this ‘over 
the shoulder’ approach may work with texts and literary criticism, but cannot pass 
muster in a discipline that seeks to describe and analyse human actors and social 
realities.290     
 
We will look in the next section at how postmodern anthropology seeks to 
foreground personal experience much more than interpretative approaches.  Yet 
Crapanzano’s worry here is not just about where individual Balinese voices have gone.  
He is also signalling a deeper worry about whether Balinese voices act as a brake on 
the anthropologists’ freestyle interpretative efforts.  There is a question here about 
how we evaluate anthropologists’ interpretations.  Geertz suggests that a good 
interpretation is one that ‘takes us into the heart of that of which it is the 
interpretation’.291  He suggests that a study is ‘an advance if it is more incisive – 
whatever that may mean – than those that preceded it.’292  This, he acknowledges, 
raises problems of verification, but he suggests this is a virtue of the interpretative 
approach.293  Shankman critiques this fiercely, suggesting that it leaves the 
anthropologist’s intellectual imagination a large area over which to roam 
unchecked.294  Shankman wants a return to a less fuzzy, more definite kind of science.  
Yet, while I agree with Denis Dutton’s response to Shankman that it is ‘[b]etter to be 
                                                
288 Crapanzano, ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ 71. 
289 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 18. 
290 Hastrup argues that there is no need to reverse ethnocentrism and unquestioningly privilege the 
native’s point of view, but that anthropology also cannot bypass people’s self-understandings.  See 
Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology 148. 
291 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 18. 
292 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 25. 
293 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures 16. 
294 Shankman, ‘Thick and Thin’ 264. 
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left with honest questions than…phony answers which persuade only by mimicking 
the language of science’, Crapanzano’s worry remains.295  Though there may be no 
fixed and firm criteria with which we can verify or falsify a given anthropological 
account, this does not mean there are no criteria whatsoever, other than interpretative 
appeal.  Anyone who has ridden a poorly maintained bicycle down a steep hill knows 
that squashy brakes are better than no brakes at all.   
 
3. Postmodern anthropology 
 
Despite the gains of interpretative anthropology, the difficulties created by Geertz’s 
analogy between culture and text are legion.  However, as Marilyn Strathern puts it, 
while the metaphor of culture of text has certainly had its day, symbolic anthropology 
has not.296  The group of scholars that I will call ‘postmodern anthropology’ attempt to 
build on Geertz’s gains, while shaking off the difficulties that come with a culture-as-
text approach.  We will see that postmodern anthropology is characterised by an acute 
awareness of Geertz’s blind spots.  As the name I have allotted to it suggests, it is also 
responding to a second set of issues – those raised by postmodernity. In his 
autobiographical reflections, After the Fact, Geertz writes, 
The moral and epistemological vertigo that struck the culture generally in 
the post-structuralist, post-modernist, post-humanist age, the age of turns 
and texts, of the evaporated subject and the constructed fact, struck the social 
sciences with particular force.297 
 
While Geertz himself faced these dizzying changes with characteristic equanimity, 
other anthropologists were keener to take the challenges of postmodernity to the heart 
of their discipline.  Postmodern anthropology is responding not only to the 
weaknesses of the interpretative approach that we have just covered, but also to what 
                                                
295 Denis Dutton, response to Shankman, ‘Thick and Thin’  272–3 (273). 
296 Strathern, response to Keesing, ‘Interpretative Quest’ 173–4 (174). 
297 Geertz, After the Fact 128. 
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we might call a postmodern crisis of representation.  We can explore postmodern 
anthropology’s central insights through looking at these responses: first, its emphasis 
on individual experience and the relationship between knowledge and power, second, 
its attention to the role of the anthropologist and, third, its move away from cultural 
holism towards studies of hybridity and globalism.  We will foreground the work of a 
scholar who, though not an anthropologist, has considerably influenced the path of 
anthropology over the last thirty years: James Clifford. 
 
 a) Anthropology, power and representation 
 
James Clifford is a cultural historian and critical theorist, yet over the last thirty years 
he has fulfilled the function of an anthropologist in relation to the anthropological 
community itself, studying and analysing its practices, methods and writings.298  If 
interpretative anthropology thought of its task as discovering and mapping cultural 
discourses, Clifford has drawn attention to the fact that anthropology itself is a cultural 
discourse, with its own ideas about what constitutes ethnographic authority, 
persuasiveness and accuracy.  If the guiding metaphor of hermeneutical anthropology 
was between culture and text, the guiding metaphor of postmodern anthropology is 
between the anthropological task and textual production. 
 
Anthropology’s new self-awareness has focussed on what happens between field and 
text, and how one gets from a fieldwork situation, in which the anthropologist 
encounters a plurality of views and experiences, to a single, coherent written account 
of how a given culture functions.  Postmodern approaches are nervous about 
                                                
298 See Paul Rabinow’s comment in Paul Rabinow, ‘Discourse and Power: On the Limits of 
Ethnographic Texts,’ Dialectical Anthropology 10 (1985): 1–13 (3). 
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interpretative anthropology’s emphasis on shared meanings and cultural coherence, 
acutely aware that these emphases risk privileging the voices of the powerful 
meaning-makers in a society, and tidying away or silencing dissenting voices and 
different experiences.  Postmodern approaches are also more chary of generalising 
about experience - as Crapanzano puts it, a whole people do not share a single 
subjectivity, so we do not necessarily have grounds for extending the emotions, 
motives or meanings attributed to one actor to others, or to the culture in general.299  
This heightened consciousness leads to a number of methodological changes in 
postmodern anthropology.  First, we see an increased emphasis on individuals, and on 
presenting individuals as such in the anthropological texts.  The genres of ethnography 
and biography come closer together.300  So instead of Evans-Pritchard’s generic ‘the 
Nuer’, we have Marjorie Shostak’s description of !Kung life through the eyes of one 
woman, Nisa.301  Second, we see attempts to make ethnographic texts ‘polyphonic’ or 
‘heteroglossial’, that is, to include in them the voices of informants.  We can see the 
individual and polyphonic trends converge in Kevin Dwyer’s Moroccan Dialogues of 
1982, which is simply an annotated transcript of conversations between the 
anthropologist, Dwyer, and a Moroccan farmer.302  These methodological moves are 
partly a way of assuaging worries over the ethnographer’s authority, which we will 
look at further below.  They are also a result of worries over representation – whether 
we truly can represent other cultures or individuals without making them a distorted 
                                                
299 Crapanzano, ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ 74. 
300 See, for example James Clifford, Person and Myth: Maurice Leenhardt in the Melanesian World 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), or Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami, Portrait of a Moroccan 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980). 
301 Marjorie Shostak, Nisa: The Life and Words of a !Kung Woman (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981). 
302 Kevin Dwyer, Moroccan Dialogues: Anthropology in Question (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1982).  See Geertz’s discussion of this in his Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The 
Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 95–6, 98.   
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image of ourselves.  They are attempts to manifest in textual form the collaborative 
way anthropological knowledge is produced in the field.303 
 
As well as increased emphasis on leaving ethnographic studies messy and multi-
voiced, we also see much more of the anthropologist in postmodern anthropological 
writings.304  Scholars like Clifford turned the spotlight anthropology shines on other 
cultures onto anthropology itself, and asked how ethnographic authority is 
established.  Post-Malinowski, at least, it seemed that the anthropologist established 
their authority in relation to a given culture by demonstrating that they had ‘been 
there’, usually with an arrival narrative, and then fading away behind objectivising 
language and generalisations: ‘the Nuer do this’ and ‘the Nuer do that’.305  What we 
get in postmodernity is the reappearance of the anthropologist in the text, as 
anthropologists struggle to negotiate questions surrounding authority, subjectivity and 
representation.306  Again, this causes methodological changes, and we see the 
anthropologist making more frequent appearances in the text.  Language of scientific 
objectivity is tempered by more emphasis on the fieldworker’s own bodiliness, 
experience and emotion.307  While these stylistic changes are fairly widespread, an 
extreme example of such personalisation might be Sarah Caldwell’s Oh Terrifying 
                                                
303 As Stephen Tyler puts it, postmodern anthropology foregrounds dialogue over monologue.  See 
Stephen A Tyler, ‘Post-Modern Ethnography: From Document of the Occult to Occult Document,’ in 
ed. Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture 122–140 (126). 
304 I wrote in chapter one about the way postmodernity causes the theologian to ‘emerge’ - we are 
dealing here with the same phenomenon. 
305 Crapanzano’s essay ‘Hermes Dilemma’ has an excellent meta-ethnographic comparative study of 
how the authority of the ethnographic witness is established in works by Catlin, Goethe and Geertz.  
See ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ 54–76. 
306 A good literature survey of such approaches can be found in George E Marcus, and Dick Cushman, 
‘Ethnographies as Texts,’ Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982): 25–69. 
307 For a reflection on emotion and fieldwork, see Renato Rosaldo’s personal account in Renato Rosaldo, 
‘Grief and a Headhunter’s Rage,’ in Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, ed. Nancy Scheper-
Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), and Geertz’s discussion in Geertz, Works and 
Lives 14–15.  For an emphasis on bodiliness, see Loïc Wacquant, Body and Soul: Notebooks of an 
Apprentice Boxer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Mother, a study of Kali worshippers that juxtaposes the finished ethnographic text 
with highly personal excerpts from Caldwell’s diary during the same period.308  
 
The third characteristic of postmodern anthropology that we should note is its move 
away from ideas of cultural holism.  Where interpretative anthropology emphasises 
shared meanings, postmodern anthropology is more likely to foreground conflict.  
Interpretative anthropology’s tendency to ‘frame off’ the other culture gives way to a 
postmodern tendency to write on hybrid cultures or subaltern groups within society.  
Likewise, we see a rise in ‘auto-ethnography’ - anthropologists studying their own 
home cultures.  Increasingly aware of globalisation and the way in which particular 
cultures are caught up in global dynamics of power and economy, anthropologists 
have begun to study non-traditional communities, like internet discussion forums and 
online churches.309  All these moves reflect postmodern ethnography’s belief that 
cultures are not bounded wholes, spatially or symbolically, and that they are better 
defined by specifying connections and interactions between individuals. 
 
What do these three methodological changes tell us about the way postmodern 
anthropology thinks about the object of anthropology, the way in which 
anthropologists know it, and the nature of anthropological knowledge itself?  There is 
obviously a much clearer sense that the anthropologist’s subjectivity is involved in the 
production of anthropological knowledge.  Far from being a hindrance, or to be 
minimised in the field, emotional involvement can become a source of knowledge 
and understanding.  Where Clifford Geertz described ‘going native’ as ‘an impractical 
idea, inevitably bogus’, Loïc Wacquant suggests the task of the anthropologist is to go 
                                                
308 Sarah Caldwell, Oh Terrifying Mother: Sexuality, Violence and Worship of the Goddess Kali 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).   
309 See, for example, Christine Hine, Virtual Ethnography (London: Sage, 2000). 
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native, but to do so armed with the tools of anthropological analysis.310  In terms of 
the object of anthropology, the social real, we have seen that postmodern 
anthropology focuses less on the ‘web of meaning’ as a coherent reality ‘out there’, 
and more on the way culture can be seen in connections between individuals.311  
 
Like interpretative anthropology, postmodern anthropology has some significant 
advantages.  Its concern for the place of the anthropologist makes it arguably more 
reflexive than interpretative approaches, and its greater emphasis on power relations 
makes it better able to take account of the complex and contested ways in which 
cultural meanings are constructed and shared.  What, though, of its disadvantages?  
Geertz’s interpretative scheme provoked harsh criticism from anthropologists wanting 
to keep anthropology closer to the physical sciences than the humanities.  Postmodern 
anthropology comes in for even fiercer criticism from the same quarters, for adding a 
deconstructionist turn to the hermeneutical one.  Sangren, for example, accuses 
postmodern ethnographers of using rhetorical critique to undermine traditional 
anthropology’s claims to authority, whilst simultaneously ‘inoculating’ their own 
work against similar critiques.312  He sees in this a very clear will to power, arguing 
that the postmodernist position confers upon the ‘young scholar’ 
a rhetoric of delegitimation of academic authority figures and a masked 
legitimation of her/his own position.  At the same time, the eschewal of 
“totalizing” theory allows the postmodernist the luxury of experimenting 
without taking on the responsibility for defending the logic of his/her 
arguments.313   
 
                                                
310 Geertz, Available Light 16.  For Wacquant’s idea of ‘going native armed’, see Chris Scharen’s 
promising paper,  ‘Ethnographic Notes Towards a Carnal Ecclesiology’.  Scharen’s reference is to Loïc 
Wacquant, ‘Habitus as Topic and Tool: Reflections on becoming a prizefighter’ in Ethnographies 
Revisited: Constructing Theory in the Field, ed. William Shaffir, Antony Puddephatt and Steven 
Kleinknecht (New York: Routledge, 2009) 137–51. 
311 See Clifford, ‘Introduction: Partial Truths’ in ed. Clifford and Marcus Writing Culture 1–26 (15). 
312 P Steven Sangren, ‘Rhetoric and the Authority of Ethnography: “Postmodernity” and the Social 
Reproduction of Texts,’ Current Anthropology 29:3 (1988): 405–35 (407). 
313 Sangren, ‘Rhetoric’ 422, 414. 
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While things may not be quite so rotten in the state of Denmark as Sangren insinuates, 
postmodern ethnography does have its problems.   
 
 b) Weaknesses in postmodern anthropology 
 
The first set of problems arises around postmodern anthropology’s critique of classic 
anthropologies, and their increased attention to how authority is constructed in 
anthropological texts.  Their interest in ethnographic authority and the increased 
visibility of the ethnographer in postmodern texts inevitably brings with it the charge 
of ‘navel gazing’, but this is not really the problem.314  The problem is that 
ethnographic authority cannot be displaced.  Close attention to postmodern texts 
suggests that the ethnographer’s authority is still being constructed and asserted, just 
in different ways.  Paul Roth points to the new emphasis on the anthropologist’s 
emotions, and argues that experience has become the new location of authority: self-
exposure is now what gives the anthropologist the authority to expose others.315  
Geertz draws attention to the same phenomenon: sincerity, not detachment, has 
become the new literary marker of authority.316  Roth’s argument is that, despite 
stylistic changes to anthropological texts, there is nothing different about the way in 
which anthropologists are conducting anthropological fieldwork, or thinking about 
the authority and accuracy of their work.  Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: 
there is, Roth argues, no epistemological change here, just a cosmetic one.317  Given 
that authority is always constructed, and it is just a matter of how, Roth sees no 
                                                
314 Rabinow argues that increased attention to anthropologists and academic institutions is a good thing.  
See Rabinow, ‘Discourse and Power’ 11–12. 
315 Paul A Roth, ‘Ethnography Without Tears,’ Current Anthropology 30:5 (1989): 555–69. 
316 Geertz, Works and Lives 99. 
317 Roth, ‘Ethnography Without Tears’  555.  He writes, ‘Clifford suggests that tortured self-
consciousness regarding the social construction of knowledge is somehow emancipatory, but we await 
any demonstration that such accounts reveal much beyond the ambivalences of their authors.’ (559). 
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intrinsic merit in postmodern ethnographies.318  The window display changes, but the 
goods and the shopkeeper do not. 
 
The same criticisms have been brought against postmodern ethnography’s emphasis 
on the necessity for ‘polyphonic’ or ‘heteroglossic’ texts.  Roth again argues that 
‘[h]eteroglossia does not guarantee authenticity or insight; it is largely beside the 
epistemological point.’319  Adding in different voices, he suggests, does not change 
what we do in the field.  There are two critical points here worth pursuing.  The first 
concerns the intention of such multi-voiced or multi-authored texts.  If, as Hatch 
suggests, the intent is to remove the ethnographic writer from between the reader and 
the subject, then it is an avoidance of ethnographic responsibility.320  That is, using 
many voices or unedited interview transcripts to suggest that the ‘other’ is being 
presented transparently masks the degree to which the anthropologist’s interests, 
questions, concerns and assumptions still shape the ethnographic encounter.  
Anthropological authority, and anthropological responsibility, cannot be displaced.  
The second criticism of postmodern anthropology’s efforts to lessen the angst of 
ethnographic authority is that it confuses text and world.  As Sangren puts it, literary 
power and cultural power are not the same thing.321  We do not create a more equal 
world by giving everyone an equal voice in the ethnographic text.322  
                                                
318 Strathern agrees that authority is constructed, one way or the other, but finds postmodern 
approaches more interesting and worthy of note than Roth.  See her comments on Roth, ‘Ethnography 
Without Tears’ 565–6. 
319 Roth, ‘Ethnography Without Tears’  559. 
320 See Elvin Hatch’s comments on Strathern, ‘Out of Context’  271–2 (272).  Paul Rabinow concurs: 
‘…those of us who produce texts must face up to the fact that we can never avoid the author function.  
There are no transparent ethnographies.’  See Rabinow, ‘Discourse and Power’ 3. 
321 Sangren, ‘Rhetoric’ 411. 
322 See David Sapire’s comments on Roth, ‘Ethnography Without Tears’, 564–5 (565). Rabinow 
suggests a very helpful set of questions: ‘There seem to be at least four interconnected but different 
dimensions at issue: (1) aesthetic (or formal): what devices could be used to introduce a more 
inventive or imaginative dimension into anthropological books and arguments? (2) epistemological: 
would bringing more voices into the text (however represented) produce a truer anthropology?; (3) 
ethical: is it incumbent on anthropologists to introduce a dialogic element into the text?  Do we want to 
constitute ourselves as the kind of subjects who are in dialogue with other equal subjects? (4) political: 
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The criticism that perhaps sticks best to postmodern ethnography is that it fails to 
escape the Geertzian analogy between culture and text.  Worries about how 
interpretative approaches fail to attend to issues of power in the production of 
meaning are translated into worries about whether marginal views and individual 
experience are adequately represented on a textual level.  As Rabinow puts it, textual 
production now becomes the guiding metaphor for the anthropological encounter.323  
What is the difficulty with this?  Sapire, Sangren, Rabinow and Roth suggest that it 
confuses epistemological, literary and political issues, and so it may well do.  I think 
the chief difficulty, however, is that it leads postmodern ethnography to 
counterbalance the problems of interpretative anthropology without undoing them.  
 
Postmodern anthropologies recognise the connection between power and meaning-
making in any given society.  The dominant meanings in any given society both form 
individual subjects’ frameworks of understanding, and render certain people’s views 
and experiences marginal.  To take a simple example, dominant understandings about 
the meaning of shopping form people’s understanding of the basics of buying and 
selling, and render certain people’s views (e.g. shoplifters) marginal or deviant.  The 
difficulty in postmodern anthropology is that the enduring analogy between culture 
and text means that the power of society to shape people’s understandings and 
exclude certain perspectives becomes associated with the power of the anthropologist 
to sort, silence and privilege different voices.324  This is, of course, correct, insofar as 
                                                                                                                                     
will the field of either world or local power relations be effectively changed if we write different texts?’  
See Rabinow, ‘Discourse and Power’ 5. 
323 Rabinow, ‘Discourse and Power’ 6. 
324 ‘Perceived paradoxes in the social scientific (scientistic?) need/desire to create closed, fictionalized, 
textual “representations” of society, on the one hand, and the fact that subjects have differing 
perspectives on the world, on the other, are the result of collapsing the dialectical relation between the 
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the anthropologist’s account of a given society understands, say, property transfer, is 
bound to reproduce the dominant understandings of that process: that women cannot 
own property, and so on.  Their society has become our text; our text becomes their 
society.   
 
The difficulty here is that postmodern ethnography’s solution to this problem results 
in inverting it rather than unpicking it.  In order to combat anthropology’s tendency 
to reproduce societal power structures, postmodern ethnographers want to hold onto 
individual voices, and the experience of the marginalised.  This is, in itself, quite 
sensible, if anthropology is not to reproduce, alongside a given society’s dominant 
power structures, that society’s blindness to certain people’s experience.  But hand in 
hand with this textual privileging of the individual subject goes an understanding of 
culture that also privileges the individual subject.  James Clifford argues that culture is 
‘always relational, an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, 
between subjects in relations of power.’325  Sangren argues that although culture is 
reproduced by communication between subjects, understanding it as only that is 
problematic: ‘“meaning” and “culture” are not merely the negotiations “between” 
subjects in acts of “communication”; such acts of communication are inevitably 
embedded in encompassing systems of power and meaning.’326  This more individual 
emphasis, combined with postmodern anthropology’s determination to preserve 
minority voices, can slip easily into imagining that ‘getting it right’ in ethnographic 
description means preserving the irreducibility of experience.  The more that 
anthropologists pick and choose, or smooth over anomalies in the experiences they 
report, the further they get from reality.  The danger here is that anthropology gets 
                                                                                                                                     
social reproduction of individual consciousness and the social reproduction of society to the single level 
of “text” or “discourse.”’ Sangren, ‘Rhetoric’  417. 
325 Clifford, ‘Introduction: Partial Truths’ 15. 
326 Sangren, ‘Rhetoric’ 417. 
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trapped in the search for ever-more detailed ‘horizontal’ ethnographic descriptive 
generalisations, simply collating experience rather than explaining how it is formed.327  
The temptation is then to imagine that, if only we tried hard enough, we could 
achieve a ‘wall-to-wall’ description.328 
 
Sangren wants to reverse postmodern ethnography’s direction entirely, and return to a 
much more realist and scientific approach to culture, which focuses on the level of 
‘encompassing systems’.  As we will see in the next section, I think Sangren’s call for 
the return of a more scientific paradigm misplaced.  Briefly noting why will introduce 
us to two of the scholars we will be working with in the next section - Marilyn 
Strathern and Kirsten Hastrup.  Strathern finds faults with the postmodernist turn, but 
is also not content with criticisms of it that ‘reinstate the very distance between subject 
and object, author and text, that at least some postmodernist productions attempt to 
overcome.’329 Sangren’s return to a more scientific view will not pull anthropology 
out of the difficulties with either the interpretative or the postmodern turns, and risks 
jeopardizing their gains.  Kirsten Hastrup unpacks the opposition we need to escape 
more clearly: 
Largely modernist ‘methodological nationalism’ (or ‘culturalism’), gave both 
logical and historical priority to the system – the whole – over 
individuals…Conversely, the ‘methodological individualism’ of various 
postmodern trends made the opposite claim and gave logical priority to the 
individual act.  Both now seem unsatisfactory because they reproduce an 
untenable opposition between the whole and the part, whether they be 
named structure and agent, society and individual, or history and biography.  
At present, anthropology struggles to get beyond the implicit determinism of 
both the modernist and post-modernist epoch.330  
                                                
327 For the horizontal/vertical distinction, see Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 458 and Kirsten Hastrup, 
‘Social Anthropology. Towards a Pragmatic Enlightenment?’ Social Anthropology 13:2 (2005): 133–49 
(143). 
328 Jenkins points out that the category of knowledge cannot be mapped in such a totalising way, 
because it is constructed in the construal of specific encounters.  See Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’  452. 
329 See Strathern’s comments on Roth, ‘Ethnography Without Tears’, 565–6 (566). 
330 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 138.  It is for this reason that I think Tim Jenkins’ and Nick Adams’ 
discussion of the difference between anthropology and theology as the way each discipline works from 
parts and wholes (anthropology from parts; theology from wholes) is lacking.  It involves us again in 
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 c) Summary 
 
Thus far we have covered two influential understandings of the anthropological task 
and the nature of anthropology’s object – culture.  Interpretative anthropology sees 
culture as the web of meanings that people spin about them, and anthropology as the 
clarification, study and analysis of those webs.  Postmodern anthropology sees culture 
as more of an anthropological construct, and anthropology as the task of analysing the 
relationships and communicative exchanges between subjects.  Both of these, we saw, 
had their difficulties.  Interpretative anthropology’s reliance on the idea of cultures as 
holistic texts led to a risk of over-attributing coherence, sense and otherness.  Its 
tendency to bypass people’s self-understandings also left us unsure as to how 
interpretative anthropology’s constructions and explanations could be evaluated.  
Postmodern anthropology did not escape the Geertzian association between culture 
and text, and so the measures it took to counterbalance the problems of interpretative 
anthropology tipped it too far in the opposite direction, into methodological 
individualism.331  What we need, it seems, is what Kirsten Hastrup identifies: a way of 
getting beyond the ‘implicit determinism’ of the interpretative and postmodern 
approaches, that is, a way of thinking about culture that neither makes it an aggregate 
of individual actors’ experiences, nor a totally impersonal force.  We need a different 
                                                                                                                                     
narrow and caricatured understandings of the tasks and character of ethnography and theology, which 
leave both disciplines (and certainly any effort to work inter-disciplinarily) very shortchanged.  See 
Nicholas Adams and Timothy Jenkins, ‘Parts and Wholes’. The following discussion of 
pragmatic/relational anthropology (drawing on Jenkins’ own work) will give us a more detailed 
understanding of how anthropology deals with parts and wholes.  For discussion of how ecclesiology 
simultaneously deals with parts and wholes, see chapter four 217–9.  
331 Methodological individualism is the belief that society is ontologically reducible to individuals.  See 
Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism 34.  Bhaskar argues that ‘sociology is not concerned, as such, with 
large-scale, mass or group behaviour (conceived as the behaviour of large groups of individuals).  
Rather, it is concerned, at least paradigmatically, with the persistent relations between individuals (and 
groups), and with the relations between these relations (and between such relations and the nature and 
the products of such relations).’ (35). 
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way of thinking about the relationship between whole and part.  It also seems that we 
need a better account of how the ethnographer herself is engaged in the production of 
ethnographic knowledge – an account that is able to leave behind the Scylla and 
Charybdis of  ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’. 
 
3. Pragmatic/relational anthropology 
 
Thus far, the history I have told has focussed on American anthropology.  Now the 
history comes closer to home, as we turn to an English anthropologist, Timothy 
Jenkins, and a Danish anthropologist, Kirsten Hastrup.  The story also comes closer to 
home in that both Jenkins and Hastrup have written on the anthropology of religion.  
I will call this kind of anthropology ‘pragmatic/relational’ for want of a better handle  
- Hastrup has recently called her project ‘pragmatic’ and ‘topographical’ and Jenkins 
has not (to my knowledge) called his particular approach anything at all.332  
Pragmatism, however, seem to characterise the approach well enough.333  As we will 
be building on this view in the chapters that follow, we will go into it in greater 
depth. 
 
 a) Anthropological subjectivity and everyday life 
 
                                                
332 See Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 144–7, where she also refers to anthropology’s latest turn as 
‘topographic’ (144); see also Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology, where she describes her approach as 
pragmatic (26). 
333 Hastrup writes, ‘In the modernist era, anthropological knowledge was presented as knowledge about 
other cultures; it consisted in largely ontological propositions about the organization of (other) social 
systems and thoughts. The result was an encyclopaedic knowledge that posited itself as an object-
knowledge – in the triple sense of attaching itself to objects, working by way of objectification, and 
itself becoming an object to be possessed and recycled. Gradually, this view outlived itself, because it 
was realized that most of what had passed for ontology in anthropology was in fact located in our 
experience of it, and in the way in which it was registered – or silenced. In consequence, knowledge 
has become – and must be – acknowledged (implicitly, at least) as relational, both in the sense that it 
attaches itself to relations between people or between people and objects and in the sense that it 
emerges within a dialogical field.’  See Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’  456. 
 147 
So, returning to our first question, how is it that anthropologists know what they 
know?  Pragmatic/relational anthropology’s answer to this question not only makes 
good sense of the subjectivity of the anthropologist: it also unpicks the difficult 
relationship between whole and part that troubles interpretative and postmodern 
anthropology.  As with postmodern anthropology, subjectivity is important, but the 
emphasis falls less on empathy and sincerity, and more on pragmatism.  The key here 
is the parallel pragmatic/relational anthropology draws between anthropological 
knowledge, and knowledge of everyday life.334  Anthropological knowledge and the 
knowledge of everyday life are alike insofar as both are self-involving, and neither can 
be neutral: ‘Knowledge of everyday life’, writes Jenkins, ‘is not available to the 
disinterested gaze of an inquirer; rather, fieldwork is an apprenticeship of signs, a 
process of entry into a particular world’.335  Unlike an interpretative approach, a 
pragmatic/relational approach does not assume that a social system is homogenous, or 
that all social actors know the same things, or share the same meanings.  This means 
that the anthropologist, like the social actors, cannot observe the social as a whole 
from the outside, but only experience it from within.336  The social space can only be 
perceived from the inside, ‘when anthropologists place themselves in the field of 
tension between the individual and the social in the same way as local protagonists.’337  
This means that the anthropologist has to take up one of the roles offered to her by the 
                                                
334 Jenkins writes, ‘The fieldwork experience exemplifies the normal condition of social 
knowledge…Social life, indeed, is made up of these acts of mutual interpretation, and the 
anthropologist, like any other actor, needs to create protocols, through acquiring various habits, skills 
and savoir-faire that will allow him or her to participate in it.’  See ‘Fieldwork’ 442–3. 
335 Jenkins writes, ‘…fieldwork, like indigenous life, is characterized by a series of apprenticeships… 
See Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 445.    
336 ‘ ‘The social’ is not then transparent, and cannot be ‘seen’ at a glance, even by an experienced actor.  
It is not a homogenous space, open to the inspection either of the people who make it up or of the 
anthropologist, but is complex and heterogenous, made up of differing and exclusive realms, of public 
and private, even secret, knowledge and deeds.’ Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 441. 
337 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 140. 
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community.338  It is the experience of playing different roles, misinterpreting offers, 
gaining particular knowledge and encountering resistance from informants that allows 
us to understand social life from the inside:  
The anthropologist gets caught up in the series of events that constitute social 
life, where there is no objective truth, but simply potentially exclusive 
versions of the truth that together constitute the event.339   
 
Subjectivity is, Jenkins says, the price one pays to do fieldwork.340  Yet the 
anthropologist’s subjectivity is not an unfortunate and unavoidable fact: it is quite 
simply the condition for the possibility of anthropological knowledge. The 
anthropologist is no ‘ideal metering device’; her ability as an anthropologist depends 
on experiencing the force of detail in everyday life, and recasting it in theoretical 
mode.341 Anthropological fieldwork, then, involves participating and being 
changed.342  Hastrup talks about the anthropologist as a map-maker, experiencing the 
terrain of the social, and then abstracting it into a map, ‘taking seriously both the 
movements of the social agents, and the paths they carve out, physically and socially, 
through their way-finding.’343  The challenge of anthropological writing then, as 
                                                
338 Jenkins points out that the role offered is that of outsider, but that this is not to be regretted: ‘if we 
accept that there is no homogeneous ‘insider’s’ knowledge to be achieved, this state is again 
characteristic of social life.’ See Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 446.  For an excellent discussion of how the 
anthropologist must take up a position in a social situation in which neutrality is not an option, see 
Jeanne Favret-Saada’s excellent discussion of investigating witchcraft in the Bocage, Jeanne Favret-Saada, 
Deadly Words: Witchcraft in the Bocage, trans. Catherine Cullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980).  She writes, ‘If I am to describe witchcraft in the Bocage, it can only be done by going 
over the situations in which I was myself given a position.  The only empirical evidence I have of the 
existence of such positions, and of the manner in which they relate to each other consists of fragments 
of narrative.  My mistakes, and sometimes my refusals or evasions are part of the text; each answer I 
gave my interlocutors was, like their question, part of the fact under investigation.’ (25).  For further 
material on the role of the anthropologist’s subjectivity in eliciting answers on clandestine knowledge, 
see Hastrup’s account of researching the huldufólk in Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 465; see also Jenkins’ 
account of the cattle market (‘Fieldwork’ 435–7) and ‘folklorising by the folk’ (‘Fieldwork’ 449). 
339 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 443.  
340 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 443. 
341 See Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology 22.  The idea of the anthropologist as an ‘ideal metering 
device’ is Edward Ardener’s; it is quoted in Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 258. 
342 Jenkins writes, ‘…the autobiographical tale of conducting fieldwork, if it is honestly told, often takes 
the form of a Confessions, an account of the wrong assumptions, oversights, blindness to the obvious, 
insensitivity and social gaffes made by the anthropologist who thought that he – or she – knew what 
was going on when he or she did not.’ Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 442. 
343 See Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 145. 
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Clifford Geertz puts it, is how to sound simultaneously like a pilgrim and a 
cartographer.344     
 
 b) The emergent object 
   
The method of participant observation is, of course, at least as old as Malinowski.  The 
difference here is that Hastrup and Jenkins want to put anthropology’s distinctive 
method, fieldwork, at the heart of accounts of anthropological epistemology, and at 
the heart of accounts of anthropological knowledge.  How anthropologists know is 
deeply bound up with what anthropologists know.  We have seen above that 
anthropologists know social reality not by chasing after parts, and collating individual 
experiences, nor by chasing after wholes, and positing an objective, shared social 
reality, whether that be ‘meaning’ or ‘knowledge’.345  Rather, anthropologists know 
by placing themselves in what Hastrup calls the ‘field of tension’ between individual 
and social.346  Hastrup argues that it is the constant interplay between individual and 
social, the way that part and whole constantly mutually create and re-create one 
another, that makes the anthropological object emergent.347  What does this mean?  
Taking a closer look at Tim Jenkins’ fieldwork in a Cambridgeshire village in his 
Religion in English Everyday Life will show us how, according to pragmatic/relational 
anthropology, the object of anthropological inquiry is three things: emergent, abstract 
and constructed.      
 
                                                
344 Geertz, Works and Lives 10. 
345 ‘Because fieldwork is no longer seen as a matter of mapping social systems and clarifying their 
nature but rather as a matter of engaging and radically interpreting lived social worlds, anthropologists 
are bound to address the mutuality of the whole and the part, however these terms are defined.’ 
Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 138–9.  The challenge, as Hastrup puts it, is to explain the connection 
between the individual and the social without making one a side effect of the other (140). 
346 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 140. 
347 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 139. 
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Jenkins’ account of the church of St. Mary’s is prefixed with a broader picture of the 
village, Comberton, in which it is situated.  Understandings of what ‘the village’ is are 
divided, split between old villagers, descendents of agricultural labourers whose 
families have lived in the village for generations, and incomers, wealthier urbanites 
who use the village as a commuting base for nearby Cambridge.  Both groups express 
their self-understandings in opposition and reaction to the self-expressions of the 
other, in a mesh of constructions, misunderstandings and disagreements.  Incomers 
have an urbanized view of what the village should be like - a self-sufficient, intimate 
and mutually supportive community.  This is in turn resisted by and capitalized on by 
the old villagers, whose more feudal understanding sees the village as a complex of 
hierarchical and reciprocal relationships of service.  Jenkins writes, 
There is, therefore, in the village an economy or exchange of fantasies, in 
which notions of the village, the villager and the incomer circulate, serving as 
the currency which allows each perspective to interact with the others…If 
‘the village’ exists at all, it exists in these mutual explorations and 
misunderstandings of mutually incompatible systems of interpretation, each 
with its own preoccupations and patterns into which the actions of others are 
fitted.348 
 
Although Jenkins encounters divergent understandings of what the village and the 
church are, this lack of shared meaning is not a problem.  Nor is an adequate 
anthropological account of the village or the church dependent on preserving as many 
of these divergent viewpoints as possible.  What Jenkins is suggesting is that the object 
of anthropological knowledge emerges in this ‘economy of fantasies’.  As individuals 
express their own views, interpret one another’s actions, disagree with one another 
and act on the basis of assumptions, they draw upon unspoken collective 
understandings of what the village is or is not.  These collective understandings are 
neither fully understood nor followed blindly; they are (as Kirsten Hastrup puts it), 
                                                
348 Timothy Jenkins, Religion in English Everyday Life: An Ethnographic Approach (Oxford: Bergahn 
Books, 1999) 59. 
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‘part of the background knowledge that makes people sense the horizon of a ‘we’.’349  
It is from these enduring collective understandings that the anthropologist can 
construct ‘the village’ or ‘the country church’.  The object of anthropological inquiry, 
then, is produced by the ‘economy of fantasies’ – it is unstable, relied upon by all the 
actors (including the anthropologist), but not reducible to any one understanding.350  
The object of ethnographic interest is an emergent, rather than fixed reality, and it 
exists only on an abstract, constructed level.351  It is worth quoting Jenkins’ conclusion 
at length in order to explain this:  
the reality that defines the country church is not located in people’s minds, in 
their opinions, ideas and wishes, but in the assumptions and collective 
categories that they (often unreflectingly) call upon and, moreover, in the 
interactions of these categories and assumptions…the reality that constrains 
and determines what is the country church is of a different order to the 
minds and to the persons that make it up; it is to be found in the mutual 
interaction and interpretation of the often mutually incomprehending 
actors…The country church exists only at this level, in a compendium of 
experiences, behaviours, misunderstandings and so forth, that is quite 
separate both from the ‘objective’ categorisations of the sociologically-
minded and from the ‘subjective’ opinions of the participants.352    
 
The social real emerges as the ethnographer investigates a social space in which all the 
actors – including the ethnographer - are engaged in a constant process of mutual 
interpretation and construal.  In these interactions in the ‘economy of fantasies’, social 
actors encounter constraints, motivations, forces and obligations.  It is through paying 
attention to these enduring patterns, and abstracting away from particular, positioned 
                                                
349 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 140. 
350 On which see Hastrup: ‘The connections that the anthropologist makes are not so much backed by 
an experience of culture as by an experience of the contingency of the frames within which everybody 
plays his or her part.’ Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 467. 
351 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 458. 
352 Jenkins, Religion in English Everyday Life 70–1. Jenkins concludes, ‘The life of the country church 
in Comberton is, therefore, an illustration of a social fact, being at the same time complex and 
intangible.  The social fact, although obscure, is both more real and enduring than either the hard facts 
(which can be counted) or the recordable opinions which together form its temporary realisations, and 
to mistake either for that reality is frequently to join in at the level of and as a participant in the 
economy of fantasies.’ (70–1). 
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encounters that the ethnographer constructs a map of the social real.353  The social 
real, then, is a kind of construction.  To claim that the social real is a construction, and 
not objective or empirically testable in a straightforward sense, is not to say that it is 
fictive.  Nor is it to say that the social real is not experienced, or that its force as 
experienced is merely our imagination, or psychosomatic.  The social real is real in the 
sense that we experience it; it is not real in the sense of having a stable, objective 
ontological status. 354   
 
 c) Anthropological knowledge 
 
When we say that the social real is constructed, or an abstraction, we are drawing 
attention to two things: how we come to know what we know, and what character 
this gives our knowledge.  That is, asserting that the social real is emergent, abstract 
and constructed is a way of acknowledging the participatory character of our inquiry 
and the temporary and fashioned character of our knowledge.  Yet 
pragmatic/relational anthropology is not simply saying that our descriptive language 
can be more or less adequate, and that an anthropological understanding is 
‘temporary’ in the sense that it can always be improved.  It goes further, by drawing 
attention to the fact that the ‘how’ of anthropological (and everyday) knowledge 
reaches out, as it were, into the ‘what’ of the object of study itself.355  Geertz 
maintained that discussions over the nature of anthropology were arguments over 
mots, not choses - arguments over the shape and adequacy of the conceptual 
                                                
353 Jenkins writes, ‘…the ‘real’ persists far longer than events, personalities or interpretations, and exists 
at this obscure level: moral or social facts are situated in the constraints and compulsions experienced as 
humans make sense of themselves and others, in the constancies of mutual interpretation and the 
patterns of understanding.’ Jenkins, Religion in English Everyday Life 12. 
354 See Hastrup, ‘The object has no fixed ontological status, be it as a culture, society, community – or, 
indeed, knowledge.’  Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 458. 
355 Hastrup quotes Hilary Putnam as saying that mind and language reach so deeply into reality that any 
idea of us mapping a reality independent of language is fatally compromised from the off.  See Hastrup, 
Passage to Anthropology 166. 
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categories through which we tackle, describe and ultimately define what we see.356  
But for Hastrup, mots and choses cannot be separated, and ‘getting it right’ in 
anthropology depends on being able to see how words produce things.  Hastrup talks 
about this link between the temporary character of anthropology’s object and 
anthropological knowledge in terms of ontological dumping.357 
 
Anthropological knowledge is fashioned knowledge.  Like everyday knowledge, it is 
constructed out of ‘that mixture of knowledge of the world, goals and ambitions, 
constraints and contingencies, imaginative “shots in the dark”, emotion and 
ignorance… which combine in the human experience.’358  It is, as Jenkins puts it, only 
a special case of the general condition of human knowledge.359  Anthropologists, like 
everyone else, depend on concepts and theories that simplify complex and varied 
experiences – concepts like ‘religion’, ‘culture’, ‘society’, ‘law’ and ‘economy’.360  
Following Strathern, Hastrup calls such theories ‘persuasive fictions’.361  This is not to 
mark them out as ideological or false, but to draw attention to their power as 
‘naturalized illusions’.362  Hastrup argues that concepts like speed, society and history  
are but summaries of a vast variety of phenomena.  Conversely, these 
phenomena can be said to find condensed expression in the words.  These 
are reflections of the theoretical propensity to condense, simplify and tidy up 
what is in fact extensive, complex and disorderly.363  
 
                                                
356 Geertz, Available Light 12. 
357 ‘If relational knowledge is more implicit and ephemeral than object-knowledge, it may nevertheless 
transform into the latter with time, partly through the general process of objectification that goes along 
with classification and articulation (also known as ‘ontological dumping’), partly through institutional 
endorsement.’  See Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 456. 
358 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 442–3.  He is quoting R Jenkins, ‘Thinking and doing: towards a model of 
cognitive practice’ in The Structure of Folk Models ed. L Holy and M Stuchlik, (London: Academic 
Press, 1981) 93. 
359 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 445. 
360 Kirsten Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context: A Discussion of Ontological Dumping,’ in New Approaches to 
the Study of Religion: Volume 1 Regional, Critical and Historical Approaches, ed. Peter Antes, et al. 
(New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2004) 253–70 (258). 
361 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 253.  The term ‘persuasive fiction’ is Marilyn Strathern’s.  See 
Strathern, ‘Out of Context’ 251–81. 
362 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 253. 
363 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 258. 
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Such theories and concepts are tidy summaries, or a sort of shorthand: they help us 
communicate about our experience, and help us interpret it, but the fit between 
theories and our experience is not exact.364   
 
Some of these theories, ideas and viewpoints (like ‘culture’) become so useful and 
trusted that we deposit them in a bank of unquestioned knowledge, and use them 
without a great deal of thought.  Hastrup calls this process of objectification 
‘ontological dumping’ because the concepts we use in this way tend to develop a life 
of their own. Persuasive fictions like ‘society’ are invented, and then invested with 
ontological significance: they become new objects, new things in the world.365   
Hastrup takes ‘society’ as an example of such a concept.  Durkheim started off by 
drawing on the concept of ‘society’ as an analytical tool, a framework for 
understanding the connections between social phenomena.  The tool proved so useful 
that it ceased to be simply an epistemological viewpoint, or a way of comprehending 
the world, and became a thing.366  Something ontologically new emerged – ‘society’, 
which came to be viewed as an objectively existent thing in the world.  The word 
‘society’ can then be used without further ado – we can read it back in time and talk 
about ‘Roman society’, assume that people know what we are referring to when we 
talk about ‘society today’, understand what Gallup polls tell us about what ‘society’ 
                                                
364 See also Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 258.  According to Hastrup, the same goes for language: ‘the 
communicative quality of language hinges on a feature of generalization that often seems to belie the 
specificity of meaning and experience.’ (256).  Although language is shared, we do not understand one 
another because we each mean or intend the same thing when we use words, or because there is some 
lowest common denominator of meaning on which we can act. We understand one another because 
we use a shared vocabulary to approximate our experience – this is what Wittgenstein is talking about 
when he gnomically says, ‘If a lion could speak, we would not understand him’.  See Wittgenstein, 
Investigations 190.  For Jenkins on the objectifying properties of language, see Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 
447–8. 
365 To make this point, Hastrup draws on Robert Paine’s distinction between the newness of discovery 
and the newness of invention.  The newness of discovery means discovering a new thing in a class of 
known things – a new star among stars, or a new culture among cultures.  The newness of invention 
involves something ontologically new – something new in the universe appears. See Hastrup, ‘Religion 
in Context’ 257. 
366 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 257–8. 
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thinks, and so on.  Society is now ‘out there’, and an epistemological viewpoint has 
become an ontological entity.   
 
This process of simplification and objectification has its benefits.  It allows us to get on 
with normal life without doubting everything at once.  It also allows for new 
knowledge, or new ways of knowing, to surface – an analytical viewpoint is there that 
was not there before.  Hastrup does not consider ontological dumping to be a bad 
thing in itself.  It can become a problem, however, ‘if we forget that the implied 
naturalization of phenomena is simply a consequence of a temporary mode of 
understanding’.367  The concept of ‘religion’ is a good example of the disadvantages of 
ontological dumping.   Hastrup argues that ‘[i]f notions such as “society” or 
“religion” start off as attempts at understanding specific and very varied phenomena, 
they end up as “things” or ontological entities, that scholars have a hard time 
dissolving afterwards.’368  
 
                                                
367 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 260. 
368 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 259. Hastrup’s article points out the ways in which concepts like 
‘religion’ and ‘context’ feed off each other.  She argues that ‘the context authenticates the ethnographic 
detail, yet by itself it is a (largely unacknowledged) theoretical by-product’. (261).  Our definitions of 
‘religion’ simultaneously define what we will consider to be its context.  Tim Jenkins, for example, 
surveys contemporary treatments of religion, which tend to view it from the outset as a phenomenon 
in decline: ‘In most contemporary accounts, “religion” is perceived as being confronted by its 
antithesis, “modernity”, and as being in a process of intellectual attenuation and institutional decline.  
At the same time, and in the same perspective, it tends to be ascribed the minor qualities of each and 
every classificatory opposition: it belongs to the private or personal as opposed to the public sphere, it 
is voluntary not obligatory, it concerns opinion not fact, it is emotive or affective, rather than cognitive, 
imprecise rather than exact, metaphorical not literal, and so on.’ See Jenkins, Religion in English 
Everyday Life 4.  Hastrup quotes this passage in Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 256.  Hastrup’s 
argument is that the dumped category ‘religion’ needs revisiting, and she stands behind Jenkins’ major 
contribution in his Religion in English Everyday Life: that religion itself can be read as context, if we re-
understand it as ‘the expression of the human aspiration to flourish’ (Jenkins, Religion in English 
Everyday Life 13). Following Jenkins, Hastrup suggests, ‘We need not waste time by recapitulating 
definitions and more or less obsolete typologies of “religion”, before we can begin to discuss what 
goes on in the world.  “Religion” may simply provide a relevant analytical context for studying certain 
actions, beliefs, or institutions that may or may not include all and sundry at times.’ (Hastrup, ‘Religion 
in Context’ 265).  Louis-Marie Chauvet has an interesting study of how different definitions of 
‘religion’ affect theologians seeking to engage anthropology in his ‘When the Theologian Turns 
Anthropologist’ in ed. Sweeney et al, Keeping Faith in Practice 148–62. 
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Although the language of ‘persuasive fiction’ and ‘naturalised illusion’ might make 
realists nervous, Hastrup is not being radical about the possibility and nature of 
human knowledge.  What she is doing is situating the ethnographer in the world 
again, rather than over against it, and pursuing the implications for ethnographic 
knowledge.  Ethnographic knowledge turns out to be another species of human 
knowledge, using language to communicate, using theories to tidy up, using 
ontological dumping to get on with life.  What Hastrup points out is the way in which 
these general human characteristics have particular impact on ethnography.  Our 
ability as ethnographers depends on our ability to sit light to – or at least recognise - 
the ontologically dumped nature of the categories with which we work.  Any chemist 
will be able to tell you that physical systems tend to progress towards increasing 
entropy – they become more and more disordered.  Human knowledge and human 
language tend to go in the opposite direction.  The key to ethnography is to work 
against the flow: to identify, examine and analyse all that goes unsaid, to question, 
break and reshape the analytic categories with which one works, to keep the reality 
one seeks to explain alive in one’s explanation.  This brings us to looking at how 
pragmatic/relational anthropology thinks about how anthropologists ‘get it right’.    
 
 d) Getting it right 
 
With such a view of the social real as an abstract construction, and the idea of society 
itself as a ‘persuasive fiction’, how are we to judge the accuracy of ethnographic 
accounts?  With no external real to which we can appeal, are all ethnographic 
descriptions equal?  Surely not – if we dismiss reference to the external real as a 
standard of proof, we can scarcely call all ethnographic representations equal on the 
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basis that they all lack that standard of proof.369  The question of how we judge 
ethnographies is closely bound up with the kind of knowledge we consider them to 
be.  If we consider them to be objective accounts, we will judge them against reality.  
If we consider them to be horizontal generalisations about experience and knowledge, 
then we will judge them against conflicting accounts of experience.  And if we 
consider anthropological knowledge relational and temporary? ‘The point of 
anthropology’, Hastrup writes, ‘is not to tell the world as it is (which would be 
practically impossible) but to interpret it and to suggest possible (theoretical) 
connections within it as perceived and inferred from being in touch with a world that 
cannot be taken for granted – unlike the home world.’370  If we consider 
anthropological knowledge to be interpretative, as well as (albeit complicatedly) 
descriptive, then the task of gauging the reliability of any given ethnographic inquiry 
is thrown back on two words in the above quotation: ‘in touch’.   
   
Jenkins asserts the moral nature of ethnographic knowledge.  It is ‘both ordering and 
revisable, intervening and reflecting, acting and comprehending’.371  If 
anthropological knowledge has a moral character, then the task of judging 
ethnographies is an ethical one.  The concept of the ethnographic real advanced here 
does not involve us in any new uncertainty about the truth of ethnographic discourse; 
rather, it recognises the uncertainty that strongly realist discourses unsuccessfully 
suppress.372  On this view, how do we choose between competing anthropological 
acounts?  We try to discern the allegorical levels on which the texts operate. We ask 
about rhetoric, textual practice, about the relationships between the facts identified, 
                                                
369 Hastrup points this out in ‘Getting it Right’ 468–9. 
370 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 468. 
371 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 452. 
372 Geertz suggests that ‘the renunciation of the authority that comes from “views from nowhere”…is 
not a loss, it’s a gain…’  See Geertz, Available Light 137. 
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the categories brought and the conclusions reached.  We ask about reliability, and 
question the ethnographer’s place on a scale of rhetoric from ‘foreshortening’ to 
distorting.  We ask about field experience and the relationships in which the 
anthropologist engaged.  In short, we undertake many of the same inquiries as simple 
realism would – though perhaps with more of an eye to the literary character of 
ethnography, and with as much attention to the fieldwork practice of the 
ethnographer as their conclusions.  The difference is that ‘getting it right’ is not 
conceived in terms of correspondence to an external real: ‘The ethical demand is to 
‘get it right’, not in any ontological sense, but in being true to the world under study 
and to the epistemological premises of anthropology.’373  
 
‘Being true to the world under study’ – is this not just a platitude, a sort of temporary 
sticking plaster for anthropological anxiety about the reliability of one’s conclusions 
and constructs?  Given that any anthropologist could claim they were being true to the 
world under study, Hastrup’s ethical principle seems to be weaker than Scout’s 
honour.  Can we not come up with anything stronger than ‘being in touch’ with a 
world and ‘being true’ to it?  The answer is no, we cannot, and in fact anthropology 
should quite properly resist attempts to make this criterion for ‘getting it right’ any 
stronger than Hastrup makes it.  For to make the criteria for anthropological 
judgement more certain would be to claim a stronger status than is warranted for 
anthropological knowledge itself.  Anthropological knowledge, as we have seen, is 
temporary, incomplete, the product of particular actors with a mixture of motives.  
We have also seen that it can produce valid and useful knowledge without dressing up 
in the clothes of ‘hard science’.  
 
                                                
373 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 469. 
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5. Ethnography and the real church 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I stated three aims.  The first was to correct the 
simplistic view of ethnography that arises when ecclesiology and ethnography are 
treated as functional opposites within the same scheme – what I called the ‘thermostat’ 
problem.  I suggested at the end of chapter two that the best way to unpick this 
problem would be to look at ethnography in detail and ask how it understood and 
related to its object of study.  To this end, this chapter has gone through four different 
understandings of how ethnography understands and relates to its object of study, the 
social real.  This investigation helped us to address the second aim of the chapter: to 
ask what kind of ‘real church’ ethnography could give ecclesiology.  A third, 
background aim was to head off various problematic uses of ethnography by 
ecclesiologists.  So far, we have gained a richer and more complex picture of 
ethnography, and I have argued for a particular understanding of how ethnography 
should think of and relate to its object of study.  What we need to do now is 
summarise the ethnographic gains of the chapter, and ask what these mean for the 
ecclesiological exploration that follows.   
 
 a) Summary 
 
I opened the chapter by looking at the Mead-Freeman controversy and briefly 
recapping the problems with a ‘hard science’ understanding of anthropology.  We saw 
that a scientific understanding of anthropology is unable to take account of the degree 
to which the anthropologist’s subjectivity is involved both in the fieldwork process, 
and in the production of a final ethnographic account.  We have already seen in the 
last chapter that concrete ecclesiologies’ social scientific descriptions of real churches 
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function on a number of allegorical levels.  Just as Mead’s description of Samoa speaks 
to extraneous disciplinary debates, ecclesiological descriptions of real churches are 
doing significant theological work.  Ethnography cannot give ecclesiology an 
objective, simple account of the ‘real church’ on which to build, or with which to 
disrupt: ecclesiologies’ use of ethnography is too bound up with theological concerns 
from the outset.  We need a more reflexive and subtle understanding of ethnography. 
  
We then looked at the rise of interpretative approaches to anthropology through 
looking at the work of Clifford Geertz.  The turn to looking at shared meanings 
enabled anthropology to get beyond an impasse over the definition of ‘culture’, but 
the same emphasis meant interpretative approaches struggled to address questions of 
power, and tended to reproduce societies’ blindness to minority views and 
experiences.  Likewise, the turn to explaining cultures in their own terms was an 
abiding advantage, but the necessary assumption that the culture constituted a 
coherent and integrated whole risked over-attributing coherence or otherness to the 
social group under study.  We saw in the two foregoing chapters that postliberal 
theologians, and some concrete ecclesiologists, find a Geertzian understanding of 
anthropology very congenial - it provides an attractive way of explicating Christian 
practices and beliefs in terms of their own internal integrity.374  Yet, just as Geertzian 
approaches can leave anthropologists leaning rather heavily on the assumptions of 
wholeness and coherence that they bring to the field, so corresponding ecclesiological 
uses can lean too heavily on the idea that the church is a distinguishable, holistic 
context.375   This means that such concrete ecclesiologies risk over-investing in 
                                                
374 Mudge writes, ‘What should ecclesiology as social theory look like methodologically?...[the] 
hermeneutical method is the most appropriate one.’  See Beloved Community 5–7 (7). 
375 Tanner, Theories of Culture 42–6, 104–110.  Tanner writes, ‘Theology projects onto the object 
studied what its own procedures of investigation requires – a coherent whole.  The method of study 
itself validates the conclusions of the theologian while disqualifying the people and practices it studies 
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distinctions between church and world that simply do not inhere, and making 
problematic assumptions about the degree to which Christianity constitutes a whole 
cultural context.376  This is, as we have seen, anthropologically unsustainable, and 
arguably theologically undesirable too.377  We need a way of approaching the ‘real 
church’ that does not leave us placing undue ethnographic and theological weight 
either on an unsustainable distinction between church and world, or on an 
unsustainable set of assumptions about the ‘wholeness’ of the Christian way of life. 
 
We saw in postmodern approaches an attempt to hold onto the advantages of 
interpretative approaches, while addressing some of their shortcomings.  This resulted 
in less emphasis on cultural wholes, and more emphasis on individual experience.  
We saw that postmodern approaches also took better account of the power dynamics 
of societies and the process of anthropological research itself.  Concrete ecclesiologies 
that are more aware of the drawbacks of interpretative approaches to ethnography 
(especially with relation to the church) tend to draw on postmodern anthropology.  
While this enables them to avoid making assumptions about Christianity as a whole 
cultural context, it leaves them with a tendency towards methodological 
individualism.  Such individualism does not work on an ethnographic level, where it 
simply reverses the problematic dynamic between whole and part, nor on a 
theological level, where (as we saw in the last chapter) it results in lowest common 
denominator ecclesiology.  We also saw that concrete ecclesiologies’ determination 
                                                                                                                                     
from posing a challenge to their conclusions.  The theologian is only uncovering a force for coherence 
that is already a part of practice, but whatever this is is only apparent once the theologian points it out.’ 
(76) 
376 For a critique of the idea that Christianity is a ‘whole way of life’, see Tanner, Theories of Culture 
97–8. 
377 Tanner argues in Theories of Culture that Christianity is defined by being beyond Greek and Jew, 
slave and free – its existence should not be predicated, then, on yet another social division (100). She 
vehemently rejects a focus on Christian social distinctiveness: ‘…everything depends on the 
maintenance of this special society; its superiority and distinctiveness are an overriding theological 
concern.  Such Christian self-concern, alternating as it does between pride and defensiveness, is, if I 
might hazard a theological judgement, nothing short of idolatrous.’ (102).  
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not to tidy away minority experiences implicates them in one of postmodern 
anthropology’s weaknesses – its tendency towards thinking of ethnographic accuracy 
in terms of how well it preserves the irreducible complexity of people’s experience.  
This means that postmodern anthropologies, and the ecclesiologies that draw on 
them, lean towards ‘horizontal’, descriptive ethnography, rather than ‘‘vertical’ 
generalizations about the processes by which meanings and practices become 
temporarily objectified in social practice, as knowledge or another kind of 
certainty.’378  We need a way of approaching the ‘real church’ that explains as well as 
describes, and that unpicks the problematic dynamic between whole and part, rather 
than slipping into methodological individualism. 
 
Finally, we turned to exploring an approach at once difficult and promising – what I 
called pragmatic/relational anthropology.  On this reckoning, the object of 
ethnographic inquiry (the social real with which it is concerned) is not a fixed 
ontological entity at all, but emergent.  It emerges in the constant interplay between 
individual and community, as people exchange understandings, misconceptions and 
constructions in an ‘economy of fantasies’.379  The anthropologist discerns this 
emergent reality by placing herself within the ‘field of tension between the individual 
and the social’; she constructs an ethnographic account not by observing from the 
outside, but by piecing together particular knowledge from the inside.380  While this 
view complicated the task of arbitrating between ethnographies or assessing their 
reliability, we saw that it did so by taking seriously the way in which the subjectivity 
of the anthropologist and the informant is involved in the construction of 
                                                
378 Hastrup, ‘Getting it Right’ 458. 
379 Jenkins, Religion in English Everyday Life 59. 
380 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 140. 
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ethnographic knowledge.381  Like knowledge of everyday life, anthropological 
knowledge is temporary and partial, but nevertheless valuable.  
 
Pragmatic/relational approaches make good sense of the way in which an 
anthropologist’s subjectivity is integral to the production of anthropological 
knowledge.  By drawing parallels between knowledge of everyday life and 
ethnographic knowledge, pragmatic/relational approaches are able to leave behind 
both scientistic insistence on objectivity and postmodern insistence on subjectivity, 
and provide a reflexive account of the anthropologist’s involvement.  In contrast to 
both interpretative and postmodern approaches, a pragmatic/relational approach is 
also able to see wholes and parts (whether these are society/individual, 
history/biography etc.) as mutually constituting, rather than making one a side effect 
of the other.382  This means pragmatic/relational approaches avoid assuming cultural 
wholes in advance, or atomising cultural wholes into individuals.  Additionally, the 
idea of ‘ontological dumping’ allows the pragmatic/relational approach to establish a 
dialectical relationship between the categories brought to a social situation, and the 
reality that emerges through the anthropologist’s investigation.   
   
 b) Theological cues 
 
Clearly, the ethnographic conclusions of this chapter set a number of hares running, 
and raise significant questions about how ecclesiological ethnography might be done 
differently in the light of pragmatic/relational anthropology.  There are plenty of 
methodological questions and issues to work through, both practically and 
                                                
381 As Hastrup puts it, ‘We can never ‘know’ individuals as subjects; nor can we ‘understand’ them, as if 
they were truly objects; what we, as ethnographers, can know, is the space that they are prepared to 
share with us.’ Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology 156–7. 
382 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 140. 
 164 
conceptually, but I am not going to pursue them here.  There are two reasons for this.  
First, promising methodological work is already being done, and there are already 
examples of astute and reflexive ethnographic studies of church communities.383  
Second, practical methodological issues in ethnography are best worked through in a 
fieldwork context; there is no sense in my proposing a set of methodological changes 
without also showing how they work in practice, and there is no space for such an 
endeavour here.  What I want to pursue instead are the theological implications of this 
chapter’s ethnographic conclusions.  We have seen that ethnography cannot deliver a 
real church that would give ecclesiologists a ‘resting place for thought’ - it cannot give 
us a once-and-for-all, objective, stable ‘real’ church on which to build theologically, 
or with which to disrupt. 384  What, then, can it give us?  What possibilities remain?  
What I want to suggest at the close of this chapter, and argue more fully in the next, is 
that the insights of pragmatic/relational anthropology can help us to develop a 
theologically richer understanding of our object of inquiry, the concrete church, and a 
renewed understanding of the purpose of ecclesiological reflection.  It can do so by 
encouraging us to make the link between how we know, and what we know. 
 
Pragmatic/relational anthropology is successful because it makes sense of how the 
subjectivity of the anthropologist is integral to the production of anthropological 
knowledge, and manages to balance a confident assertion of the value of 
anthropological knowledge with an honest appraisal of its limitations.  It does this by 
placing the distinctive ‘how’ of anthropological knowledge – ethnographic fieldwork 
–at the heart of its understanding of nature of the social real, and at the heart of its 
                                                
383 Among which I would include McClintock Fulkerson's, Places of Redemption and Jerome Baggett's, 
Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
384 The idea of a ‘resting place for thought’ is Rorty’s; I borrow it from Hastrup’s Passage to 
Anthropology 12. 
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account of the character of anthropological knowledge.  Anthropology’s contribution 
to knowledge is unique and valuable because of the way it is gained: by the 
anthropologist placing herself in the ‘field of tension’ between the individuals and the 
social, experiencing the very real force of social expectations, assumptions and 
tensions, and then constructing from these positioned encounters a theoretical account 
of the social real.  Anthropology’s object of inquiry, as we have seen, is understood as 
abstract, emergent and constructed.  Hastrup writes, 
One could simply say that the anthropological contribution to knowledge is 
based in ethnography, had this term not been debased by being imported 
either as a ‘method’ into other disciplines (often meaning little more than 
that the investigator actually talked to people), or by being seen merely as a 
way of presenting data (incorporating direct quotes from informants).385  
 
What I want to argue at the end of this chapter, and in much more depth in the next, 
is that the key to developing a renewed understanding of the concrete church and the 
purpose of ecclesiological reflection will be to make the same connection between 
how we know and what we know.  Our account of what the concrete church is needs 
to be governed by the ways in which we ordinarily know and talk about the church.  
Making this connection, and drawing out what it means for how we understand the 
concrete church and the purpose of ecclesiology, is the task of the next chapter.  
 
c) Drawing similarities  
 
At the close of this chapter, and by way of a bridge to the theological reflections of the 
chapter following, I want to draw out some similarities between pragmatic/relational 
ethnography and theology.  The explorations of this chapter have suggested that, far 
from being functional opposites, theology and ethnography show marked similarities 
in the ways that they relate to, and are determined by, their objects of inquiry.  Briefly 
                                                
385 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 141. 
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exploring three of these similarities will establish some groundwork for the 
ecclesiological reflection of the next chapter. 
 
i) Committed in the body 
 
First, ethnography as we have explored it here is a profoundly relational and involving 
discipline.  The ethnographer does not simply sacrifice subjectivity in order to gain 
the pearl of knowledge: the condition of knowing the reality of social life is engaging 
in it, experiencing its force.386  As Tim Jenkins puts it, ‘the anthropologist is 
committed in the body – almost unlike any other form of research – to an encounter 
with another form of social life.’387  The anthropologist describes social life not from 
some vantage point above it, but from within, by experiencing its forces, constraints 
and assumptions, and constructing from these particular encounters a picture of the 
social dynamics at work.  The distinctive way that anthropological knowledge is 
gained is what characterises and constrains anthropological knowledge and language.  
The process of piecing an account of the social real together from particular places 
within it means that anthropologists have to constantly adjust and re-adjust their 
analytical and descriptive categories: ‘getting it right’ involves a kind of constant 
adequatio mentis ad rem.   
 
Pragmatic/relational anthropology both resonates with and informs a certain 
understanding of the theological (and ecclesiological task).388  Theology, too, is 
                                                
386 Hastrup, Passage to Anthropology 22. 
387 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 451. 
388 Louis–Marie Chauvet suggests the same parallel: ‘might not Christian theology, doubtless less in its 
content than its manner, have some service to render to anthropology, since it is constantly battling not 
only with interpretation but also and above all with the question of the implication of the confessing 
subject in an object that s/he is nevertheless seeking to treat with all the resources of critical reasoning?  
I leave this question open.’  See Chauvet, ‘When the Theologian Turns Anthropologist’ 160. 
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profoundly relational and involving.  Theology may be faith seeking understanding: it 
is also, as Sebastian Moore puts it, the story of a soul in toils with its God.389  
Moreover, theologians also find themselves describing the dynamics of God’s ways 
with the world not from some vantage point outside creation, but from their place 
within those dynamics.  This is what characterises and constrains theological language.  
It is human, partial, sinful, and needs to be constantly engaged in breaking and 
reshaping its descriptive categories in order to do justice to the living realities it seeks 
to address. 
 
  ii) Inadequacy of language 
 
The second point of similarity I want to draw between ethnography and theology is 
between their language: ethnographic language as we have explored it here bears 
marked resemblance to theological language.  As we explored above, one of the 
difficulties with ethnographic descriptions is their performative or creative character.  
This, together with the fact that ethnography inevitably describes social worlds from 
within, means that ‘getting it right’, or specifying how someone has got it wrong, is 
not straightforward: as we have seen, there is no objective, external real against which 
any given description can be measured.  
 
With theological language, too, we also only know the inadequacy of our language 
from within it.  Denys Turner’s analogy of the way in which apophatic discourse 
functions could easily have been written about the ethnographic real as we have just 
surveyed it.  He argues that the position of the theologian is  
                                                
389 Dom Sebastian Moore, ‘Four Steps Towards Making Sense of Theology’ 87–8. 
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like that of the person who, when lost for a word, can only say what it is not, 
with absolutely no prospect of ever finding the right one, the word which 
will do full justice to the thought.  She may very well be able to judge some 
candidates to be more adequate than others, but this cannot be because she 
knows the mot juste as a standard of comparison.  We can only know the 
inadequacy of our language from within it.390 
 
This same feature of ethnographic and theological language means that we cannot 
contest their claims by holding them up to an external reality, but by negating their 
claims with other allegories and other metaphors: we say Samoa is not Mead’s by 
making it Freeman’s; we say that God is not a rock because God is a bird.391  I will 
argue in the next chapter, just as all language about God is ‘tainted by ultimate 
failure’, I will also suggest that ecclesiology needs to reacquaint itself with the 
brokenness of its language about the church.392   
 
 iii) Living realities and breaking language 
 
Lastly, ethnography and theology’s language is characterised and constrained in the 
way we have just described because both deal with living realities that will always 
remain beyond their descriptive and analytical grasp.  This means, as I have already 
said, that both involve a kind of constant adequatio mentis ad rem.  It also means that 
theology’s task bears marked similarities to the task of ethnography.  We saw earlier 
that the ethnographic task involves constantly breaking and reshaping categories, 
examining all that goes unsaid and is taken for granted – not just in the social group 
being studied, but in the categories ethnography brings to it.  The ethnographer is 
constantly working against the flow of language, which tends to generalise and 
                                                
390 Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) 39.  
391 Turner, Darkness of God 37. 
392 See Turner, ‘Apophaticism, Idolatry and the Claims of Reason,’ in Silence and the Word: Negative 
Theology and Incarnation ed. Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 11–34 (16). 
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‘ontologically dump’, sifting through sedimented meanings, assumptions and beliefs 
in order to arrive at an understanding of the social real.  The challenge is to keep the 
living social realities of which one speaks alive in one’s description.   
 
Theology, too, faces living realities which will always elude any final description and 
analysis.  Given the fact that our theological knowledge is always in-the-middle, and 
our language always inadequate and fragmented, theology too must constantly break 
and reshape its categories.  In chapter one, I quoted Robert Jenson’s characterisation of 
the question driving systematic theology: ‘What shall we say, that the gospel may 
again be spoken?’393  We know our tendency to repeat well-worn formulae, and part 
of the task of theology is to work against the flow of habit and ossification, returning 
over and over to Christian faith and practice in order to break and renew our language 










                                                
393 ‘…In that we have heard and seen such-and-such discourse as gospel, what shall we now say and do 
that gospel may again be spoken?’ Jenson, Systematic Theology Vol.1 14. 
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The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement.  (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)  The 
conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming 
empty. –We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a 
certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, because of that, we are unable 
to walk.  We want to walk: so we need friction.  Back to the rough ground!394 
 
This thesis began with the question, ‘What is ecclesiology about?’  In the 
introduction, I parsed this into two questions, one about the nature of ecclesiology’s 
object of inquiry, and one about the purpose of ecclesiological reflection itself.  Thus 
far, we have focussed on concrete ecclesiologies’ distinctive answers to these 
questions.  We have seen how concrete ecclesiologies are engaged in reshaping the 
object of ecclesiological inquiry, by insisting that ecclesiology ought to focus its 
attention on the concrete, historical, sinful church of experience.  We have also seen 
how concrete ecclesiologists are reshaping the purpose of ecclesiological reflection, by 
suggesting that it ought to be helpful to concrete communities in their struggle to live 
faithfully in their particular social and historical contexts.   
 
The exploration thus far has suggested that, while concrete ecclesiologies’ basic 
convictions are sound, the way in which they tend to express them in contrast to 
modern ecclesiology causes problems.  Treating theology and ethnography as 
functional opposites leaves us with a difficult understanding of ethnography and the 
kind of ‘real church’ it can give us, and a difficult understanding of theology as 
                                                
394 Wittgenstein, Investigations §107.  To save cluttering the footnotes, works by Wittgenstein are 
referred to by the customary abbreviated titles: PI (Philosophical Investigations); Z (Zettel); BB (The 
Blue and Brown Books) and PR (Philosophical Remarks). 
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inherently abstracting and idealising.  In the last chapter, we explored some of the 
various ways in which ethnographers have understood their object of inquiry, the 
social real, and the nature of ethnographic knowledge.  This helped to undermine the 
idea of theology and ethnography as functional opposites, and also helped us to 
develop a richer understanding of the kind of real church ethnography might be able 
to give us.  I suggested that ethnography might help us to develop a more 
theologically mature understanding of the concrete church, and the purpose of 
ecclesiological reflection.  It could do so, I argued, by encouraging us to make the 
connection between how we know and what we know.   
 
Concrete ecclesiologies have already begun making this connection between the how 
and the what of ecclesiological knowledge. They argue that, since we experience the 
church in particular, not the church in general, the principal object of ecclesiological 
inquiry should be the real, concrete church in its particular social and historical 
context.  Their efforts to realise the significance of this point have, thus far, largely 
taken methodological rather than theological shape, as concrete ecclesiologists try to 
appropriate the methods and insights of ethnography in order to attend more closely 
to the concrete church.  What I want to do in this chapter is advance the theological 
conversation a little further, by reflecting on what our ordinary ways of knowing and 
recognising church might mean for how we think about the object of ecclesiological 
inquiry, the church, and the purpose of theological reflection.395 
                                                
395 There has been some theological reflection on the connection between the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of 
knowing the church, but this has largely focussed on drawing out the significance of particular cases for 
how we understand church in general.  Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s uses her study of disabled 
people’s participation in a small Methodist church, for example, to suggest that our understandings of 
church are often overly intellectual, and Christian Scharen uses his study of three churches in 
downtown Atlanta to make the point that faithfulness looks different in different contexts.  These kinds 
of ecclesiological study, in which (as Geertz would put it) small facts are made to speak to larger 
realities, have the potential to raise many interesting and important questions about the nature of the 
church and the purpose of reflecting on it; here, though, I want to reflect in a more general way on the 
connection between ‘how’ and ‘what’ in ecclesiology. 
 172 
 
a) Wittgenstein  
 
The main conversation partner for this chapter will be the later work of Wittgenstein.  
Given the postliberal tendency to connect questionable uses of Wittgenstein with 
eyebrow-raising claims about the church, this might seem a surprising choice, but 
Wittgenstein’s work has three helpful emphases for the discussion that follows.  First, 
Wittgenstein’s concern is to return our attention to the rough ground – to the details 
of linguistic practice in everyday life.  Instead of understanding meaning as a sort of 
mental pointing-at-things, for example, Wittgenstein returns our attention to the ways 
in which we use words on a daily basis: going shopping, telling someone about a 
dream, following instructions and so on.  This emphasis on everyday knowledge was 
something we picked up in chapter three, in looking at pragmatic/relational 
ethnography.  There, we saw Jenkins and Hastrup draw parallels between everyday 
knowledge and the knowledge of fieldwork, and use the comparison to show how 
ethnographic knowledge is simultaneously valuable and limited.  This chapter will 
draw on Wittgenstein to reinforce that emphasis on the ‘rough ground’ of everyday 
knowledge and, in answering questions about how we discern and define church, 
repeatedly draw attention to the everyday ways in which we encounter, know and talk 
about church.   
 
Second, Wittgenstein’s work is characterised by anti-essentialism.  He is not interested 
in coming up with one overall theory of language, but with drawing attention to the 
many different ways in which we use words and understand them.  Likewise, he is 
not interested in essentialist definitions of concepts like colours and games.  Rather 
than trying to explain the concept ‘game’ by enumerating the basic properties shared 
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by all games, he prefers to understand the concept as a loose ‘family’, and explain it 
by giving examples.  This anti-essentialism obviously resonates with concrete 
ecclesiologies’ conviction that ecclesiology should not become preoccupied with 
defining ‘essential churchness’.396  I will suggest in what follows that Wittgenstein’s 
anti-essentialism can help us to develop a more theologically mature account of the 
concrete church, and the purpose of ecclesiological reflection.   
 
Third, Wittgenstein’s work is characterised by explanatory asceticism.  He is quite 
prepared to admit that explanations come to an end, that philosophy cannot (in fact 
should not) seek to explain everything and that, despite being so limited, 
philosophical reflection is nonetheless useful and necessary.  He writes, 
Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty–I might say–is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it.  “We have already said everything. 
–Not anything that follows from this, no, this itself is the solution!”   
This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas I believe the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it 
the right place in our considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to 
get beyond it. 
The difficulty is here: to stop.397      
 
At the end of chapter two, we looked at one of the most promising theological 
attempts to connect how we know the church with what we know – Healy’s ‘A 
(Somewhat) Chastened Ecclesiology’.  We saw there that his treatment of the church 
still tended towards a preoccupation with the church’s distinctiveness, and what I 
called ‘lowest common denominator’ ecclesiology.  Drawing attention to 
Wittgenstein’s explanatory asceticism will help us to address these problems by 
encouraging concrete ecclesiologies to resist the urge to over-explain the church – to 
learn to stop. 
                                                
396 Jinkins, Church Faces Death 80. 
397 Z §314. 
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b) The path ahead  
 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to develop concrete ecclesiologies’ accounts of 
the concrete church and the purpose of ecclesiological reflection on it.  In the first part 
of the chapter, we will explore Wittgenstein’s basic insights about the way language 
works, and the features of human life that make it work in this way.  In the second 
part of the chapter, I will sharpen some of Wittgenstein’s insights about meaning and 
language into an ecclesiological point.  
 
1. Wittgenstein on meaning and language 
 
a) Wittgenstein’s critical targets 
 
Before exploring Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and understanding, it is 
important to set him in context by briefly describing the positions against which he is 
arguing in the Investigations and his later works more generally. Reading Wittgenstein 
against the background of his critical targets is important because of the kind of 
philosophical work he believes himself to be doing.  That work is primarily critical: 
although Wittgenstein gives positive examples for how we should think about 
meaning, understanding and thinking, he proposes these in a fairly piecemeal fashion 
as ways of levering us out of problematic ways of thinking about these activities.398  
While his work does have an idiosyncratic coherence and order to it, particularly in 
the better organised Investigations and Blue and Brown Books, he is not a systematic 
                                                
398 He describes philosophy as a ‘fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us’.  
BB 27.  See also similar comments on philosophy in PI §§115–33: Philosophy does not deal with a 
single problem and is not a single method – like therapy, it has different methods (PI §133). 
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philosopher.399  His work is characterised by the way in which it criss-crosses the same 
territory repeatedly, making proposals, working through particular examples, voicing 
and countering objections, and then changing track to pick up another example, or 
another train of thought entirely.400  Identifying Wittgenstein’s targets helps to 
organise and explain what might otherwise seem like a motley collection of multi-
voiced and disorganised arguments.  It also helps to understand the kind of argument 
Wittgenstein is making, and the nature of his positive proposals: we should neither 
seek nor demand too much coherence and detail from his positive proposals; to do so 
would be to risk distorting him.401  This will become important when I pick up some 
of Wittgenstein’s positive proposals and explore them in an ecclesiological direction 
later on, as the constructive intent of my proposals will be similarly limited.  
 
 b) The Augustinian picture 
 
Wittgenstein’s first target is what I will refer to as the ‘Augustinian picture’ of 
language.402  His Philosophical Investigations opens with a quotation from Augustine’s 
Confessions, in which Augustine describes how he learned language as a child: 
                                                
399 Baker and Hacker comment on some of the peculiarities of Wittgenstein’s thought in G P Baker and 
P M S Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) xv–xvi. 
400 For the idea of criss-crossing the same ground repeatedly, see PI x. Kerr quotes F. R. Leavis 
complaining about Wittgenstein’s propensity for voicing objections to his own arguments: 
‘Wittgenstein can take all the sides by himself; he answers before you’ve said it – you can’t get in’.  See 
Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 51. 
401 Baker and Hacker warn, ‘the danger of separating Wittgenstein’s account from the context of an 
explicit critique of the Augustinian picture is that one may replace the venerable idol of Merkmale-
definition by the new idol of explanation by overlapping similarities among paradigms; one might 
think that here is the foundation for constructing a ‘new theory of universals’.’  See Baker and Hacker, 
Meaning and Understanding 185.  See also their caution that Wittgenstein should not be thought of as 
advancing a positive theory that vagueness is an essential feature of language in Baker and Hacker, 
Meaning and Understanding 209. 
402 Following Baker and Hacker, who have a fuller discussion of the Augustinian picture in their Baker 
and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 4–13. Wittgenstein uses this ‘Augustinian’ picture of 
language rather like a police photo-fit image: it is not a perfect photograph of the positions against 
which he argues, but it can be used to recognise and apprehend the three chief suspects – Frege, Russell 
and Wittgenstein himself in the Tractatus. Baker and Hacker suggest that, although the Augustinian 
picture does not square with the work of Frege, Russell or the Tractatus in all respects, it is nevertheless 
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When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards 
something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound 
they uttered when they meant to point it out.  Their intention was shewn by 
their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the 
expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other arts of the 
body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, 
having, rejecting or avoiding something.  Thus, as I heard words repeatedly 
used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to 
understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to 
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.403   
 
From this fragment, Wittgenstein develops a picture of the understanding of language 
he is rejecting: ‘the individual words in a language name objects - sentences are 
combinations of such names.  In this picture of language, we find the roots of the 
following idea: Every word has a meaning.  This meaning is correlated with the word. 
It is the object for which the word stands.’404   
 
In the Augustinian picture, words have meaning because they point to things and 
stand for them.405  We can explain words through verbal definition (which explains 
one word in terms of another verbal expression) or through ostensive definition, in 
which we point to a thing.406  Ostensive definition is what forges the link between 
language and reality, and hence what fundamentally moors the meaningfulness of 
language.407  According to the Augustinian picture, then, all significant words are 
names, whose meanings, established through ostensive definition, remain the same 
regardless of the context in which the word is used.408  Not all of the things to which 
we refer with language can be physically pointed at, of course – we do not just name 
                                                                                                                                     
important.  It should be seen as ‘the full flowering of certain propensities in philosophical thinking 
which are expressed in a variety of ways in accounts of meaning that are superficially quite different 
from each other…It is characteristic of a Weltanschauung that it has no owner or author; that it is the 
property of many individuals.’ Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 13–14.  They summarise 
the projects of Frege, Russell and the Tractatus in relation to the Augustinian picture of language in 15–
20, 20–5 and 25–7 respectively.  
403 PI §1. 
404 PI §1. 
405 PI §1, §10. 
406 BB 1. 
407 PI §15: ‘…naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.’ 
408 Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 4–5. 
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things like spiders and dogs, but also feelings, memories and mental states.  In these 
cases, Wittgenstein writes, ‘Where our language suggests a body and there is none: 
there, we should like to say, is a spirit.’ – that is, we are pointing at some inner state 
or private experience.409 Without being linked to things in this way, words seem to be 
no more than dead, empty signs.410 
 
According to the Augustinian picture, then, names are the building blocks of 
language, and ostensive definition secures the foundations of language in reality.  
Given that ostensive definition anchors the meaningfulness of words in this way, it is 
important that a word’s reference to reality is unambiguous and exact, for a word has 
no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.411  It is therefore important to the 
Augustinian picture that ‘a name ought really to signify a simple’.412  That is, where 
we cannot explain a word by a verbal definition, in which we break it down into its 
constituent parts, we must be able to explain it by ostensive definition – by 
straightforward and unambiguous pointing.413  Our explanations of words need to be 
                                                
409 PI §36, §26. 
410 He writes ‘Frege’s idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just 
complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of 
life.  And the same, of course, could be said of any proposition: Without a sense, or without the 
thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing.  And further it seems clear that no 
adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live.  And the conclusion which one draws from 
this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something 
immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs.’ BB 4.   
411 PI §§40–2. 
412 PI §39.  PI §46 refers to Russell and the Tractatus in this connection.  There is some debate as to the 
relationship between the Investigations and the Tractatus: Norman Malcolm seems to see the 
Investigations as a complete break with the Tractatus, and Baker and Hacker suggest that the 
Investigations completely destroys the distinction between simple and complex objects that 
underpinned the Tractatus.  Kerr qualifies the picture: while Wittgenstein abandons the strict distinction 
between simple and complex objects, the search for simple objects in the Tractatus becomes the search 
for ‘forms of life’ in the Investigations.  See Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? 
(London: Routledge, 1993) 38–9; Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 58–9; Kerr, 
Theology After Wittgenstein 64. 
413 See Wittgenstein’s example of the sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade.’ PI §39.  Baker and Hacker 
write, ‘It must be possible for an ostensive definition of an unanalysable word to be a complete 
explanation of the meaning of this word; for it to be final and unambiguous…If every ostensive 
definition were ambiguous or left open questions about the application of the defined word, it would 
require supplementation, and, unless this were itself further ostensive explanation, something other 
than ostensive definition would be necessary to secure the foundations of language.’ See Baker and 
 178 
complete, because names must have a precise referent in order to have meaning.  
Defining a word or concept’s meaning, in the Augustinian picture, means analysing 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the word.414 
 
The idea that language is founded on ostensive definition makes both meaning and 
understanding into mental events.  To mean something is to sort of intentionally 
mentally point at it.415  To understand something is to mentally associate a word with 
a thing; when two people understand one another, it is because they are both using 
the same words to refer to the same things.  Wittgenstein writes, 
if you are asked what is the relation between a name and the thing it names, 
you will be inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one, and 
perhaps when you say this you think in particular of the mechanism of 
association. –We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of 
two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, 
which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting, 
thinking.  These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of 
medium, the mind...416 
 
This idea of meaning and understanding as mental events results in the impression 
that, when we are thinking, ‘meanings’ are going through our minds in addition to 
the verbal expressions.417  
 
                                                                                                                                     
Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 5. This straightforward correlating of words with things means 
that, in the Augustinian picture, words and reality are isomorphic: see Baker and Hacker, Meaning and 
Understanding 6.    
414 Norman Malcolm also argues that definition-by-analysis is one of Wittgenstein’s critical targets.  
When exploring the meanings of concepts like ‘truth’, ‘beauty’ and ‘justice’, philosophers have usually 
focussed, ‘…not on doings or happenings in the world, but as the meaning of these words.  When you 
say that you ‘know’ this or that, what are you saying?  Usually the concentration was on truth-
conditions.  When you say that you know that so-and-so, what are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that must be satisfied in order for your assertion to be true.  If a philosopher could spell out 
those conditions he would be giving a definition of the meaning of ‘know’.’  See Malcolm, 
Wittgenstein 25.  Malcolm understands Wittgenstein to be returning philosophy’s attention to ‘what is 
given’ (PI 192) - language-games and forms of life.  
415 ‘Here meaning gets imagined as a kind of mental pointing, indicating.’ Z §12.  See also PI §33: 
‘Point to a piece of paper. –And now point to its shape–now to its colour–now to its number (that 
sounds queer). –How did you do it? –You will say that you ‘meant’ a different thing each time you 
pointed.  And if I ask how that is done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the 
shape, etc.’.  
416 BB 3. 
417 PI §329. 
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This idea of meaning and understanding as mental events brings us to Wittgenstein’s 
second critical target.  As well as criticising the Augustinian picture of human 
language and how it works, Wittgenstein is also arguing against the view of the 
human person that underlies the Augustinian picture.  Augustine’s description of 
himself as a baby, Fergus Kerr writes,  
registers a strong sense of how the self-transparent little soul looks out from 
its head, hears the adults making various noises, watches them (through its 
eyes) as they lumber towards some item of middle-sized dry goods, and then 
suddenly, and on its own, makes the connection, in its own mind, between 
the sounds the adults emit and the objects that they touch. Augustine pictures 
his infant self as already aware of its own identity (what is going on inside its 
own mind) and of what is going on around it (outside its mind), prior to 
and independently of its mastering the arts of speech.418 
 
We will see in what follows that, as well as targeting the Augustinian picture of 
language, Wittgenstein is also critiquing the idea of meaning and understanding as 
mental activities.  While Wittgenstein is very much interested in what Augustine calls 
the ‘natural language of all peoples’, he sees physical gesture not just as the expression 
of a separate and private mental process, but as fundamental to how we communicate 
with one another.419  Wittgenstein is trying to release philosophy from the grip of an 
understanding of the human person as a solitary, mental ‘I’ that dwells in, expresses 
itself through, and is finally limited by the physical body in which it has its seat.420  
 
c) Wittgenstein’s alternative 
 
 
                                                
418 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 56.  See also PI §32. 
419 Hacker argues that the purpose of the private language arguments in PI §§243–315 ‘is to reveal the 
incoherence of a comprehensive picture of human nature, of the mind and the relation between 
behaviour and the mental, of self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s experience, that has 
dominated philosophy since Descartes.’ P M S Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Part I: Essays, 
vol. 3 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 1. 
420 Wittgenstein, BB 69: ‘We feel that in the cases in which “I” is used as subject, we don’t use it 
because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that 
we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body.’  
Wittgenstein shows that holding such a view results in the odd conclusion that what has pains and sees 
and thinks is of a mental nature only, because material objects cannot feel pain (BB 74).  
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Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of signs is not to be found in the thing to which 
they point.  A sign’s meaning is not something separate from it, which animates the 
sign and gives it life.421  The meaning of words is their use, their function in social 
exchanges.  Wittgenstein’s purpose in many of the examples he uses in the 
Investigations is ‘to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday 
use’.422  His first example, sending someone shopping, parodies the Augustinian 
picture of language: 
I send someone shopping.  I give him a slip marked “five red apples”.  He 
takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; 
then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample 
opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers–I assume that he 
knows them by heart–up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an 
apple out of the drawer. –It is in this and similar ways that one operates with 
words.423 
 
Wittgenstein’s point in this laboured example is that this is not how people operate 
with words on an everyday basis. The example illustrates perfectly what happens 
when we bring words back to everyday use: we realise that ‘the locus of meanings is 
not the epistemological solitude of the individual consciousness but the practical 
exchanges that constitute the public world which we inhabit together.’424  
Wittgenstein’s second example asks us to imagine a ‘complete primitive language’ 
used by a builder and his assistant, and the associated ‘form of life’ (a building 
project) in which this language is used.425  The builder calls out ‘Slab!’, ‘Block!’, 
‘Pillar!’ and so on, and the assistant brings the objects he has learned to fetch when he 
hears these instructions.426  Wittgenstein’s point is that if we want to know the 
meaning of the word ‘Slab’, we need to look at its function in the exchange of the two 
                                                
421 PI §432.  When we think, there are not meanings going through our head at the same time as 
words: see PI §329, 186; Z §146. 
422 ‘[O]ne must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is 
its original home? –What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.’ 
PI §116. 
423 PI §1; cf. BB 16–17. 
424 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 58. 
425 PI §§2–21; cf. BB 77–83 for a different version of the same example. 
426 PI §2, for ‘form of life’ see §19. 
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builders.427  Understanding a word means grasping its currency in a social exchange – 
knowing what it is the word does.428 Meaning and understanding are not mental 
processes, but social capabilities.429   
 
Throughout the Investigations, Wittgenstein seeks to bring our attention back to the 
contexts in which words are straightforwardly used and understood, in order to break 
the hold that the Augustinian picture has over us.  To do so, he develops the ideas of 
‘language-games’ (Sprachspiele) and their associated forms of life (Lebensformen).430 
For Wittgenstein, to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life in which that 
language has meaning: ‘…the term “language–game” is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-
form.’431  The examples he gives of language-games are all small things, like 
requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying.432  Such activities, like comforting 
someone in pain, involve not just characteristic uses of language, but also 
characteristic actions and forms of behaviour.433  Like games of cards or football, we 
                                                
427 Asking about the meaning of a word is like asking about the function of a piece in chess.  PI §108. 
428 ‘One cannot guess how a word functions.  One has to look at its use and learn from that,’ PI §340.  
For example, the difference between the order ‘Five slabs!’ and the report, ‘Five slabs’ is not to be 
found in what they refer to, but in their currency in a social exchange – what it is that they do for us.  
See PI §21. Wittgenstein suggests that words are instruments characterised by their use: BB 67. 
429 To understand a rule is not to have a particular mental state of understanding, but to have mastery of 
a technique: understanding is ‘knowing how to go on’.  See PI §§148–55; cf. Z §144 ‘How words are 
understood is not told by words alone.’  Baker and Hacker note, ‘Although behaviour manifesting 
understanding is not itself understanding, but evidence for it, what this is evidence for is an ability, not 
a state, i.e. not a persisting mental structure in an ethereal medium.’ Baker and Hacker, Meaning and 
Understanding 341. 
430 In the Blue and Brown Books, Wittgenstein explains language-games as ‘the forms of language with 
which a child begins to make use of words’, and says that the study of language-games is ‘the study of 
primitive forms of language or primitive languages.’  BB 52. 
431 PI §23. 
432 PI §23. Kerr notes, ‘To wonder whether such a vast and internally diverse phenomenon as religion 
or Catholicism would count [as a language game] seems superfluous.’ Kerr, Theology After 
Wittgenstein 30. 
433 In this respect, they resemble games, which also involve characteristic gestures, presuppose 
particular reactions, or take place in the context of particular activities. For presupposing particular 
reactions, see PI §142: ‘…if there were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; 
if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency 
– this would make our normal language-games lose their point. –The procedure of putting a lump of 
cheese on a balance and fixing their price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently 
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require training in order to ‘play’ these language-games correctly, according to the 
established, publicly-understood rules.434  While these rules do not provide for every 
eventuality (chess rules do not specify the size of chess pieces, for example), they are 
not thereby rendered incomplete or inadequate to the task, and they do allow for 
improvisation.435  Looking at three ways in which Wittgenstein uses examples of 
particular language-games to criticise the Augustinian picture of language will help us 
to explore Wittgenstein’s use of the concept further, and sketch out the elements of 
Wittgenstein’s thought that we will be putting to ecclesiological use in the second part 
of this chapter. 
 
  i) Following a rule 
 
Wittgenstein uses the example of following a rule, or obeying an order, to undermine 
two ideas that emerge from the Augustinian picture of language: first, the idea that 
signs are self-interpreting and, second, the idea that the meaning of words is fixed by 
a sort of intentional mental pointing at a thing.  He writes,     
A rule stands there like a sign-post.–Does the sign-post leave no doubt open 
about the way I have to go?  Does it shew which direction I am to take when 
I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country?  
But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of 
its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?436 
 
A sign-post cannot intimate to me, in and of itself, the way I should go: I need to be 
part of a community in which a pointy bit of wood means something.437  Wittgenstein 
follows this with the example of the slab language-game transferred onto paper.  
                                                                                                                                     
happened that such lumps suddenly grew or shrank for no obvious reason.’  See also PI 192–3 and cf. Z 
§351: ‘“If humans were not in general agreed about the colours of things, if undetermined cases were 
not exceptional, then our concept of colour could not exist.” No:–our concept would not exist.’  
Human agreement does not produce the colour red, however: see Z §430–1. 
434 Like chess playing, mastering a language is mastering a technique.  See PI §150, §569; BB 67; Z 
§318 on training.  
435 PI §83; Z §§115–20. 
436 PI §85. 
437 There is no ‘inner guiding’ we feel when we look at signs.  See PI §§172–8. 
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Now, A trains B to match up in a table the written order for a building stone with a 
picture of the stone in the opposite column: 
–One learns to look the picture up in the table by receiving a training, and 
part of this training consists perhaps in the pupil’s learning to pass with his 
finger horizontally from left to right; and so, as it were, to draw a series of 
horizontal lines on the table.438 
 
Wittgenstein’s point is that the joining-up of words and things through ostensive 
definition is itself a socially-embedded practice that requires training.439  Returning to 
the rule-following example later on, Wittgenstein gives the example of a pupil who is 
asked to write down a ‘series of the form 0, n, 2n, 3n, etc. at an order of the form 
“+n”; so at the order “+1” he writes down the series of natural numbers.’440 When 
the pupil gets to 1000, having correctly followed the rule thus far, we then ask him to 
start adding 2.  He writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.  ‘We say to him: “Look what 
you’ve done!” –He doesn’t understand.  We say: “You were meant to add two: look 
how you began the series!” –He answers: “Yes, isn’t it right?  I thought that was how 
I was meant to do it.”  Following rules and repeated patterns of action is not a matter 
of my private intentions, but a matter of abiding by a socially established practice of 
rule following.441  All these examples reinforce Wittgenstein’s point that using signs is 
a social skill, a set of abilities that we acquire by training.  Understanding signs, rules 
and orders is not a mental state, but a practical ability to carry on in the same way.442  
By repeatedly focussing our attention on the ordinary uses of language in the small 
contexts of language-games, Wittgenstein shows that the Augustinian picture, even as 
                                                
438 PI §86. 
439 ‘We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a 
name.’  PI §31. 
440 PI §186. 
441 ‘I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ 
rules.’ Z §318. 
442 If we know how to use a rule, asks Wittgenstein, ‘…what does this knowledge consist in?  Let me 
ask: When do you know that application?  Always?  day and night?  or only when you are actually 
thinking of the rule?’  PI §148.  He adds, ‘The grammar of the word “knows” is evidently closely 
related to that of “can”, “is able to”.  But also closely related to that of “understands”.  (‘Mastery’ of a 
technique.)’ PI §150; cf. Z §303–6. 
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it attempts to find the simple foundations of language, ends up with an 
overcomplicated and confusing account of how we communicate on an everyday 
basis. 
 
  ii) Exact reference and family resemblance 
 
In the Augustinian picture, all words are basically names, all explanations ostensive 
definitions, and all sentences descriptions: one theory accounts for the meaningfulness 
of language in all the varied contexts in which language is employed, and in all the 
tasks for which language is employed.443  Ostensive definition is what moors the 
meaningfulness of language.  To explain what a word or concept means, then, I need 
to know what it is referring to.  If I am to use a word accurately (for example ‘red’), 
then I must know the conditions that have to inhere for my use of the word to be true 
(the thing to which I am pointing must have the property of ‘redness’).  In order for 
language to make sense, each time I use the word ‘red’, I need to be intentionally 
pointing at the same property – I cannot point at a summer sky and meaningfully say, 
‘Look how red it is!’  This means that, in the Augustinian picture, ‘the search for 
definitions is the search for those ingredients of everything falling under a concept 
that makes things fall under this concept.’444 
 
In order to undermine both the idea of an overall theory of language and the 
understanding of definition as analysis, Wittgenstein develops the idea of a ‘family 
                                                
443 Wittgenstein comments in PI §13, ‘When we say: “Every word in language signifies something” we 
have so far said nothing whatever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make.’ 
444 Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 187. 
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resemblance’ concept, by drawing an analogy between language in general and games 
in general.445  First, he voices an objection to his language-games approach: 
“You take the easy way out!  You talk about all sorts of language-games, but 
have nowhere said what the essence of a language game, and hence of 
language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them 
into language or parts of language.  So you let yourself off the very part of 
the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about 
the general form of propositions and of language.”446 
 
Wittgenstein then admits the charge: he is not going to produce ‘something common 
to all that we call language’.447  Instead, he argues that ‘these phenomena have no one 
thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, –but that they are related 
to one another in many different ways.’  It is by virtue of these relationships, 
Wittgenstein argues, that we call all these different language-games, ‘language’.  He 
then draws an analogy between language and games.  Games come in all shapes and 
sizes: ‘board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.’448   There is 
no common property shared by all these games that makes them share the name 
‘game’: ‘…if you look at them, you will see not something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that…a complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail.’449   
                                                
445 It is important to note that Wittgenstein’s use of the concept of family resemblances is negative: ‘it is 
used to criticize the dogma that every general term must be applied on the basis of properties common 
to everything that falls under it…the danger of separating Wittgenstein’s account from the context of 
an explicit account of the Augustinian picture is that one may replace the venerable idol of Merkmal-
definition by the new idol of explanation by overlapping similarities among paradigms; one might 
think that here is the foundation for constructing a ‘new theory of universals’.’  See Baker and Hacker, 
Meaning and Understanding 185.  They understand Wittgenstein’s argument in PI §§66–85 to be 
‘…that we know of no properties common to all games; that we do not explain ‘game’ by enumerating 
Merkmale of games; and that even if we were to discover a property common to all games, it would 
not reveal part of our concept of game because it would not belong to our (present) practice of 
explaining ‘game’.’ (193). 
446 PI §65. 
447 PI §65.  See his comments on our ‘craving for generality’ in BB 17–19. 
448 PI §66. 
449 PI §66. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that ‘“There is something common to all these constructions – 
namely the disjunction of all their common properties.” –I should reply: Now you are only playing 
with words.  One might as well say: “Something runs through the whole thread–namely the 
continuous overlapping of these fibres.’  See PI §67; cf. Z §26.   
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When we pay attention to how we use and explain the word ‘game’ on an everyday 
basis, we notice two things.  First, we can see that we do not apply the word by 
looking at a given activity and then mentally pulling out a chart listing the common 
properties of games, and seeing if the activity we are watching corresponds to the 
mental chart.  As Wittgenstein points out, when we look at all the varied activities we 
call games, we can see that the concept has unity not because all games have common 
properties, but because they are held together by similarities that crop up and 
disappear.450  Second, we can see that we do not explain the concept ‘game’ by citing 
the common features shared by all games, but by giving examples and adding, ‘“This 
and similar things are called ‘games’”.451  ‘Games’ is a blurred concept, but 
nonetheless useful.452  Although it does not have precision or sharp boundaries, we 
can and do use the concept ‘games’ intelligibly and without difficulty.453  We might 
draw a sharp boundary around the concept, but this boundary would have nothing to 
do with our ordinary use of the word ‘game’.454  By drawing our attention back to 
how we use simple words like ‘game’, Wittgenstein is undermining the idea that 
words must have exact references in order to have meaning, and the idea that 
explaining a concept-word means defining it.455 By drawing an analogy between 
                                                
450 ‘–Are they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses.  Or is there always winning or 
losing, or competition between players?  Think of patience.  In ball-games there is winning and losing; 
but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared.  Look at 
the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis.  Think 
now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other 
characteristic features have disappeared!  And we can go through the many, many other groups of 
games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.’  PI §66.   
451 PI §69.  Remarks follow in PI §§73–4 about the role of samples.  This is discussed extensively in 
Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 174–83. 
452 PI §71.  See also his comments on heaps of sand in Z §392. 
453 PI §70–1.  He writes, ‘…we can draw a boundary – for a special purpose.  Does it take that to make 
the concept useable?  Not at all!  (Except for that special purpose.)  No more than it took the definition: 
1 pace = 75cm. to make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable.’  PI §69. 
454 PI §76; BB 17. 
455 Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts is negative: ‘…it is to criticize the dogma 
that every general term must be applied on the basis of properties common to everything that falls 
under it.’  See Baker, and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 185.  Baker and Hacker consider 
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language as a whole and games in general, Wittgenstein also draws our attention back 
to the myriad different ways and multiple different contexts in which language is 
used, showing that the Augustinian picture’s overall theory of meaning inevitably 
(and unhelpfully) flattens out the differences, and thereby causes significant 
philosophical confusion.456   
 
iii) Inner and outer 
 
Not everything that we want to talk about using language is, as Fergus Kerr’s phrase 
has it, ‘middle sized dry goods’; we also need talk about things like thoughts, 
sensations, mental states and memories.457  In the Augustinian picture of language, we 
name these in the same ways as we name physical things like sheep or tea-towels, by 
positing an inner object (a thought, sensation or feeling), and then verbally pointing 
at it.458  Wittgenstein attacks this idea and the picture that accompanies it, of a private, 
mental ‘inner’ self in which sensations are felt and meanings and understandings are 
invisibly registered, and a public, bodily ‘outer’ self through which we express (or 
behind which we conceal) the goings-on of our inner life.459  He does so, again, by 
                                                                                                                                     
Wittgenstein’s argument in PI §§66–83 to be a systematic argument intended to destroy the idea of 
definition as analysis.  See Baker, and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 197, and their comments on 
Wittgenstein’s use of explanation in contrast to definition (Erklärung), 30. 
456 ‘It is interesting’, Wittgenstein writes, ‘to compare the multiplicity of tools in language and of the 
ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about 
the structure of language.’  PI §23. In PI §24 he warns ‘If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-
games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: “What is a question?” –Is it the 
statement that I do not know such-and-such, or the statement that I wish the other person would tell 
me…?  Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty?’  Baker and Hacker argue that 
‘…Wittgenstein’s strategy of focussing upon the uses of sentences undermines philosophical theories 
erected to explain how we can, mysteriously, do many of the mundane things we do with language.  It 
explains away the mystery by clarifying the grammatical articulations that give rise to the impression of 
mystery.’  See Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 79.   
457 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 56. 
458 Of the phrase ‘I imagined him’, Wittgenstein writes, ‘…every such use of language is remarkable, 
peculiar, if one is adjusted only to consider the description of physical objects.’  Z §40. 
459 What Fergus Kerr calls, following J M Cameron, the idea of human beings’ fundamental 
‘epistemological solitude’.  See Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 44. Kerr also makes the connection 
between these two ideas: ‘Perhaps it is only if we are already strongly tempted to treat the self as a 
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bringing our attention back to everyday experience and language use – this time, by 
discussing the example of feeling and expressing pain. 
 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of pain shows the extent to which the Augustinian picture of 
language holds us captive, affecting not just what we think about language, but what 
we think about the nature of human beings.460  If I understand language to be founded 
on the practice of observing and naming physical objects, then I am likely to think of 
describing pain in terms of observing and pointing to an inner sensation, the pain.  
This pain, like all my inner thoughts, feelings, memories and so on, is private: nobody 
else knows I am in pain unless I choose to tell them so, just as nobody else knows 
what I am thinking until I tell them.  The sensations, thoughts and emotions of others 
are private in the same way, and so I can only infer from their behaviour what they 
are feeling or thinking – they could, after all, be feigning pain, or happiness to see 
me.  This picture of the human person is a familiar one because it calls to mind 
Augustine as an infant: 
Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into 
a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, 
as if it already had a language, only not this one.  Or again: as if the child 
could already think, only not yet speak.  And “think” would mean here 
something like “talk to itself”.461  
 
Prior to, and separately from, any engagement in social life, it seems I can name my 
own feelings, thoughts and sensations ‘to myself’. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
solitary intellect locked within a space that is inaccessible to anyone else that language looks intuitively 
like a system of referring to things.’  Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 57.   
460 Hacker unpacks the position against which Wittgenstein is arguing in Hacker, Meaning and Mind 8–
12. 
461 PI §32; cf. PI §257. 
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Wittgenstein critiques this picture of language in characteristic manner by pushing it 
to its unnatural conclusions, and letting it fall apart as we watch.462  He asks us to 
imagine a language ‘in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to 
his inner experiences – his feelings, moods and the rest’, for his own private use.  
‘The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the 
person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.  So another person cannot 
understand the language.’463  This should be possible if it is true that we refer to 
sensations in the same way that we refer to physical objects, by forging a mental 
association between word and thing and then using it: we ought to be able to have a 
sensation, name it something (‘S’), and then use this to refer to the sensation 
subsequently – whether or not other people know what we mean.464 Wittgenstein 
shows that this idea of referring to an inner object is redundant.  He writes, 
Why can’t my right hand give my left hand money? –My right hand can put 
it into my left hand.  My right hand can write a deed of gift and my left hand 
a receipt. –But the further practical consequences would not be those of a 
gift.  When the left hand has taken the money from the right, etc., we shall 
ask: “Well, and what of it?” And the same could be asked if a person had 
given himself a private definition of a word; I mean, if he has said the word 
to himself and at the same time has directed his attention to a sensation.465 
 
This example forms part of a larger and much more complex series of arguments, 
which we will not explore here, except to note that one of the purposes of these 
arguments is to ‘retrieve the natural expressiveness of the human body’, and the 
degree to which our everyday communication depends on this feature of human 
                                                
462 PI §464 ‘My aim is to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is 
patent nonsense.’ 
463 PI §243. 
464 PI §258. 
465 PI §268.  See also PI §279: ‘Imagine someone saying: “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his 
hand on top of his head to prove it.’  D Z Phillips cites another example of Wittgenstein going on a 
walk with Norman Malcolm and ‘giving’ him the trees they passed, on the condition that he did not cut 
them down or do anything to them, nor prevent their previous owners from doing anything to them – 
with those reservations, the trees were his.  See ‘Religion in Wittgenstein’s Mirror’ in Phillips, 
Wittgenstein and Religion 237–54 (252). 
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life.466  Against the idea that we are ‘a crowd of hobbled angels, each isolated ‘behind 
the wall of the body’, like a hermit in a moated grange’, Wittgenstein wants to show 
that we do understand one another quite immediately and unreflectively.467  If we see 
someone else in pain, we do not ‘guess’ or ‘infer’ that they are in pain – we simply 
respond to them.468  Likewise, the statement that our own sensations are private is like 
the statement ‘One plays patience by oneself’ – it usually perfectly obvious to others 
what is going on.469  In the face of objections that others might be feigning pain, or 
might even be automata merely acting like humans, Wittgenstein points out that a 
complex communicative act like ‘simulating pain’ depends on a whole series of 
simpler acts in which pain-expressions are usually (and unthinkingly) trusted.470  
Wittgenstein’s intent here is to prise us out of thinking that we are first and foremost 
alone, a mental self trapped within the body, and show that we are first and foremost 
social and bodily – we communicate and understand on an intuitive level.   
 
  iv) Wittgenstein’s full stop 
 
Through carefully bringing our language back from the slippery ground of 
metaphysical confusion to the rough ground of everyday life, Wittgenstein shows that 
the Augustinian picture is tortuously overcomplicated, positing ghostly mental objects 
and occult mental processes when our experience is that everyday communication is, 
if not as theoretically tidy, much more straightforward.  Wittgenstein’s concern is 
always to bring our attention back to what he calls ‘the given’ – forms of life.471  It is 
                                                
466 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 89. 
467 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 80. 
468 PI §287, §303, §310.  See also PI 152: ‘My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul.  I am 
not of the opinion that he has a soul.’ 
469 PI §248. 
470 A dog cannot simulate pain: PI §250. 
471 PI 192. 
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by describing these forms of life, and the language-games that accompany them, that 
philosophy can bring clarification to our thinking.472  Philosophy’s task is description, 
not explanation: it ‘simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything’.473  Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the descriptive nature of 
philosophy, and on language-games as simply given and beyond explanation, have led 
to over-enthusiastic theological appeals to the way language-games act as a ‘full stop’ 
in Wittgenstein’s work, and corresponding criticisms of ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’.474  
But, as Peter Winch points out in his comments on Malcolm’s Wittgenstein: A 
Religious Point of View?, Wittgenstein is not saying that some things are simply and 
inherently beyond explanation: 
Spinoza thought that because explanations come to an end there must be 
something which has no further explanation, a causa sui.  But Wittgenstein’s 
point is not at all like that at all – it is a criticism of such an outlook.  He does 
not think that explanations come to an end with something that is 
intrinsically beyond explanation.  They come to an end for a variety of quite 
contingent and pragmatic reasons, perhaps, because of a practical need for 
action, perhaps because the puzzlement which originally prompted the 
search for explanation has evaporated (for one reason or another.)475        
 
In the next part of the chapter I will pick up on the themes of Wittgenstein’s thought 
we have explored here: on the negative side, his distrust of overall theories and his 
eschewal of definition-as-analysis and, on the positive side, his use of family 
resemblance concepts and explanation-by-example, and his emphasis on intuitive 
                                                
472 PI §125. 
473 PI §126.  See also PI §124: ‘Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it 
can in the end only describe it.’ 
474 Norman Malcolm suggests that ‘Wittgenstein regarded the language-games, and their associated 
forms of life, as beyond explanation…a language-game itself rests on no grounds that explain or justify 
it, that show it to be reasonable or unreasonable.  It can only be observed and described.’ (77–8) He 
argues that Wittgenstein wants explanations to come to an end with the existence of language games 
(82).  Application of this idea by theologians (and Malcolm himself) have been attacked for ‘fideism’ – 
for making language-games autonomous, and beyond justification or criticism: see Kai Nielsen, 
‘Wittgensteinian Fideism,’ Philosophy 42 (1967): 191–209.  Phillips argues that both such 
interpretations of Wittgenstein ‘do not follow from a proper reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and 
take us away from the central questions Wittgenstein was addressing.  Phillips’ ‘Wittgenstein’s Full 
Stop’ in Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion 79–102, and ‘From Coffee to Carmelites’, ibid. 131–52 are 
an excellent and careful guide to Wittgenstein’s idea of things being ‘beyond explanation.’ 
475 Peter Winch, ‘Discussion of Malcolm’s Essay’ in Malcolm, Wittgenstein 95–135 (104). 
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behaviour.  Exploring some of the ecclesiological implications of these concepts will 
help us to develop concrete ecclesiologies’ understandings of the nature of the 
concrete church, and the purpose of ecclesiological inquiry. 
 
2. The meaning of ‘church’ 
 
We have already seen in chapter one that concrete ecclesiologies’ theological and 
methodological instincts owe a good deal to Wittgenstein.  Just as Wittgenstein 
wanted to return philosophy to the ‘rough ground’ of particular language-games, 
concrete ecclesiologies seek to draw attention back to the multiple different ways in 
which church is understood and concretely lived.  Concrete ecclesiologies’ lack of 
interest in ‘essential churchness’ is also quite Wittgensteinian: they suggest that we 
come to understand what ‘church’ means, not by describing abstract Merkmale of 
church in general, but by looking at particular forms of ecclesial life.  We have also 
seen that concrete ecclesiologies’ Wittgensteinian instincts are largely worked out in 
methodological rather than theological mode: while they have applied themselves 
with enthusiasm to social-scientific study of particular churches, they have yet to 
engage in much reflection on the theological implications of their method.  My 
purpose in the second part of this chapter is to advance concrete ecclesiologies’ 
theological reflection a little further by (without pushing Wittgenstein too far), 
sharpening some of his insights to an ecclesiological point. 
 
a) The difficulty is here: to stop 
 
Back in chapter two, we took a close look at Healy’s paper ‘A (Somewhat) Chastened 
Ecclesiology’.  We saw Healy critique Rowan Williams’ rather Wittgensteinian 
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suggestion that we can discover the meaning of the word ‘God’ by looking at the 
speech and practice of ‘this community’, the church.476  Healy argues that ‘this 
community’ is not easily discernible: he argues that ethnographic studies show that 
church communities differ extensively from one another in their life and language, 
and also that individual congregations exhibit considerable internal pluralism in belief 
and practice.  While there may be some basic shared characteristics, ‘the ethnographic 
view undermines the notion that they constitute the church as a ‘community’ or 
moral person in a sufficiently rich and consistent way to work as a principle for 
theological or ecclesiological method.’477  Ethnography cannot deliver the concrete 
commonalities in belief and practice that would enable a straightforward appeal to 
‘this community’.  Healy’s subsequent suggestion for how ecclesiology should 
proceed is also Wittgensteinian in spirit.  He returns our attention to the details of 
individual practice, and to the complex ways in which Christians ‘pick and choose’ 
their beliefs and practices from the resources of church and world, and he refuses to 
tidy up this complexity into a general account of a distinctive Christian way of life.  
The approach is very promising yet, rather oddly, his account still ends up focussed on 
commonalities.  First, he builds his account on the only concrete commonality he 
thinks ethnography can give us – individuals.  Second, his account is still dominated 
by the need to define the distinctive commonality that defines the church – its 
mediating function.  Although the direction of his thought is Wittgensteinian and 
anti-essentialist, he still ends up trying to identify ‘those ingredients of everything 
falling under a concept that makes things fall under this concept.’478  He ends up 
                                                
476 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 1. 
477 Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 5. 
478 Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 197.  Some ecclesiologists who focus in somewhat 
Wittgensteinian fashion on the practices of the church also concentrate their efforts, in rather less 
Wittgensteinian fashion, on defining the practices that make the church.  See, for example, Reinhard 
Hütter, Bound to be Free: Evangelical Catholic Engagements in Ecclesiology, Ethics, and Ecumenism 
(Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 2004) 34–7. 
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sifting through the details of individual Christians’ practice in order to find some 
account of what makes the church distinctive.  His focus may be on the theological 
distinctiveness of the church, rather than its empirical distinctiveness, but Healy is still 
trying to establish what makes the church distinctively the church.479  His suggestion 
that concrete ecclesiologies should turn to the ordinary, complex and plural ways in 
which church is lived is a good one: the difficulty, as Wittgenstein observes, is to stop 
there, and to resist the urge to start distilling from these multiple different examples 
some kind of essential church.   
 
The instinct that ecclesiology ought to somehow define the church is not unique to 
Healy.  A good deal of ecclesiological energy is expended on trying to define the 
church, whether that means discussing its theological marks, discussing what ‘makes’ 
the church (mission, eucharist etc.), or trying to define the basic characteristics of its 
social appearance.480  Such efforts to establish a Merkmal definition of the church can 
be good and helpful: they may help us to negotiate pastoral situations where we need 
to be clear about what is church and what is not, and they can also help us to explore 
different theological facets of the church’s life.481  I want to suggest in what follows, 
though, that it is possible to develop an alternative understanding of ecclesiology’s 
task, and an alternative approach to exploring ecclesiology’s object.  The key, as I 
                                                
479 Healy argues that the theological distinctiveness of the church is established by God’s call, and not 
our response to that call.  Perhaps this is another case of the hands being the hands of Wittgenstein, but 
the voice being the voice of Karl Barth! 
480 Miroslav Volf, for example, frames his constructive ecclesiological work in After Our Likeness as 
follows: ‘Exploring the question of ecclesiality means exploring what makes the church the church.  On 
the one hand, this represents a restricted point of inquiry, since it overlooks much of the rich life and 
multifaceted mission of the church; our interest is directed not toward how the church ought to live in 
the world according to God’s will nor how it can live successfully in the power of the Spirit, but rather 
toward the sine qua non of what it means for the church to call itself a church in the first place.  
Ecclesiality involves that which is indispensable.’  See Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as 
the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 1998) 127.  
481Although Healy suggests that ecclesiology should abandon the search for a ‘supermodel’ – one model 
of the church’s essence, from which a complete systematic normative description of the church is 
deduced – he does suggest models can be ‘used to discover and explore imaginatively the many facets 
of the Christian church’.  See Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 35–6. 
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noted earlier, will be joining up how we know the church, with an account of what 
we know.  We will begin by returning our attention to the rough ground – to the 
ordinary ways in which we talk about and recognise church.  From there, I will look 
at what it might mean to think of the church as an analogical, or family resemblance 
concept, and reflect theologically on the significance of our ordinary practice of 
recognising the church.  I will then draw out what these proposals might mean for 
how we understand the purpose of ecclesiological reflection: as searching for, rather 
than defining, the church. 
 
a) The church as an analogical concept 
 
If I instructed you to name all the churches you could think of that lie within a one-
mile radius of your home or place of work, and then asked you how you had done 
this, I would be fairly confident that you had not gone mentally door-to-door with a 
template of what a church should concretely look like, in terms of its beliefs and 
practices.  One or two instances (a Quaker meeting house, for example) might have 
given you pause for thought, and you might then have begun to consider whether 
that community was a church.  That exception, however, would serve to show that 
you usually used the word ‘church’ fairly unreflectingly, that you accepted various 
different examples of ‘church’, and that your knowing how to use the word did not 
depend on having an exact mental template by which your local churches could be 
recognised and named as such.  Sometimes, of course, a more sharply-bounded 
concept of church would be useful, and we might draw one up specifically for the 
purpose of criticising a church community (by telling them they ought to look after 
the poor in their own community, for example) or making clear that a group that 
claimed to be a church (for example Scientologists) was at least not a Christian one.  
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But, again, this would serve to underline the general rule that such sharp boundaries 
are not part of our ordinary practice of recognising and naming churches.   
 
The ordinary ways in which we talk about and recognise churches suggests that we 
use ‘church’ as a family resemblance concept.  We use the concept ‘church’ in a 
similar way to ‘love’ (or ‘game’).  If someone asked us the meaning of the concept 
‘love’, we would probably explain it by giving examples, which might be ordinary, 
romantic, heroic, selfless or tragic.  We accept that love can take very different forms, 
from Tristan and Iseult to changing a baby’s nappy, and we can and do use the word 
‘love’ correctly (and analogically) in all these cases.  We do not mentally carry around 
a list of love’s distinguishing characteristics, nor do we use our off-the-cuff examples 
of love as mental templates.482  Moreover, attempting to define ‘love’ apart from 
specific examples of this kind would result in a definition that was rather bloodless 
and general, and conveyed little of love’s character.  If we tried to define ‘love’ in a 
general way, love’s concreteness, which is what makes it love, would be lost, and the 
definition would be less than helpful on the rough ground of everyday experience.  I 
want to suggest that our ordinary way of explaining church follows the same pattern, 
and that this should alert us to an important theological point: that church is, quite 
properly, an analogical concept.   If we were asked to explain what church was, we 
could point to hundreds of quite different examples, from the early to the 
postmodern, the local to the furthest flung, the familiar to the extraordinary.  All these 
examples of church would be different, but we would use the word ‘church’ to refer 
to all of them, and would recognise that the church’s faithfulness looks different in 
different times and places.  I suggest that we need to pay more theological attention to 
                                                
482 ‘Someone says to me “Shew the children a game.”  I teach them gaming with dice, and the other 
says “That sort of game isn’t what I meant.”  Must the exclusion of the game of dice have come before 
his mind when he have me the order?’  PI 28. 
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how we ordinarily use the concept ‘church’ in this way.  We will begin by looking at 
one theologian’s attempt to think about the church as an analogical concept. 
 
i) Analogical imagination 
 
T. Howland Sanks argues that the church is, and always has been, quite properly an 
analogical concept.483  He discusses this claim by looking at three recent issues in 
Roman Catholic ecclesiology that he suggests would benefit from ‘analogical 
thinking’: the development of Base Ecclesial Communities (BECs) in Latin America, 
the Notre Dame study of the changing US parish system, and national and regional 
episcopal conferences.  We will take the first case, BECs, to explore what Sanks means 
by analogical thinking.  He writes, 
the question has been raised as to whether or not these BECs can be called 
"church." Are they merely natural groupings, or a passing manifestation of 
the postmodern quest for community? Or are they, as Boff and others have 
claimed, a new way of being church, a church of the people, from below, a 
true expression of the Church as People of God? Do they pose a challenge or 
a threat to other forms of church such as parish or diocese, and to a 
hierarchically ordered church in general?484   
 
Sanks suggests dealing with these questions by thinking analogically about church. His 
idea of analogical thinking comes from David Tracy’s The Analogical Imagination.  
Tracy suggests that Catholic Christianity is characterised by its analogical imagination.  
Very simply, this means that Catholic systematic theology tends to proceed by 
ordering its diverse themes around a central event: God’s self-disclosure in Christ.485  
This becomes what Tracy calls the ‘prime analogate’: everything else in the theological 
                                                
483 T Howland Sanks, ‘Forms of Ecclesiality: The Analogical Church,’ Theological Studies 49:4 (1989): 
695–708. 
484 Sanks, ‘Analogical Church’ 697.  Gerard Mannion also makes use of Sanks’ work in Mannion, 
Ecclesiology in Postmodernity 179–83, but develops it in a different direction, into what he calls ‘virtue 
ecclesiology’. 
485 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (London: 
SCM, 1981) 408. 
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system is ordered to it and interpreted in light of it.486  This process of analogical 
ordering around a central event illuminates that event, just as the event itself 
illuminates and orders the theological account of reality.  Yet the central event of 
God’s self-disclosure in Christ always remains a mystery, and the fullness of its 
meaning is never captured or exhausted by the process of analogical theology.  
Catholic systematic theology is therefore characterised by a constant analogical 
movement between God and all that is not God.487  It is also characterised by a 
constant movement between negative and positive theology: the positive theology that 
draws the analogy, and reveals a similarity between God and the world, and the 
negative theology that always highlights the limited nature of the analogy, and the 
fundamental dissimilarity between God and the world.488  Sanks writes,  
I would contrast the analogical mode of thinking with a dichotomous mode, 
which stresses that relationships are either/or: either completely alike or 
completely different. This mode of thinking does not see proportional 
relationships between different entities or structures but stresses only the 
differences. It can only replicate or repeat its focal meaning rather than allow 
that focal meaning to illuminate new experiences or structures.489 
 
Sanks recommends that we think about church as an analogical concept, rather than in 
strict either/or, church/not-church terms.  A dialectical mode of thinking about the 
church expects the same form of ecclesiality to be replicated everywhere.  An 
analogical mode of thinking about church finds a prime analogate for the church, and 
then considers various forms of church as they relate to this central meaning.  Sanks 
writes, 
if the prime analogate for being church is a community of disciples gathered 
in the name of Jesus—"Where two or three are gathered together in my 
name, there I am also present" (Mt 18:20)—then there would be no 
question of whether or not the base communities are truly "church." They 
clearly are, and they are analogous to other forms of church in historical 
experience…"Church" is and always has been an analogical notion, as its use 
                                                
486 Tracy, Analogical Imagination 410–1. 
487 Tracy, Analogical Imagination 409. 
488 Tracy, Analogical Imagination 411–3. 
489 Sanks, ‘Analogical Church’ 703. 
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in the New Testament verifies.490 
 
Sanks argues that the various different historical forms of church are all analogously 
related to one another: it is by exploring these different forms as analogies of a focal 
meaning that we can gain a sense of the church as a whole.491 
 
In Sanks’ paper, we begin to see what it might mean theologically to think of the 
church as an analogical concept.  Some work needs doing, however, to join up his 
idea of church as an analogical concept with the idea of church as a family 
resemblance concept.  For Wittgenstein, the concept ‘games’ does not form a family 
because all the examples we might give of games (chess, snakes and ladders, rugby) 
are all ’vertically’ related by likeness to a single archetypal game or prime analogate.  
The concept ‘games’ forms a family because of what we might call ‘horizontal’ 
relationships – multiple similarities that crop up and disappear again.  Sanks’ use of 
the idea of analogy tends towards the ‘vertical’ sense: he talks of the church being 
‘embodied’ in different historical forms, (which suggests that the church also has a 
‘disembodied’ existence apart from and prior to the particular forms it takes in 
history) and his method still involves selecting us a ‘focal meaning’ to which all the 
                                                
490 Sanks, ‘Analogical Church’ 703–4.  He adds, ‘If we think of church as analogical, the question of 
base communities eventually replacing parishes as a form of ecclesiality evanesces. We can have 
both/and rather than either/or. Boff and other enthusiastic proponents of base communities may 
indeed speak of a church arising from the grass roots, but this need not imply the withering away of 
the parish structure.’ (704).  
491 He writes, ‘All the various forms of ecclesiality have been conditioned by the circumstances and 
needs of the time. The forms we develop for our time are no less church for that reason…"Church" is 
and always has been an analogical notion, and the forms in which it has been embodied are historically 
conditioned but analogously related one to another. This means that there will be differences within 
similarities, but then that is precisely how the focal meaning of Catholic Christianity, the Incarnation, 
has enabled us to envision or imagine all of reality.’ Sanks, ‘Analogical Church’  707–8.  Some concrete 
ecclesiologists also think of church along analogical lines. Jinkins argues, ‘Examining biblical witnesses 
to the early church, we do not find a single homogeneous or monolithic “community of faith.”  On the 
contrary, we find a polymorphic cloud of witnessing communities whose shapes change with the times 
and locales…a plurality of communities in different contexts, bearing sacred traditions often at variance 
with other communities of faith.’  See Jinkins, The Church Faces Death 3–4.  Pete Ward notes that ‘The 
use of the word church in Paul’s writings does not indicate any one set pattern of community life that 
can guide us as we reimagine church in our context…We see in Paul’s writing that what it means to be 
church cannot be contained in one clear social organization or institution.  If we follow Paul, then we 
can regard a small group as being just as much church as a townwide meeting.’  See Ward, Liquid 
Church 8.  
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analogous forms are related as similarities.   
 
I want to suggest that we need to develop a more ‘horizontal’ understanding of the 
church’s analogical character.  The reason for this links back to a point I made at the 
end of the previous chapter.  Like the ethnographer’s knowledge of the social real, our 
knowledge of the church is in-the-middle – both in the ordinary sense that we can 
only know the church from our particular time and place, and in the added 
theological sense that we are creatures in via.  This means, I suggested, that theology 
and ethnography share an important characteristic: we only know the inadequacy of 
our language from the inside.  We have no overall view of the whole that we can use 
to measure up our particular proposals and constructions about it.  While exploring 
the identity of the church through focussing on one particular image or form can 
sometimes be helpful and illuminating, our position in-the-middle and on-the-way 
means that we cannot finally find the right focal image, the mot juste.492  We cannot 
specify one overall form or image of church that would serve as a measuring stick for 
all our proposals.493  Like a person lost for a word, we can only multiply examples.  
We may be able to judge some examples to be better than others, but we cannot do so 
by comparison to a view of the whole church, either in its concrete complexity or its 
theological mystery: such a view belongs only to God.  In order to develop Sanks’ 
insights further, without drifting back into essentialism, it will be helpful to look 
more closely at the New Testament, and explore how the church appears there as an 
analogical notion in the more horizontal sense I am aiming for.  
                                                
492 I think this adds something to Healy’s critique of twentieth century ecclesiology, namely that it often 
ended up lost in deciding which model or focal meaning was the right one.  (Healy, Church, World 
and the Christian Life 32–3, 36.)  The point is not just that such a quest is less than helpful ‘on the 
rough ground’, but also that our position in via makes a final decision on the right image or form of 
the church impossible. 
493 This relates to Kathryn Tanner’s comments about our inability to fix the criteria for Christian 
faithfulness in advance, which I discuss below, 204–5. 
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  ii) The New Testament witness  
 
Perhaps the clearest indication that ‘church’ is an analogical notion in the New 
Testament is the fact that the word ‘church’ is not uniformly used as a term for 
describing the earliest Christian communities.494 Not all the New Testament writings 
use the term ekklesia and, where they do, the term has a range of meanings.495  It is 
most commonly used to indicate local gatherings of Christian believers – we read 
about the church gathering in the house of Prisca and Aquila, for example (Rom 
16:3–5), and the churches of Macedonia (2 Cor 8:1).  But the term ‘church’ is also 
used in a second sense, to indicate the church as a whole, which suggests that the 
church is already being thought of as existing in some more abstract sense, on a level 
that transcends the particular churches (e.g. Col 1.24).496  ‘Church’ is only one of a 
number of terms used to describe the earliest Christian communities.497  As well as 
being described using a variety of terms, the church is also described using a range of 
metaphors and images – as the body of Christ, as the household of God, as exiles and 
as citizens.498  Some of these images are used more frequently than others, but the 
most well-worn are used in a range of different and interlocking ways.  The use of the 
image ‘body of Christ’ in the Pauline epistles is a good example.499  In Ephesians, we 
                                                
494 It is used by Matthew, Acts and the Pauline corpus; it is not found in Mark, Luke, John, 1 or 2 Peter. 
495 Gooder argues that ‘it is not possible to explain the development of Christian community with 
primary recourse to the word as its usage is sporadic and inconsistent.’  See Paula Gooder, ‘In Search of 
the Early Church’ in Mannion and Mudge (eds.) The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church 9–
27 (10). 
496 The Letter to the Ephesians, particularly in chapter 5, contains a good few examples of Paul using the 
word ‘church’ in this extended sense. 
497 Other include ‘the Way’ in Acts (e.g. 9:2; 18:25–6; 22:4), ‘Saints’ (e.g. Acts 9:32; Rom 1:7; Heb 
13:24) and, rather more rarely, ‘Christians’ (Acts 11:26). 
498 Paul Minear writes, ‘Conservatively estimated, there are more than eighty of them, but this number 
might readily be increased to one hundred if the various Greek words were counted separately.’  See 
Paul S Minear Images of the Church in the New Testament (London: Lutterworth Press, 1961) 28.  
499 Minear states that ‘the phrase “body of Christ” is not a single expression with an unchanging 
meaning.’  See Minear, Images of the Church 173. 
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find the image used to emphasise the importance of unity (4:4–6) and the different 
parts of the church working together (4:16), but we also see it used to talk about 
authority and order in the church (1.22; 5:23) and the parity of Gentile believers with 
Jewish believers (3:6). In the first letter to the Corinthians, the image is used to 
emphasise the importance of unity and interdependence in the Christian community 
(12:12–20), but then the metaphor shifts slightly to reinforce importance of looking 
after the most vulnerable members of the community (12:22–4).  There is no single 
image that dominates or orders all the others; rather, what we see is a series of 
overlapping similarities in how the early Christian communities describe themselves.  
The proliferation of descriptive terms and images for the early Christian communities 
in the New Testament suggests that these communities were ‘fumbling to find words 
and images to describe themselves both internally and externally’ – lacking, as it were, 
the mot juste.500 
 
As well as using a range of terms and images to describe the earliest Christian 
communities, the New Testament witness also suggests that these communities existed 
in varied and interlocking forms.  It seems that a good many early communities of 
believers existed in a complex and changing relationship with the synagogue: in Acts 
we can see from Paul’s account of his persecution that Christians were to be found in 
synagogues (Acts 9.2; 22.19); we can also see that, by the time John’s gospel was 
written, there were considerable tensions and followers of Jesus were being thrown 
out of synagogues (Jn 16:2).501  Other Christian communities, however, seemed to 
                                                
500 Gooder, ‘In Search of the Early Church’ 15. 
501 This development also seems to be read back into the tradition at Jn 9:22 and 12:42.  James 
Burtchaell argues that we should understand Christian worship and polity as growing out of the 
synagogue tradition.  For a brief statement of his argument, see James Burtchaell, From Synagogue to 
Church: Public Services and Offices in the Earliest Christian Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) 180–200. 
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centre on the household (Acts 16:15; 1 Cor 16:15).502  The texts of the New 
Testament do not give us a comprehensive picture of early Christian communities’ 
belief and practice, and the snapshots they do give seem to show both variation and 
development in their practices.503  Sharing meals seems to have been an important part 
of early Christian practice (Acts 2:42, 2:46), but it is not clear where straightforward 
table fellowship ends, and celebration of the Lord’s supper begins.504  And although 
Paul gives clear guidelines for celebrating the memorial of the Lord’s supper in 1 Cor 
11, it remains unclear, as Gooder points out, whether or not Paul’s guidelines were 
followed by other Pauline communities, or by non-Pauline communities.505  
Circumcision (Gal 2; Acts 15) and dietary laws (Acts 10:9–16; 11:1–12) also seem to 
have been areas of varying practice and subsequent tensions within and between early 
Christian communities.  Again, what we see in the New Testament witness is not one 
stable, concrete form of the church, but a range of communities related by 
overlapping similarities. 
 
The earliest Christian communities form a family, not because they all believe and 
practice the same things in exactly the same way, nor because they share a clear 
                                                
502 Wayne Meeks argues that ‘The meeting places of the Pauline groups, and probably of most other 
early Christian groups, were private houses.’  He suggests, however, that Paul ‘probably uses kat’ oikon 
to distinguish these individual household-based groups from “the whole church” (hole he ekklesia), 
which could also assemble on occasion (1 Cor 14:23; Rom 16:23; cf. 1 Cor 11:20), or from the still 
larger manifestations of the Christian movement, for which he could use the same term, ekklesia.’ See 
Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1983), 75; see also Meeks’ comments on the ‘whole church’ sense of ekklesia, ibid. 108–10. 
503 Acts 2:44–5 and 4:32, for example, suggest that the early Christians sold all they had and shared the 
proceeds, but it is also clear later on that some members continued to own houses (Acts 21:16; Col 
4:15, against the general practice suggested in Acts 4:34) in which the early Christian communities 
met.  
504 Paul’s criticism of the Corinthians, Gooder argues, ‘suggests a development/change in the 
significance of table fellowship.  In 1 Corinthians 11.22 he suggests that they should eat and drink at 
home and in 11.34 that if they are hungry they should eat first.  Thus the community meal becomes 
more about fellowship than it does about eating; it is the meeting together to remember Jesus that is 
the most important.’  See Gooder, ‘In Search of the Early Church’ 21. 
505 She adds, ‘It is quite possible that Paul has a more normative influence on the church in the twenty-
first century than he ever did on the first-century communities.’  See Gooder, ‘In Search of the Early 
Church’ 16. 
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theological sense of what it means to be church, but because they are recognisable to 
one another.506  They recognise one another because of overlapping similarities in 
their belief and practice, and also because they recognise one another as engaged in 
the same struggle to work out what it means to follow Jesus.  I have suggested that the 
New Testament witness cannot give us a comprehensive picture of one original 
concrete form of the church, to which all others are related as analogies, nor a single 
dominant theological image for the church.  This does not mean, of course, that the 
New Testament witness concerning the church is not significant or authoritative for 
subsequent ecclesiological reflection.  It does mean that we need to clarify how the 
New Testament witness acts as a key example for our explanation of the word 
‘church’.  This will help us to explore in more general terms the significance of 
explaining ‘church’ by giving examples. 
 
  iii) The function of samples 
 
How does the New Testament witness to the faith and practice of the earliest 
Christians guide subsequent ecclesiological reflection?  The temptation to distil some 
essential properties of church from the New Testament witness is a hard one to resist.  
Surely, we think, we can pull out some core practices – fellowship, mission, charity, 
baptism – and create from these a basic understanding of what church should do and 
be, which we can then use as a measuring stick.  We can, and we might, but I want to 
suggest that we should not.  As soon as we begin to abstract away from the 
particularities of the New Testament picture towards a general template of church, we 
begin to lose the significance of explanation by example.  We begin to treat the New 
                                                
506 They greet one another (1 Pet 5:13; Rom 16:16, 23; 1 Cor 16:19), and the fact that apostles (and 
others) can travel between communities and be received in them suggests they recognise one another.  
In Col 4:16, Paul asks that his letter to the community at Colossus be also read in the community at 
Laodicea, and vice versa. 
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Testament as an example in spite of its particularity, rather than because of it.  
Wittgenstein stages a short conversation to make a similar point:  
‘A ruler does measure in spite of its corporeality; of course a ruler which only 
has length would be the Ideal, you might say the pure ruler.’  No, if a body 
has length, there can be no length without a body – and although I realize 
that in a certain sense only the ruler’s length measures, what I put in my 
pocket remains the ruler, the body, and isn’t the length.507 
 
Sometimes, focussing theological attention on the ‘length’ of the New Testament 
account of church rather than on its ‘body’ can be helpful.  But such efforts should 
come with a health warning: there is a risk that we end up putting concepts before 
experience.  What does this mean?  In chapter three, we saw Kirsten Hastrup argue 
that concepts like society and religion are ‘persuasive fictions’.508  They are concepts 
that we use to interpret and express our experience, but the fit between experience 
and theory is not exact.  Some of these concepts become so useful that we 
‘ontologically dump’ them, and begin to think and speak of them as objective realities.  
This process is not a problem in itself, but it can pose difficulties if anthropologists 
forget the ontologically dumped nature of their objects of study, and put definitions 
or concepts, whether these are of ‘society’, ‘religion’ or ‘church’, before the 
experiences they summarise.509  The danger then is that the anthropologist ends up 
investigating their concept rather than exploring the particular experiences that 
produce such abstract concepts in the first place.  If we focus on the ‘length’ of the 
New Testament accounts of church, rather than on their ‘body’, then we risk putting 
our desire for a unified concept of ‘church’ before the experience of the New 
                                                
507 Wittgenstein, PR §81. Baker and Hacker comment, ‘It is extraordinarily hard to recognize that 
concrete objects used as samples in explaining or applying expressions belong to our grammar or our 
method of representation.  We are tempted to think that these objects are merely incidental, that the 
real samples are Platonic or mental entities (e.g. the length of the standard metre, the colour of the 
patch on the chart, or the image of this colour in the mind of the perceiver.)’ Baker and Hacker, 
Meaning and Understanding 114. 
508 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 262. 
509 ‘We should realize that most of what we study in the human sciences are ontologically situated, not 
in the things themselves, but in our experience of them.  Where are the objective entities of “religion,” 
“aesthetics,” or “culture” for instance, if not in our experience of their real, material impact, summed 
up in words, but not represented by them.’  Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 260–1. 
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Testament communities themselves.  These are communities engaged in a struggle to 
work out for themselves, both in their concrete life and in their theological imagery, 
what it means to be a community of believers in Jesus.  They are united – as far as we 
can tell – not by a clear set of characteristics, but a shared desire to gather around the 
person and teaching of Jesus, and a shared sense ‘of the importance of figuring it 
out’.510   
 
The question is, what now?  If the New Testament cannot give us a comprehensive 
account of the form of the earliest Christian communities, or a unified theological 
understanding of them and if, as I have argued, we should not try to distil from the 
information that we have some generic ‘New Testament church’, then how do we 
understand its significance as a key example for explaining ‘church’?  The important 
thing here is to focus our attention on the practice of giving an example.  Take the 
example of a book called The Spotter’s Guide to Dogs.  If we flick through the pages, 
we will find lots of photographs of pedigree dogs, together with descriptions of their 
breed history, physical characteristics, needs and temperaments.  In order for the 
guide to be useful, the dogs in the photographs and descriptions will have to be 
typical examples of their breed, representative of that kind of dog - there would not 
be much sense in including a picture of a three-legged Labrador, for example, because 
it would make us suppose that three legs is characteristic of the breed.  But imagine 
now that I allow a small child to cut around the photograph of the Old English 
Sheepdog and glue it onto a collaged farm scene.  That picture has now ceased to be a 
sample.511  The point here is that, while samples do need to be in some way 
                                                
510 Discussing the concept of Christian ‘identity’, Kathryn Tanner argues that ‘[w]hat unifies Christian 
practices is not…agreement about the beliefs and actions that constitute true discipleship; but a shared 
sense of the importance of figuring it out.’  Tanner, Theories of Culture 152. 
511 Baker and Hacker give the example of taking a sample of carpet from a sample-book in a carpet shop 
and using it to carpet a dolls house.  See Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 99. 
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representative of the group of which they are a sample, calling them a sample 
characterises their role, and not their intrinsic features.512   
 
We use the New Testament accounts of the earliest Christian communities as a key 
example for ecclesiological reflection because we hold that their belief and practice (or 
what we know of it) is (or ought to be) representative of churches in general.  This 
means that we need to focus our theological attention not on the intrinsic features of 
the communities we glimpse through these accounts, but on the role of these 
accounts: the double-sided fact that we recognise ourselves as church because of our 
relation to them, and that we recognise them as church because of their relation to us.  
We look at the New Testament accounts of early Christian communities like we might 
look at an old photograph of a long-dead relative we have never met: we scrutinise 
their face for some likeness with our own, precisely because we already understand 
ourselves to be related to them.  If we want to understand church as an analogical, or 
family resemblance concept, we need to do two things: first, to notice the simple fact 
of our recognition of both the New Testament communities and the ordinary 
communities we encounter and name as church on a day to day basis and, second, to 
reflect theologically on this practice of recognition. 
 
 b) The practice of recognition 
 
The concept of recognition crops up reasonably regularly in Wittgenstein’s work.513  
He uses examples of recognising familiar people, pictures or objects to critique the 
idea that we recognise from mental images or templates, in much the same way as he 
                                                
512 Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 99. 
513 PI §§602–4; Z §§608–10. 
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uses examples of following rules to critique the idea that we follow rules by constant 
mental consultation.  His discussions of recognition and rule-following are also used 
to undermine the idea that thinking, meaning and understanding are mental 
processes, and the idea that we name objects mentally every time we use a word.514  
He writes, 
Asked “Did you recognize your desk when you entered your room this 
morning?” –I should no doubt say “Certainly!”  And yet it would be 
misleading to say that an act of recognition had taken place… It is easy to 
have a false picture of the processes called “recognizing”; as if recognizing 
always consisted in comparing two impressions with one another.  It is as if I 
carried a picture of an object with me and used it to perform an identification 
of an object as the one represented by the picture.515 
 
What Wittgenstein is critiquing here is the philosophical impulse to explain – the idea 
that the regular human activity of remembering or recognising must involve our 
checking things against hypothetical mental images.516  Wittgenstein wants to draw 
our attention away from such speculation, back to the quiet weighing of linguistic 
facts.517 
 
Wittgenstein uses recognition as a critical tool, not a positive theory.  He is not 
suggesting that the unity of the family resemblance concept ‘game’ lies in our ability 
to recognise all games as such, nor that all games share a hypothetical property 
(‘recognisability-as-games’) that make them a family.518  Wittgenstein simply wants to 
focus our attention on the fact – the language-game – of recognition.  In the same 
                                                
514 Z §§605–6: ‘One of the most dangerous of ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think 
with our heads or in our heads.  The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed 
space, gives him something occult.’  See also PI §601 ‘When I talk about this table, –am I remembering 
that this object is called a “table”?’ 
515 PI §602, §604.   
516 Norman Malcolm writes, ‘Philosophical and psychological theories of memory arise because the 
theorists cannot accept this regularity as a plain fact.  They try to explain it by introducing an 
intermediary – a retained mental image, or a physiological trace – to bridge the temporal gap between 
the witnessing and subsequent recollection.  When we scrutinize these intermediaries, we realise that 
they are powerless to do the trick. Malcolm, Wittgenstein 67–8. 
517 Z §447. 
518 ‘If X and Y are each one metre long, then they have the same length, i.e. the length of X is identical 
with the length of Y.  But it does not follow that to say that X and Y have the same length is to say that 
there is some length that they share…’ Baker and Hacker, Meaning and Understanding 181. See BB 55. 
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way, I want to focus attention on the fact of our recognising churches: that we do so 
fairly unreflectingly, that we do so without a mental template or image of what 
church should be, do or look like, and that we can give and accept multiple different 
examples of church.  Like the person sent to buy apples at the beginning of the 
Investigations, we recognise churches not because we have charts of beliefs or colour-
swatches of practices, but because our ordinary acquaintance with particular churches 
gives us the ability to recognise them.  I want to place more theological weight on the 
culturally embedded and Spirit-guided practice of recognition.   
 
  i) Culturally embedded 
 
Talking about discerning church in terms of recognition allows us to acknowledge the 
degree to which naming and recognising church are learned abilities which have 
become intuitively followed practices.519  We recognise churches almost 
unreflectingly, before we realise what is happening.  It is important to acknowledge 
this because it helps us to be reflexive about the cultural assumptions that lie behind 
our recognising of church.  When we acknowledge that we recognise churches (or 
not) because of our own ingrained and culturally particular understandings of what 
churches should be, do and look like, we are better able to hold our own experience, 
with its normative claims about what church should be and do, as relative to its time 
and place.  When we think about identifying the church in terms of holding up 
different churches to a single descriptive and normative template drawn from 
scripture and church tradition, we obscure the degree to which all such normative and 
descriptive templates are deeply implicated in the preoccupations and prejudices of 
                                                
519 See PI §381 ‘How do I know that this colour is red? –It would be an answer to say: “I have learnt 
English”.’ 
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their age.520  
 
More positively, the culturally embedded nature of recognition also shows that it is an 
ability that depends on our ‘socialisation’ into the church.  In the same way as our 
ability to recognise those who are likely to mug us depends on our socialisation into a 
certain sort of urban society – one where we mistrust lone men loitering in dark 
alleys, for example – our ability to recognise church depends on our ‘socialisation’ 
into a community of people who are constantly seeking to understand what it means, 
in faith and practice, to follow Christ.  By making this point, I am not trying to 
suggest that the church is a ‘society’ or culture, nor that only holy people are qualified 
to pronounce on whether or not a given community is faithful or unfaithful, church 
or not-church.521  Rather, I am trying to draw attention to the fact that meaningful use 
of the word ‘church’ is fixed by public criteria, not my private feelings.522  This point 
is important for both my description of church as an analogical concept, and my 
appeal to our ordinary practice of recognising churches.     
 
Earlier on, I suggested that the church was like ‘love’: we can point to examples of it, 
but any attempt to describe love in the abstract results in a definition that has none of 
the concrete character of love.  Yet to say that love cannot be abstractly defined, and 
that it is a matter of recognition, is not to say that we can identify love as being 
present in a situation with no warrant at all, as if mere intuition were enough - we 
cannot reasonably intuit that someone loves someone else in spite of all appearances to 
                                                
520 The question we must always ask such normative templates (as well as our normative examples) is, 
‘Who is it, here, that gets to say what church should be and do?’  See Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s 
comments about the relationship of doctrine and practice in Miroslav Volf’s work, and the assumptions 
it entails, in her Places of Redemption 232.  
521 On the contrary – I will argue below that we may come to a fuller understanding of church by 
exploring the margins of the concept, rather than trying to define its centre.  See below 219–21. 
522 Although Wittgenstein notes that we are not always able to give explanations for concepts when 
asked, but also that this inability does not mean we are not using the word intelligibly most of the time.  
See BB 17. 
 211 
the contrary.  ‘Love’ may be a matter of intuition, but there are public criteria for 
meaningful use of the word.  These public criteria are not a shared understanding of 
the common characteristics of love (there isn’t one), nor the minimum conditions 
necessary for meaningful application of the term (what would they be?).  Nor are the 
rules complete – they allow for improvisation.  In fact, we cannot describe these 
public criteria for the correct use of the word ‘love’ much more precisely than a 
simple appeal to our ‘way of going on’ with the word.   
 
The same points need to be reinforced about our analogical use of the word ‘church’, 
and our recognition of churches.  Knowing what ‘church’ means and being able to 
recognise churches does not mean possessing a definition, but an ability: we show 
that we understand the word ‘church’ by giving meaningful examples.  What 
constitutes a meaningful example of church is governed by public criteria, our way of 
going on with the word.  It is these public criteria to which we might appeal if we 
were to substantiate our recognition of a community as church. We might suggest, for 
example, that we recognise a community as church because it professes belief in Jesus 
as the Son of God, meets regularly to read the Bible, and celebrates a memorial of 
Jesus’ last supper with his disciples.  We would appeal to the well-worn forms of 
Christian life that are part of our way of going on with the word ‘church’.  In doing 
so, we would not be expressing a tacit understanding or definition of church that, in 
some occult way, we referred to every time we recognised a church.  Nor would we 
be appealing to a shared understanding of what church should be, do and look like - a 
sort of lowest common denominator that everyone understands to be church.  What 
we would be appealing to would be our ‘way of going on’ with the word, and our 
common grounds of argument.   
 
 212 
Kathryn Tanner argues that the Christian ‘public’ is constituted not so much by 
common beliefs and practices as by argument around issues of common concern. 
Christians can come together over the forms of things, if not their substance: to take 
Tanner’s example, we may agree that Jesus saves, or that ritual meals should be eaten 
in church, even if we do not agree about the meaning of such statements and 
gestures.523  Yet she also argues that these common forms are not common enough or 
stable enough to form the basis of a once-and-for all definition of the Christian ‘way 
of going on’.524  Tanner argues that, ‘while they set the terms for argument, the forms 
themselves are not immune from questioning as the argument proceeds.’525  She also 
notes that argument does not always arise over the same issues: ‘[a]lmost any element 
of Christian practice has the capacity to become a focus of concern; indeed, every part 
of it has some claim to such a position – as a place, to use specifically theological 
language, where God’s Word or directing Spirit may be heard or felt.’526  Although 
our meaningful use of the term church is moored in a concrete way of going on with 
the word, and governed by common grounds of argument, both these can shift and 
change.  This means, Tanner argues, that there is no way of fixing once and for all 
what faithfulness looks like, or determining what Christian practice will come to 
include or exclude over the course of time.527  There is only a concrete way of going 
on – or, as she puts it, a community of argument.528  This community of argument 
                                                
523 Tanner, Theories of Culture 121–2. 
524 Tanner criticises postliberal appeals to stable ‘rules’ of Christian belief and action in this connection: 
‘Such a strategy for assuring Christian identity is only plausible if the rules can be insulated from the 
vicissitudes of history…In the effort to support the claim of a stable Christian identity, postliberals 
appear to be lifting the rules out of the ongoing historical processes that formed them, as if, once 
produced, they could not be altered by the same processes in the future.’  Tanner, Theories of Culture 
138–9.   
525 Tanner, Theories of Culture 127. 
526 Tanner, Theories of Culture 127. 
527 ‘One may sum up what Christianity stands for in the process of judging what one must do here and 
now.  But, since the Word of God is a free Word, the meaning of discipleship – what it really means to 
be a Christian – cannot be summed up in any neat formula that would allow one to know already what 
Christian discipleship will prove to include or exclude over the course of time.’  Tanner, Theories of 
Culture 155. 
528 Tanner, Theories of Culture 156.  Amy Plantinga Pauw criticises Tanner’s idea of a community of 
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has its unity not on the basis of some red thread of common practice and belief 
stretched across the centuries, but by the fact that we recognise one another as 
engaged in the same struggle to work out, for our own time and place, what it means 
to be followers of Jesus. 
 
Our ability to recognise churches, then, is both enabled and constrained by our 
position ‘in the middle’.  Acknowledging the culturally embedded nature of our 
recognition of church is important.  It helps us to realise that our understanding of 
what church should be, do and look like is limited by our time and place, and 
informed as much by our cultural milieu as our theological convictions.529  This, in 
turn, helps us to acknowledge the provisional character of our ecclesiological 
constructions and judgements.  But acknowledging the culturally embedded character 
of our practice of recognition is not just about a methodological commitment to 
reflexivity.  It is also a theological conviction, for if the Holy Spirit guides the church 
into the fullness of the truth, then she does so in and through (and sometimes in spite 
of) our actual process of recognition, not through the definition that we think we 
ought to have.530  This means we need to talk more about the role of the Spirit.   
                                                                                                                                     
argument: ‘On its own, ‘community of argument’ is of course not an adequate ecclesial image, either 
empirically or theologically. The vast majority of Christians have never participated in the kind of ‘open 
debate’ Tanner advocates regarding ecclesial beliefs and practices, and do not have anything like her 
rich and nuanced knowledge of the tradition with which to fund their arguments.’  She does, however, 
suggest that reference to a ‘community of argument’ is an important way of balancing Tanner’s appeal 
to a community of mutual fulfillment: see Pauw, ‘Ecclesiological Reflections on Kathryn Tanner’s Jesus, 
Humanity and the Trinity’ Scottish Journal of Theology 57:2 (2004): 221–27 (226–7). Tanner 
responds to Pauw’s criticism in her ‘Church and Action’, the conclusion of which I cite above 108–9.  
529 Healy draws attention to the way in which Christians ‘pick and choose’ their beliefs and practices, 
not just from the resources of the church, but also from the resources of their own particular cultural 
milieu.  See Healy, ‘Chastened Ecclesiology’ 12. 
530 This theological commitment to ordinary faith I draw from Rahner: ‘Moreover, it is the faith in the 
Church that actually exists in heads and hearts, and not properly official Church doctrine, that 
immediately and in itself is the faith that constitutes the church… We may not judge this faith by its 
objective verbal contents.  Even when its objectification in words and concepts is very poor and 
deficient it is still God’s action in us, constituted by the self-communication of God in the Holy Spirit.  
The depositum fidei is not first and foremost a sum of statements formulated in human language.  It is 
God’s Spirit, irrevocably communicated to humankind, activating in persons the salutary faith that they 
really possess.  Of course, the same Spirit also brings forth in this way the community of the faithful, in 
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  ii) Spirit guided 
 
Attending to our ordinary practice of recognising church helps us to recognise the in 
via character of our knowledge of the church, and our judgements about it.  I want to 
suggest here that attending to the practice of recognition might also give us a richer 
theological language for talking about how we discern and identify church.  We will 
explore some of the theological potential of the concept of recognition, first by 
looking briefly at its use in the ecumenical movement, and then by looking at the role 
of the Holy Spirit. 
 
Recognition is a concept with some theological pedigree.  When the Baptism, 
Eucharist and Ministry documents were sent out to local churches in 1982, the 
questions for reflection that accompanied the text centred on recognition: whether 
local churches recognised their own faith in these documents, and whether they could 
recognise them as representing the faith of the wider church.531  Although the concept 
of recognition appeared in a number of ecumenical exchanges and documents, the 
concept never became the focus of sustained and explicit theological attention in its 
own right.  Gerard Kelly points out that this resulted in a number of different 
understandings of the term.532  On one hand, ‘recognition’ meant one church 
acknowledging another’s belief and practice to be authentic or legitimate on the basis 
                                                                                                                                     
which the unity and fullness of Christian faith are objectified and brought to consciousness in what we 
perceive as the official faith of the institutional Church.  Nevertheless, what really matters above all is 
the faith that really lives in the ordinary Christian.  That is the faith that actually saves, in which God 
communicates himself to humanity, however pitiful and fragmentary its conceptualization may be.’  
See Rahner, ‘What the Church Teaches’ 169–70.  Rahner therefore argues that ordinary faith is 
normative (properly understood, he adds) for both official church teaching and theological reflection 
(175).   
531 See the preface to the World Council of Churches’ Faith and Order Commission, ‘Paper No. 111 
Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry,’ (1982). 
532 Gerard Kelly, Recognition: Advancing Ecumenical Thinking (New York: Peter Lang, 1996) 26. 
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of an existing underlying unity or understanding shared by both.  It is recognition of 
similarity – recognition of unity in spite of difference.  Paul VI, for example, writes 
that ‘[r]ecognition means that churches can see that, beyond the different words and 
the different theological expressions, the one and unique apostolic faith is being 
professed.’533  In Catholic-Lutheran dialogues, on the other hand, recognition was 
more about recognising differences between the two communions.534  It took on a 
more juridical meaning, referring to the way in which the other’s offices, sacraments 
or ministries might be recognised as legitimate and authentic in their difference, 
rather than in spite of them.  In his Church of Churches, Jean Marie Tillard also 
suggests that recognition is not a ‘simple juridical process but a genuine spiritual 
process’:  
In this encounter of one church with another there is always the possibility 
that it may come to apprehend its own faith in a new way.  This process of 
“re-cognition” is not a once-for-all-event, but continues throughout the life 
of the church.535  
 
Understanding recognition as a genuinely spiritual process has a great deal to offer the 
understanding of the church and ecclesiology that I have developed thus far.  When 
communities recognise one another as church, this may mean there are substantial 
and concrete similarities between their belief and practice.  Yet recognition need not 
be recognition of an underlying unity, a lowest common denominator of belief and 
practice to which both communities can agree.  It can be the recognition of 
difference, in style or substance, which challenges our understanding of what church 
should be and do.  Recognition is also ‘re-cognition’, as Tillard has it – in 
encountering those whose faithfulness takes a different shape from our own, we are 
engaged in a constant process of re-thinking the church.   
 
                                                
533 Kelly, Recognition 12. 
534 Kelly, Recognition 25. 
535 Kelly, Recognition 14–15. 
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 This idea of recognition across difference resonates with some of the anthropological 
ideas we encountered in chapter three.  We saw there that ethnographic texts work by 
pointing out differences in human experience, and in doing so they depend on what 
James Clifford calls an ‘abstract plane of similarity’.536  In coming to understand 
others’ lives, as Clifford puts it, ‘a difference is posited and transcended’.537  This is 
what makes ethnographic texts allegorical: they constantly shuttle between the 
unfamiliar world of the objects of study, and the familiar world of the reader.  This is 
partly because of the way human beings understand things: we understand what we 
do not know in terms of what we do.  What good ethnography shows us is that this 
allegorical way of understanding does not mean that we never grow in understanding 
of ourselves or others: rather, in encountering others and understanding them, we 
expand our sense of what being human means.538  Anthropology is possible because 
we are imaginable to one another.539 I suggest that we should understand this process 
of recognition and re-cognition as a place of the Spirit’s working, and our 
‘imaginability’ to one another as a gift of the Spirit. 
                                                
536 Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’ 101. For Wittgenstein, agreement in forms of life is the basis of 
understanding.  He writes, ‘The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by which we 
interpret an unknown language.’  PI §206.  Fergus Kerr comments on the difference between Donald 
Davidson and Wittgenstein in this respect: for Davidson, shared beliefs are what produce understanding 
across difference, for Wittgenstein, agreement in forms of life is the basis of understanding: ‘For 
Davidson, to think of a conceptual framework is to think of a language; but for Wittgenstein, to think 
of a language is to think of some activity…’.  See Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein 106–9. 
537 Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’ 99.  
538 Joel Robbins writes very interestingly on the way in which anthropology and theology ‘mock’ one 
another.  Anthropology mocks theology by discovering and demonstrating ‘that there are viable ways 
of conceiving and living life that are different from their own’.  Theologians mock anthropologists ‘by 
the confidence they have that the differences they find are really fundamental ones that point to wholly 
different ways of living—a fact which, as I will show, should be a matter of theoretical concern for 
anthropologists—and by their sense that their committed readers really might take the bait and let these 
differences transform their lives—a belief that makes the critical force of theology far more palpable in 
print than its tends to be in anthropological writing these days.’  See Joel Robbins, ‘Anthropology and 
Theology: An Awkward Relationship?’ Anthropological Quarterly 81 (2008): 285–94 (288).  His idea 
of disciplines ‘mocking’ one another comes from Marilyn Strathern, ‘An Awkward Relationship: The 
Case of Feminism and Anthropology,’ Signs 12:2 (1987): 276–92. 
539 Hastrup writes,  ‘The practice of anthropology presupposes the possibility of human understanding 
across manifest difference; there is a basic assumption that people are imaginable to one another.  We 
could phrase it like this: people do not live in different worlds, they live differently in the world.  Part 
of what we share is an experience of relativity; conceptual or epistemic relativity, that is, not 
ontological incommensurability.’  See Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context' 260. 
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In John’s gospel, the Spirit is portrayed as the Spirit of Christ.540  Set as a seal on Jesus 
(6:27) at his baptism (1:32–4) and present throughout his ministry, the Spirit is 
associated most of all with Jesus’ glorification and return to the Father.541  Just as Jesus 
stands in an exclusive relationship to the Father, as the only one who can reveal the 
Father (1:18) and the only one through whom the Father can be known (14:6), the 
Spirit stands in an exclusive relationship to Christ: all that the Spirit reveals is taken 
from Christ, and the Spirit guides believers into the fullness of the truth (16:13).542  
The Father and Jesus are one, and Jesus and the Spirit are one.543  After Jesus’ return to 
the Father, then, the Spirit has a special relation to those who believe in Jesus.  In 
relation to the believing community, the Spirit is described as the Spirit of truth 
(14:16–17), the teacher (14:26), and the witness to Christ (15:26).  Dwelling in 
believers (14:17), the Spirit is given to guide believers into the fullness of truth 
(16:13).  Yet although everything the Spirit reveals will be taken from what is 
Christ’s, just as all Christ teaches is from the Father (14:15), the Spirit is not a sort of 
caretaker, whose task is merely to keep the believing community faithful to a 
revelation received in the past.  The Spirit continues to guide believers into truth, into 
                                                
540 It should be noted that there is considerable scholarly debate, and not a great deal of consensus, over 
the relationship of the Spirit to Christ, and the nature of the Spirit’s work in testifying to Christ.  A clear 
summary of the major positions on the meaning of the Greek παρακλετος can be found in Tricia 
Gates Brown, Spirit in the Writings of John: Johannine Pneumatology in Social-Scientific Perspective 
(London: T & T Clark, 2003), 170–234. Brown herself prefers to translate the word as mediator or 
broker (181), and to characterise role of the Paraclete in John in those terms: as a broker who 
guarantees exclusive access to a benefactor.  See her survey of other scholarly positions in Spirit in the 
Writings of John 182–6, and her own exegesis of relevant passages in 186–232.  It should be noted 
that the lack of scholarly consensus over the role of the Spirit in John includes challenges to the 
identification of the Paraclete with the Spirit.  See Brown, The Anchor Bible: The Gospel According to 
John (XIII–XXI) (New York: Doubleday, 1970) 653 and the fuller discussion in 1135–44. 
541 Indeed, as a commentary on Jesus’ words about living water, John adds ‘He was speaking of the 
Spirit which those who believed in him were to receive; for there was no Spirit as yet, because Jesus 
had not been glorified’ (7:39).  See also 16:7, where Jesus states that if he does not return to the Father, 
the Advocate will not come. 
542 Believers must be born of water and the Spirit (Jn 3:5), and true worship of God is worship in the 
Spirit (Jn 4:23).   
543As Raymond Brown puts it, ‘Jesus bore God’s name (xvii 11, 12) because he was the revelation of 
God to men; the Spirit is sent in Jesus’ name because he unfolds the meaning of Jesus to men.’  Brown, 
The Gospel According to John 653. 
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a fuller understanding of what Jesus has revealed: ‘I still have many things to say to 
you, but you cannot bear them now.  When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide 
you into all the truth…’ (16:12–13).544  I want to suggest here that the ongoing 
presence of the Spirit with the believing community as teacher, advocate and witness 
to Christ is what guides the constant process of recognition and re-cognition, in 
which we affirm continuity with the faith and practice of others before and around us, 
and re-examine our own faithfulness in light of theirs.  Recognition of others as 
church is recognition in the Spirit: as the child in Elizabeth leaps at the presence of the 
unborn Jesus (Lk 1:44), so the Spirit leaps in us as we recognise others as church.  
When recognising others as church causes us to re-think what church should be, do or 
look like, this re-cognition is also the work of the Spirit, guiding us into a fuller 
understanding of what it means to follow Christ.   
 
  iii) The Spirit of truth and cultural consensus 
 
Although it is important to see our ordinary practice of recognition as a place of the 
Spirit’s working, it would be a mistake to necessarily (or too closely) equate the 
Spirit’s guiding of the church with the church’s general direction, or with the 
prevailing cultural consensus about what church should be or do.  We only have to 
look at the churches’ implication in slavery and racism to see that Christian intuition 
owes as much to local prejudice as the Spirit’s inspiration.545  In order to address this 
worry, we need to look at the relationship between the culturally embedded and Spirit 
guided aspects of recognition.  To do this, we return to Wittgenstein again for some 
                                                
544 Raymond Brown translates, ‘he will guide you along the way of all truth’, and adds that ‘Guidance 
along the way of truth is guidance to the mystery of Jesus who is the truth (John xiv 6).’  See Brown, 
The Gospel According to John 707, 715.   
545 See Kathryn Tanner’s cautions on appeals to Christian intuition and the example of slavery in Tanner, 




In his ‘The Truth Behind Practices’, Christopher Insole critiques what he sees as a 
common misuse of Wittgenstein by theologians.  Such theologians – among whom he 
includes Yoder and Hauerwas – understand Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning well 
enough, and the connection it makes between the use of a word or expression in a 
community and its meaning.  Their misstep, he suggests, is to introduce truth into the 
equation, and suggest that truth is whatever a community understands to be justified. 
Truth then becomes immanent to forms of life.546  Insole suggests that there are two 
ways of understanding Wittgenstein’s idea of a practice (or language-game), and that 
very different things happen to the concept of ‘truth’ depending on which way we 
follow.  The first option is to say that practices are something an actual community 
does.  So, if the community intends that ‘to shop’ means ‘to exchange money for 
goods’, that is what it means – the connection between word and action persists as 
long as the community intends it.547  The second option is to say that words and 
actions are joined up by ‘…a way of going on which is repeatable and in principle 
communicable, with criteria for correctness that are public, over and above what 
simply ‘feels right’ according to my intentions.’548  Insole points out: 
Very different things happen to the concept of truth, depending on which 
option one takes on the interpretation of ‘practice’.  If one reads ‘practice’ as 
an actual community (such as the Church, for instance), then the truth about 
what it is to ‘go on in the same way’ with any concept is given by the 
collective consent of the members of that community.  On this 
interpretation, truth is rendered a collective construct.549 
 
But if a practice is simply a ‘way of going on’ that is communicable, repeatable and 
has public criteria for its correctness, then the concept of truth is quite different:  
                                                
546 Insole, ‘Truth Behind Practices’ 366–7, 372–3. 
547 Insole, ‘Truth Behind Practices' 369. 
548 Insole, ‘Truth Behind Practices’ 369. 
549 Insole, ‘Truth Behind Practices’ 372. 
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Such a reading of ‘practice’ has no ambitions to collapse truth into our 
practices, or for any grand theory about the nature of truth: it simply leaves 
open the possibility that truth transcends the beliefs of a particular 
community…When, in a community of language users, we learn correct use 
of the concept ‘truth’, what we learn is not the consensus of the community, 
but precisely a linguistic gesture outside of this consensus.550 
 
Truth, according to the second interpretation of Wittgenstein on practices, is a 
‘linguistic gesture outside of consensus.’551  Appealing to the truth is not appealing to 
a body of knowledge, and nor is it appealing to whatever a given group of people 
believe to be true.  Appealing to the truth is appealing to a standard that relativises our 
beliefs.552  In the same way, while we can appeal to the Spirit of truth’s guiding 
presence in the church, we cannot equate the Spirit’s guiding with popular consensus 
– however tempting it may be to do so.  It would be wrong, for example, to say that 
because 98% of Roman Catholics do not think that artificial contraception is wrong, 
that the Spirit has clearly shown her hand on the matter.  Equally, however – and 
apposite in the context of the same example - we must not equate the Spirit’s guiding 
with a body of knowledge that can be possessed, controlled or dispensed by any 
ecclesiastical or worldly authority.553  An appeal to the Spirit of Christ is not an appeal 
to Christ’s last will and testament, left in the hands of a trusted few, but an appeal to 
                                                
550 Insole, ‘Truth Behind Practices’ 373. 
551 Insole, ‘Truth Behind Practices’ 370.  
552 The truth to which we appeal may or may not be knowable, but it is used the same way in both 
respects.  Compare the statements, ‘I believe Rusty slept on the sofa while I was out, but it might not be 
true’, and ‘It is not true that raindrops are tear-shaped in mid air, they are in fact spherical.’ 
553 In connection with this discussion, it is interesting to note the relationship between truth, consensus 
and authority in the sensus fidelium as explored in Lumen Gentium: the church cannot err (e.g. 
believes truly) when, the body of the faithful, under the guidance of the Magisterium, manifests 
consensus on a matter of faith or morals (Lumen Gentium §12).  In the wake of the widespread non-
reception of Humane Vitae, Familiaris Consortio clarifies that ‘the "supernatural sense of faith" (13) 
however does not consist solely or necessarily in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the 
Church seeks the truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.’ (Familiaris Consortio 
§5). On the basis of such statements, one wonders whether lay belief and practice could ever diverge 
from that of the Magisterium without being thought of as somehow deficient thereby. While Familiaris 
Consortio maintains, in the preceding paragraph, that the discernment of the sense of the faith is given 
to all the faithful, the variety of gifts and charisms that it invokes seems to render the laity’s sense of the 
faith effectively meaningless: where it diverges from the teaching of the Magisterium, it is simply 
wrong.  I have suggested that our ability to discern the church is both culturally embedded and Spirit 
guided.  Being culturally embedded in our concrete ‘way of going on’, our sense of faithfulness 
certainly relates to consensus.  But my suggestion that the church itself is an emergent reality, whose 
truth unfolds over time as successive generations work out what it means to follow Christ, might also 
allow us to understand the sensus fidelium as expressing itself through dissent and change. 
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his living presence, and to his coming judgement.  An appeal to the Spirit, then, is an 
appeal to that final revelation that will come when we will see all things as they truly 
are, because we will see them in God.  
 
So what is the gift of the Spirit of truth to the church in via?  The guiding Spirit of 
truth is what gives the church the ability to go on together: she is the Spirit of 
communion.  Our common appeal to the Spirit of truth involves a mutual openness to 
judgement.  Where lengthy and heart-searching discernment still leaves me at odds 
with my neighbour on a matter of belief or practice, our common appeal to the 
guiding Spirit of Christ, who will judge all, is what might keep me in church 
alongside them.  The Spirit’s guiding does not happen somehow ‘underneath’ or in 
spite of such disagreements, but in and through them.  The guidance of the Spirit 




At the end of chapter three, I suggested that pragmatic/relational ethnography could 
help us to theologically develop our understanding of the concrete church and our 
understanding of the task of ecclesiology, by encouraging us to make the connection 
between how we know, and what we know.  So far in this chapter, I have used 
Wittgenstein to draw attention to the ordinary ways in which we talk about and 
recognise church, and have reflected on two ways we might reflect on this 
theologically: through thinking of church as an analogical concept, and through 
putting more theological weight on the culturally embedded and Spirit guided 
practice of recognition.  Sanks argues that understanding church as an analogical 
                                                
554 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology' 140. 
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concept gives us a way of getting beyond the sort of dichotomous thinking that 
expects the church to be always and everywhere the same.  Instead of thinking in 
terms of church/not church, we can think of relationships of likeness to a focal 
meaning or prime analogate.  I used Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance 
concepts to push this idea a little further: instead of thinking about likeness 
‘vertically’, in relation to a single prime analogate or focal meaning, we can think of 
likeness ‘horizontally’, in terms of a family resemblance concept, constituted by 
multiple overlapping similarities that crop up and disappear.  The church has its unity, 
I have suggested, because we recognise one another as engaged in the same struggle to 
work out what it means to follow Christ.  I then moved on to reflect on the idea of 
recognition itself.  I argued that it was theologically significant not just that there are 
likenesses, but that we recognise others as engaged in this same struggle – others are 
imaginable to us, not just in their similarity, but in their difference.  I suggested that 
our recognition of others as church needed to be warranted by reference to common 
grounds of argument.  I then went on to explore the concept of recognition through 
briefly looking at its use in ecumenical dialogue, and then exploring the role of the 
Spirit in making us imaginable to one another, and guiding us into a fuller 
understanding of what it means to follow Christ.  Drawing on Wittgenstein again 
helped me to clarify the relationship between the guidance of the Spirit and cultural 
consensus.  What I want to do now is look more closely at how the in-the-middle 
character of our knowledge of the church might affect how we understand the 
purpose of ecclesiological reflection. 
 
c) The purpose of ecclesiological reflection 
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I suggested earlier on that ecclesiology has often been understood as a sort of science 
of ecclesiality, whose task is to discuss and define the essential characteristics that 
‘make’ the church.  This focus on defining the church can be apologetic, prompted by 
a specific pastoral situation that requires us to restate what the church should be, do 
and look like, but it can equally be found in more constructive studies that set out to 
theologically explore the church’s essential identity.  Concrete ecclesiologies are 
already moving away from this, by avoiding essentialist accounts of church and 
focussing their theological attention on particular church communities.  Following in 
their footsteps, I have begun to sketch out what an alternative approach to exploring 
ecclesiality might look like.  Rather than explaining ‘church’ by producing a Merkmal 
definition, I have suggested we could follow Wittgenstein in explaining church by 
giving examples, and exploring how these examples are analogically related as a sort 
of family.  The aim has been to join up how we know with what we know, and 
develop a way of exploring ecclesiality that builds on the in-the-middle character of 
our knowledge of the church.   
 
At the end of chapter three, I suggested three similarities between theology and 
ethnography, which highlighted the ‘in-the-middle’ character of their mode of 
knowing, and the temporary character of their knowledge.  Both disciplines, I 
suggested, were personally involving: knowing the reality of the church, like knowing 
any social real, involves being ‘committed in the body’.555  Both disciplines also find 
their language characterised and constrained by their position in-the-middle.  Neither 
theologians nor ethnographers have access to an objective view of the whole which 
could serve as a measuring rod for their constructions: they only know the inadequacy 
of their language ‘from the inside’.  Both disciplines also find themselves constantly 
                                                
555 Jenkins, ‘Fieldwork’ 451. 
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having to break and reshape their language in order to do justice to living realities that 
will always outrun their capacity to describe them.  In this chapter, I have picked up 
on these three characteristics and explored how ecclesiological knowledge is, like the 
church itself, in via: in-the-middle and on-the-way.  Drawing this out in three 
respects will help to develop, if only briefly, an account of the purpose of 
ecclesiological reflection. 
 
  i) Abstracting and expressive theory 
 
In chapter three, we saw pragmatic/relational ethnographers describe the object of 
ethnographic inquiry as abstract, or ontologically dumped.  On one hand, this was a 
way of highlighting the limited nature of anthropological knowledge: an account of 
the social real can only be produced by abstracting away from particular encounters 
towards a picture of the whole, and that picture is itself an abstract construct.  On the 
other hand, though, it was a way of highlighting the unique value of anthropological 
knowledge as expressive rather than designative theory.  Designative theories, Hastrup 
suggests, point out things about their objects.  The objects are naturalized, and 
theories can be judged by how well they measure up to the object.556  Hastrup 
suggests that ethnographic theory should be understood as expressive.557  Expressive 
theories do not point to things about the world, but express or realise things about the 
world.  Although ‘what is made expressed is made manifest only by this expression’, 
                                                
556 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 265.  The distinction between designative and expressive theory 
comes from Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985) 218ff. 
557 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 265–6. 
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reality is not exhausted by the expression, as it may only communicate a fraction of 
what is available to experience.558   
 
The argument of this chapter thus far has suggested that we might also think of 
ecclesiology’s task as expressing the reality of the church, rather than designating it.  I 
have proposed that church is an analogical, or family resemblance concept.  Rather 
than explaining the meaning of church by pointing to the essential characteristics of 
belief and practice shared by all churches, we explain it by giving concrete examples.  
These examples manifest or express the reality of the church, but they do not exhaust 
it – neither individually, nor all taken together.  We are unable to wholly grasp the 
reality of the church.  This is partly because we are limited by our time and place, and 
so unable to grasp the concrete reality of the church in its historical and geographical 
complexity.  It is partly because we human creatures in via, and so limited in our 
ability to discern and understand God’s action and purposes.  It is also, I have 
suggested, because the reality of the church is itself still unfolding, guided by the 
ongoing presence of the Spirit.  By exploring different examples of church as 
likenesses of one another, ecclesiology can serve the church’s ongoing practices of 
recognition and re-cognition: the processes of recognition by which we establish our 
likeness to those forms of church behind and around us, and the processes of re-
cognition by which we work out what it means to be faithful in our own time and 
place, and thus grow towards the fullness of the truth.  Ecclesiologists are called to be 
both pilgrims and cartographers.559 
 
                                                
558 Hastrup, ‘Religion in Context’ 265. A good example of such a theory might be wave and particle 
theories of light in physics.  Both express something about the way in which light can be observed to 
behave, and neither theory expresses either what the other theory expresses, or the whole of what can 
be observed. 
559 This is Geertz’s description of the anthropological vocation.  See Geertz, Works and Lives 10. 
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   ii) Constructing and the role of wholes 
 
Pragmatic/relational ethnography, as we saw in chapter three, has the same emphasis 
on the constructed nature of ethnographic knowledge, and we saw that ethnography’s 
object of inquiry can be understood as a construct.  This was, again, a way of making 
the connection between how ethnographic knowledge is gained, through fieldwork, 
and what is thereby known.  Ethnographic knowledge is gained by the ethnographer 
creating relationships, entering into particular social roles and situating themselves ‘in 
the amorphous field between subjective and objective’.560  From these particular 
positions, the ethnographer can construct a picture of the whole – a whole that may 
be only inchoately sensed, if at all, by the social actors themselves.   
 
I want to suggest here that acknowledging the constructing character of ecclesiological 
reflection might be helpful.  I have already argued above that our understanding of the 
church is necessarily partial, limited by our place in our particular social, geographical 
and historical context, and it advances as we abstract and construct our way towards a 
fuller picture of the whole.  Although concrete ecclesiologies emphasise the 
importance of focussing theological reflection on the level of the particular, I want to 
suggest that ecclesiology also quite properly deals with wholes.  It does so because it is 
not just a descriptive discipline, but also a normative one.  Ecclesiological reflection, as 
I have already noted, often occurs when some concrete pastoral situation requires us 
to clarify what the church should be, do or look like.  Ecclesiological reflection might 
be prompted, for example, by concrete questions like how the parish council should 
spend a large bequest, or whether a Roman Catholic parish can invite a local 
Methodist minister, who happens to be a woman, to preach at mass during the Week 
                                                
560 Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 141. 
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of Prayer for Christian Unity.  In discussing these questions, it is likely that we would 
want to set these problems in the context of wider patterns of church practice or 
belief, identify major theological issues at stake, refer to the New Testament witness to 
the early Christian communities’ belief and practice, cite historical similarities or point 
out departure from historical precedent.  We might even want to appeal to more 
abstract definitions of what the church should be, do and look like – naming what we 
understand to be the identifying marks of the church’s belief and practice, for 
example.  In all these cases, we will be setting the particular problem in view of a 
larger whole, and coming to some judgement about what we should do.  In 
ecclesiology, setting particular problems in the context of a larger whole allows us to 
come to judgements about what is faithful belief and practice, and what is not, what is 
faithful development and what is departure from the gospel, what is church and what 
is not-church.  The key is not to identify the wholes we construct with the whole view 
of the church’s concrete life and theological mystery that belongs only to God.  
 
  iii) Emerging realities and searching for church 
 
Finally, we saw in chapter three that pragmatic/relational anthropologists understand 
their object of inquiry as emergent.  The social real is real, but not in the sense of 
being an objective, stable reality that can be observed as a whole from some vantage 
point outside it.  Rather, the reality of the social emerges as people interact, 
interpreting one another’s behaviour and expressing their experience, and in doing so 
draw on and are constrained by enduring assumptions and categories.  The 
anthropologist maps this real, which ‘persists far longer than events, personalities or 
interpretations’ by placing him or herself in the ‘field of tension’ between the shared 
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world of the social and the subjective accounts of the individual.561  The map thus 
produced is not identifiable with the social territory itself: it expresses it, but does not 
exhaust it.  The reality of the social, then, is manifested not just in the adequacy of 
ethnographic descriptions and analyses, but also in our experience of their 
inadequacy.  It is when we experience the incompleteness of our ethnographic 
constructs that the social real emerges as something that outlasts our own 
interpretation and experience.   
 
The argument of the chapter thus far has suggested that ecclesiologists, too, might 
want to think of their object of inquiry as emergent.  I have suggested that, while we 
may name and describe the church, we will always lack the mot juste – the overall 
view of the whole that would allow us to specify precisely how our descriptions fall 
short.  I have highlighted that, although we can map the church through providing 
concrete examples, we can never do so finally or comprehensively.  Here, I want to 
extend these suggestions just a little further, and suggest what they might mean for 
how we understand the purpose of ecclesiological reflection.  If the church is 
emergent, then its reality is not just what we capture in the adequacy of our 
theological and ethnographic categories: it is also what we experience when they 
fail.562  It is in these failures that the reality of the church is glimpsed as something that 
                                                
561 Jenkins, Religion in English Everyday Life 12; Hastrup, ‘Social Anthropology’ 140.  She writes, ‘The 
resulting complexity of the social space, which is a kind of bottom-up causality (not to be confounded 
with individualism), cannot be observed as a whole, but it can be perceived when anthropologists place 
themselves in the field of tension between the individual and the social in the same way as the local 
protagonists. Because the social is not (only) a collection of facts, but also the instituting processes and 
the connections between them, it cannot be observed or documented as such. This does not mean that 
it is unreal, only that its reality must be expressed in theoretical terms. In that sense, it has to be 
written; anthropology cannot revert to modernist assumptions of direct access to objective realities and 
representations.’ 
562 Jinkins is getting at something similar when he writes, ‘…the creative potential to expand our 
understanding of the church lies not in reading into the church’s history a uniformity (or, even, a 
taxonomy) that was never there and trying to develop taxonomies that reflect only this nonexistent 
uniformity (or harmony).  Rather, it lies in detecting the places of paradox and contradiction in our 
theoretical categories, in describing their nature, and in pressing them further.’  See Jinkins, The 
Church Faces Death 64. 
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outreaches both our theological constructions and ethnographic observations.  If what 
I have argued here holds true, then perhaps ecclesiology should focus less on 
determining what the church essentially is, whether we conceive of that as an 
objectively existing ideal, or as a lowest common denominator of shared 
characteristics and practices on a concrete level.  If we experience the reality of the 
church when our certainties about it are called into question, then perhaps our 
ecclesiology should be focussed on exploring the margins of ecclesiality as well as 
defining its centre.  Ecclesiological reflection would then become not just a centripetal 
force, but a centrifugal one: it would be focussed not just on drawing together 
accounts of church, exploring their likenesses and discussing essential ecclesial 
identity, but also on cataloguing the different ways in which ‘church’ is used and 
understood, and so helping us to engage in a constant process of breaking and 




This chapter set out to develop concrete ecclesiologies’ understandings of their object 
of inquiry, the concrete church, and their purpose in undertaking ecclesiological 
reflection.  I suggested that the best way to do this might be to follow the lead of 
pragmatic/relational ethnography, and join up the ‘how’ of our knowing the church 
with an account of what we know, and the nature of our inquiry.  Exploring 
Wittgenstein’s attempts to bring philosophy’s attention back to the rough ground of 
everyday linguistic practice helped us to square theological attention on the ordinary 
ways in which we use the concept ‘church’ and recognise churches.  I followed Sanks 
in suggesting that church should be understood as an analogical concept, and then 
explored how the accounts of early Christian communities in the New Testament 
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might help us to develop what I called a ‘horizontal’ understanding of analogy, more 
akin to Wittgenstein’s idea of a family resemblance concept.  After some comments 
about the role of samples in ecclesiology, I moved on to reflect on the theological 
significance of our ordinary practices of recognising churches.  I argued that we 
should understand these processes of recognition as both culturally embedded and 
Spirit guided, and explored the relationship between the two.  The chapter concluded 
by drawing some conclusions about how we should understand the purpose of 
ecclesiological inquiry.  I have argued throughout the chapter that we should not 
think of the purpose of ecclesiology as defining the church, if that means trying to fix 
the characteristics of belief and practice common to all that we call church.  What has 
emerged instead is an understanding of ecclesiology’s purpose as something more like 
searching for the church.  Basil Hume says something similar about the task of 
monastic contemplation: 
Contemplation is not just looking at God; for most of us, now in via, it 
consists in looking for God, and if from time to time some ‘sight’ of him is 
accorded, this will only be a glimmer granted by grace in what will always be 
a ‘cloud of unknowing’.563  
  
Ecclesiology is not the task of looking at the church: for us, in via it is the task of 
looking for the church.  The task of ecclesiology is to engage in a constant process of 
encountering the diversity of Christian belief and practice, exploring similarities, 
charting differences, tracing relationships and family resemblances, showing how 
different forms of Christian faithfulness can be imaginable to one another and, 
through this process, constantly re-thinking what it means to faithfully follow Christ 
in every age and place. 
 
 
                                                











































Titles are dangerous things: they are too easily chosen.  Once chosen, I began 
to have doubts: was it really appropriate to discuss what seemed, the more I 
looked at it, a rather naïve or childish question?564 
 
This thesis began with the simple question, ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’  As a research 
question, at least, it seems rather naïve or childish – not a particularly good starting 
point for a doctoral thesis.  Yet Nicholas Lash suggests that it may be the job of the 
theologian to address such childish questions.  Small children, he notes, are not old 
and learned enough to be experts, nor have they experienced or suffered enough to be 
wise.  Nevertheless, small children do ask fundamental questions as a matter of 
personal concern.  Theologians, he adds, are usually elderly enough to have a measure 
of scholarly expertise and some of the wisdom that comes from experience and 
suffering.  Yet Lash suggests that it is ‘part of the theologian’s responsibility, a 
function of his expertise and his measure of wisdom, to try to ask, and to help other 
people to ask, fundamental questions as a matter of personal concern.’565  ‘What’s 
ecclesiology about?’ may not be a good question, but it is a fundamental one, and it 
has been both asked and answered in this thesis as a matter of personal concern.  
 
 a) A fundamental question? 
 
There are such things as fundamental theological questions, but we usually think of 
these as things like ‘Why do bad things happen to good people?’ and (especially for 
children) ‘Do pets go to heaven?’  The question I have addressed in this thesis does 
not seem to be one of them: ‘What’s ecclesiology about?’ is neither asked by children, 
                                                
564 Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: SCM, 1986) 3. 
565 Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus 3. 
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nor worried about by adults.  Yet this thesis has shown that the question really is 
fundamental, and that ecclesiology really is a matter of personal concern. 
 
I have traced the rise of ecclesiology in late twentieth century theology from being a 
discrete sub-discipline of systematic theology to being the new fundamental theology.  
I have shown how, for many theologians in Europe and North America, ecclesiology 
has become the convergence point for a number of pressing concerns: concerns about 
secularisation and the justification of Christian truth claims, and concerns about the 
authority and power of the theologian, her place in the academy and her relationship 
to the church.  Church-talk, which used to be a matter for slim volumes on history, 
sacraments, ecumenism and models of church, has broken its traditional disciplinary 
boundaries and become widespread, as theologians of all stripes appeal to the 
Christian community as the ground for their claims and the source and end of their 
reflection.  In late twentieth century theology, the church is certainly a matter of 
personal concern to theologians.   
 
I have also shown that this widespread turn to the church has caused the question, 
‘What’s ecclesiology about?’ to become fundamental.  I have demonstrated that 
ecclesiology over the last thirty years has been engaged in an effort to redefine the 
object of ecclesiological inquiry and reshape the purpose of ecclesiological reflection.  
The result has been the rise of the methodological common sense I called concrete 
ecclesiologies, defined by their twofold conviction that the ordinary, sinful church of 
experience is worthy of theological attention, and that social science can help 
ecclesiologists attend to it.  
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In this thesis, I have explored concrete ecclesiologies’ response to the question ‘What 
is ecclesiology about?’ in three ways: descriptive, critical and constructive.  Looking 
back over these three strands of the thesis will help to draw out the significance of my 
argument for concrete ecclesiologies’ development over the coming years.   
 
 b) Descriptive 
 
I have described concrete ecclesiologies as a distinct theological genre for the first 
time.  Twentieth century theology has turned to the concrete church to make claims 
about themes ranging from ethics to scriptural authority and the nature of Christian 
truth claims.  I have argued that, while concrete ecclesiologies owe much to this wider 
turn, they should be regarded as a distinct genre because their object of inquiry and 
focus of interest is the concrete church itself.  I have surveyed concrete ecclesiologies’ 
characteristics and concerns and argued that these form a methodological common 
sense – a shared understanding of what ecclesiology should attend to, and how it 
should be undertaken.  I have traced concrete ecclesiologies’ roots in postliberal 
theology and post Vatican II Catholic theology, and have also shown how they arise in 
response to typically postmodern concerns about authority and power and the 
theologian’s relationship with the church and the academy.   
 
How might this descriptive work help concrete ecclesiologies develop?  We have seen 
the diverse theological influences that converge to form concrete ecclesiologies.  We 
have also seen that concrete ecclesiologies’ engagement with social science arises not 
just from convictions about the nature of the church and the way it should be studied, 
but also from worries about the theologian’s authority, the place of theology in the 
secular university and the place of the church in society at large.  I have shown that 
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concrete ecclesiologies lack awareness of these theological and cultural influences.  
Their reluctance to spend a great deal of time ‘getting their thinking right’ about the 
church certainly helps them to avoid the theological stagnation that can accompany 
endless methodologising.566  Nevertheless, there is a balance to be struck between 
over-cautious methodologising and lack of reflexivity, and the argument of this thesis 
has suggested that concrete ecclesiologies have not yet got the balance right.  I want to 
suggest that concrete ecclesiologies need to become more aware of the range of 
theological and cultural concerns that produce their ecclesiological common sense and 
then operate unacknowledged beneath its surface.   
 
Increased reflexivity about their theological and cultural provenance will be important 
for concrete ecclesiologies’ development over the coming years for two reasons.  
Awareness of their theological heritage will help concrete ecclesiologies to negotiate 
the theological tensions underlying their project, and develop positive ways of moving 
beyond them – and I will say more about this below.  Awareness of their cultural 
context will help concrete ecclesiologies to respond explicitly and positively to the 
challenges of doing theology in postmodernity.  Becoming aware of the roots of their 
common sense need not entail concrete ecclesiologies becoming a self-consciously 
unified ‘movement’ in theology: I think their loosely shared common sense is a 
strength, rather than a weakness.567  In order to develop and flourish theologically, 
however, concrete ecclesiologies need to spend a bit more time ‘getting their thinking 
right’, and greater awareness of their theological and cultural provenance will help 
them do so. 
                                                
566 Healy, Church, World and the Christian Life 36.  
567 I am thinking of Hans Frei’s caution, which I noted at the end of chapter one: ‘Very often, especially 
in theology, scholars start off from shared convictions, a “common sense” in the best sense of that 
term, shared views and a shared sensibility, and then relentlessly pursue some element in that amalgam, 
untying one knot after another, until at some point a common vocabulary and a shared sensibility turn 
into a technical, often esoteric special-school outlook.’ Frei, ‘Epilogue’ 276.  
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c) Critical   
 
In my critical analysis, I have argued that concrete ecclesiologies’ tendency to define 
themselves in opposition to modern ecclesiologies undermines their theological 
maturity.  By expressing their methodological common sense in dichotomies like 
ideal/real, abstract/concrete and doctrinal/empirical, concrete ecclesiologies often 
end up working with impoverished understandings of ethnography and theology.  I 
have shown how this oppositional way of thinking feeds into an understanding of the 
ecclesiological task as one of balancing the claims of two languages, theological and 
social scientific, about a single object, the church.  Even as concrete ecclesiologies 
make promising attempts to break down the traditional impasse between theological 
and social scientific perspectives on the church, their view of theology and 
ethnography as functionally opposite and mutually regulating influences undermines 
their efforts, with the result that caricatured understandings of both disciplines go 
unchallenged.  Concrete ecclesiologies’ implicit response to postmodern worries about 
the connections between doctrine and hegemony compounds the problem, causing 
the doctrinal register of concrete ecclesiologies to be repressed. 
 
While concrete ecclesiologies continue to define themselves in opposition to modern 
ecclesiologies and understand theology and ethnography as functional opposites, they 
will remain theologically underdeveloped.  Their theological development will hang 
on two things.  First, the concrete ecclesiological project needs to be developed and 
articulated in positive terms – focussing on what it is doing, rather than what it is not.  
The publications emerging from the Ecclesiology and Ethnography Research Network 
over the next few years will doubtless begin to articulate the concrete ecclesiological 
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project in more constructive and positive terms.  Second – and perhaps more difficult 
- concrete ecclesiologies need to find ways of expressing how theology and 
ethnography relate that do not trade on a tacit understanding of the two disciplines as 
functional opposites.  I have suggested that one possible way forward might be to 
draw out the similarities between the ways in which theology and ethnography relate 
to their objects of study.  Exploring the ways in which both disciplines find their 
language and knowledge characterised and constrained by the living realities they seek 
to address might help us to see them not as functional opposites, but as potential 




As well as surveying and critiquing how concrete ecclesiologies answer the question, 
‘What is ecclesiology about?’, I have also developed constructive suggestions for 
thinking about the nature of ecclesiology’s object of inquiry and the purpose of 
ecclesiological reflection. My constructive proposals for how we think about the object 
of ecclesiological inquiry and the purpose of ecclesiological reflection have picked up 
on the emphasis I noted in the introduction – the need to watch our language about 
the church, and remain aware that it is language in the presence of God.  Accordingly, 
I have emphasised the ways in which our knowledge of the church is enabled and 
constrained by our position in via. 
   
                                                
568 I have tentatively explored this possibility in Hawksley, ‘“After my husband died…”: Ecclesiological 
Ethnography and the Hiddenness of God’, (Paper presented at the Being Surprised by God: Embodied 
Ecclesiology in Local Contexts Conference, Utrecht, 2010). 
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Taking my cue from pragmatic/relational anthropology, I have argued that our 
account of what the church is should be determined by how the church is known.  I 
have drawn on Wittgenstein’s work to argue that we should focus our theological 
attention on the ordinary ways in which we use the word ‘church’ and recognise 
churches.  This led to a constructive proposal that we think of church as an analogical, 
or family resemblance concept: one that we explain by giving examples, rather than 
by defining essential characteristics.  It also led to theological reflection on the practice 
of recognition itself, which I suggested gave us a helpful way of talking about how we 
discern and identify church.  Finally, I have argued we should think of the purpose of 
ecclesiological reflection, not in terms of defining the church’s essential 
characteristics, but in terms of searching for the church: exploring examples, drawing 
likenesses, showing tensions, and constantly striving to understand anew what it 
means to faithfully follow Christ.   
 
What significance does this constructive work have for concrete ecclesiologies’ 
ongoing development?  The intention of my constructive work has not been to 
homogenise concrete ecclesiologies, and make sure they are all using social science in 
the same way, for the same theological reasons.  Nevertheless, it is the theological 
implications of my critique of concrete ecclesiologies that I have chosen to pursue, 
rather than trying to work out a good field method or suggest methodological ways 
forward.  This is partly an issue of time and space – any methodological proposals 
would have to be tested thoroughly in a fieldwork situation, and there has been no 
space for such an extended study here.  It is also a more positive choice, however: I 
think the major work to be done in concrete ecclesiologies over the coming years will 
be theological, rather than methodological. 
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I want to suggest that concrete ecclesiologies’ methodological moves indicate an 
incipient struggle into a new ecclesiological paradigm.  ‘New paradigm’ is possibly 
too grand a way of putting it – I think what we are seeing is a struggle towards 
articulating a post-postliberal theological vision.  I suggested in the introduction that 
ecclesiology needed new courage and new humility, and it is these characteristics that 
best describe the theological vision struggling to emerge here.  The cultural context is 
the decline of the churches, and the incipient theological sense seems to be that 
humility requires the church to step back from blustering claims to social 
distinctiveness, but courage requires it to maintain its witness to the concrete 
possibility of a different life.  The theological context is the shadow of twentieth 
century theology, and the incipient theological sense seems to want Barth’s singular 
attention to the Word, but with ‘hands’, postliberalism’s attention to practices, but 
without sectarianism, and Catholic theology’s attention to experience, without making 
it the norma normans non normata.  To what extent this incipient theological sense is 
‘out there’, and to what extent it is my own sense of what needs to happen, is hard to 
tell.  What I think we can be sure of is that concrete ecclesiologies’ struggle with both 
the theological heritage of the twentieth century and the cultural challenges of the 
twenty-first century is largely taking methodological, rather than explicitly theological 
shape.  I have argued that the doctrinal issues at stake here need to be discussed as 
such, and not treated solely as methodological issues.  This is not to say that we must 
get our thinking about the church right first, after which we can proceed to discuss 
practical methodological matters; nor is it to say that methodological moves are not 
also theological ones.  It is to say that if concrete ecclesiologies are to mature over the 
next few years, they will need to develop theological conversations as lively and 
engaged as their methodological ones.  My constructive work in this thesis has been 
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